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Abstract
It has long been recognized that Performance Management and Control Systems (PMCSs) 
impact positively on organizational efficiency and effectiveness by affecting the behaviour of 
organizational participants. However, PMCSs also create tensions between achieving short­
term and long-term objectives which often times lead to unintended negative consequences. 
These effects of PMCSs are much more attributed to their design than the way they are used. 
This coupled with the undesirable PMCSs’ effects has led to several innovations that propose 
complementing, and some proposing total replacement of, the traditional PMCS with a wider 
range of non-fmancial or operational measures.
This study investigates the way a PMCS, encompassing both financial and non-fmancial 
measures, is used and the effect on work behaviour and performance. It examines the possible 
influence of hierarchical levels on the nature of measures employed in the PMCS, the way it is 
used, as well as the effects of the PMCS. It also investigates other factors that affect the 
consequences of PMCS use, and the mechanisms by which these effects are transmitted. 
Furthermore, it seeks to shed light on the complexity of the way PMCSs impact on work
behaviour and performance by examining the interplay of the factors that affect PMCSs’ 
effects and the mechanisms by which these effects are transmitted.
The results of the study show that PMCSs do have some positive effects on performance, but 
also have albeit unintended positive effects on dysfunctional behaviour. It also shows that 
hierarchical levels influence the nature of measures employed in PMCSs, the manner in which 
they are used, as well as PMCSs’ effect on work effort. More financial measures tend to be 
employed at higher hierarchical levels, while PMCSs tend to be used in more target-focused 
manner at lower levels of the organisation. However, the effects of PMCSs do not vary at 
different levels of the organisation except for the effect on work effort. Nonetheless, it was 
also found that the way that a PMCS is used impacts work behaviour and performance much 
more it seems than its design in terms of the type or nature of PMCS measures. Furthermore, 
the level of goal difficulty, interactive use of control systems, and supervisory trust were 
found to affect the impact of PMCSs use on behaviour and performance. In addition, the 
findings reveal goal commitment to be an important mechanism that mediates the effects of 
PMCSs use. Also, the perception of equity and fairness was found to be another mediator of 
PMCS effects. Finally, the study reveals that the interplay of interactive use of control 
systems and perceptions of equity and fairness significantly influence PMCSs’ effects on 
dysfunctional behaviour; while the interplay between goal difficulty and goal commitment 
significantly influence PMCSs’ effects on performance.
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Chapter 1 Introduction 1
Chapter 1 Introduction
This study is motivated by an interest in understanding how managers’ use of management 
control systems information -  financial, quantitative non-financial, and other qualitative 
information - aimed at achieving the organisation’s strategic plans influence behaviour and 
performance. It also aims to understand the mechanisms by which style of information use 
affects behaviour and performance, and how these may be affected by organisational 
hierarchical level (OHL) and by other factors identified from the literature.
The literature on the design and use of management control systems (MCSs) for performance 
evaluation and reward is extensive and still growing. Indjejikian (1999, p. 148) notes “while 
different paradigms and methods have been used to study how managers are evaluated and 
rewarded, the overriding verdict of the academic literature is that performance evaluation and 
compensation design are important issues worthy of study.” Similarly, Covaleski et al. (2003, 
p. 7) observe that:
The research questions formulated by the budgeting literature in the last several 
decades are likely to remain important questions for future research. How do 
budgeting practices affect employee motivation and performance, as well as 
organisational performance? What role should budgets play in evaluating and 
rewarding employees’ performance? What are the costs and benefits of different 
levels of budget-target difficulty and different methods of setting the targets? How 
does budgeting help or hinder in planning and coordinating activities in complex 
organization, and what is its role in generating or resolving organizational conflict?
How does the answers to these questions change with changes in non-budgeting 
variables such as environmental uncertainty, technology, and organizational strategy 
and structure?
MCSs provide information for managerial planning and decision-making, and control of 
organisational activities, presumably towards the achievement of organisational objectives.
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However, it is not just the design of MCSs that effect control of organisational activities but 
the manner in which they are used, especially in performance evaluation and reward. The 
manner in which MCSs are used makes them effective or ineffective organisational control 
tools. The style of use of MCSs for performance evaluation, termed here as performance 
evaluative style (PES), has been studied generally from a contingency theory perspective with 
two main streams of interest providing background to this study -  i.e. the budgetary control or 
reliance on accounting performance measures (RAPM) stream, and the strategy-MCS fit 
stream.
What has become known as the RAPM literature (e.g. Hopwood, 1972; Otley, 1978; Brownell 
and Hirst, 1986; Hirst, 1981, 1983; Brownell, 1982a, 1982b, 1983; Govindarajan, 1984; 
Brownell and Merchant, 1990) in general focuses on PES characterised by reliance on budgets 
and accounting information in performance evaluation, and examines its impact on 
performance and behaviour in various contexts like different task environments and 
technologies. Some of the studies also attempt to investigate the mechanisms that impact on 
the relationship between RAPM and performance within these contexts e.g. participation in 
target setting, leadership style etc.1 On the other hand, the strategy-MCS literature (e.g. Snow 
and Hrebiniak, 1980; Govindarajan and Gupta, 1985; Simons, 1987, 1990; Covin, 1991) 
expand the RAPM literature by investigating organisational strategy as a new contingent 
variable; and thus considers the impact of RAPM on performance within different strategies. 
Though empirical evidence is inconclusive, the overall suggestion from these studies seem to 
be the inappropriateness of accounting information (deemed incomplete) for performance 
evaluation and reward in complex and uncertain conditions (Chenhall, 2003). In particular, 
reliance on accounting/budgetary performance measures is deemed to lead to dysfunctional 
behaviours and poor performance -  though the empirical evidence for such effects is 
inconclusive.
1 Hopwood (1972) and Otley (1978) do not strictly belong to the RAPM category because of conceptual 
differences between their studies and the others in the RAPM stream.
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Because of conflicting findings and methodological problems, this body of studies has been 
criticised by some as not yet providing a cumulative body of knowledge nor an overall 
framework for analysis of relations of contingent factors with MCSs (Chapman, 1997; Dent, 
1990; Hartmann, 2000; Langfield-Smith, 1997; Otley, 1999).2 The major reason advanced for 
the conflicting findings, aside methodological issues, is the assumption, with little or no 
validation, that budgets and accounting data play a central role in the performance evaluation 
and reward process of the studied organisations (Otley and Fakiolas, 2000). Also, most of 
these studies provided rather narrow specification of PES, as based or not based on budgets, 
mostly accounting data, despite possibilities of broader PES specifications indicated by the 
earlier pioneering studies (Briers and Hirst, 1990; Hartmann, 2000).
Furthermore, these studies provide limited evidence and guidance on how MCSs are used 
concurrently at different hierarchical levels within an organisation as analyses are typically 
conducted at the same hierarchical level within or across organisations. The contingent 
variables studied may apply differently at different hierarchical levels within the same 
organisation. Moreover, current applicability of the findings of these studies are called into 
question by recent changes in the business environment; for e.g. globalisation and rapid 
advances in information technology, and changing control practices such as higher 
prominence accorded non-fmancial performance measures in these changing competitive 
business environments (Otley, 1994; Bums et al., 1999; Baines and Langfield-Smith, 2003). It 
is needful therefore to re-examine PES and its effects on behaviour and performance in the 
current business environment. In addition, these studies provide limited insights on the 
process(es) by which PES affects behaviour and performance.
2 This conclusion is still made despite the claim by Brownell and Dunk (1991) that the RAPM stream o f studies 
represents the only cumulative body of knowledge within behavioural management accounting research.
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Consequently, the present study seeks to deal with the highlighted shortcomings in the 
literature by addressing the following research questions within the context of a specific 
organisation:
1. What are the nature/ type o f performance measures predominantly used at different 
levels in the organisation?
2. How are these used in evaluating and rewarding performance, i.e. what is the style of 
use or performance evaluative style (PES)?
3. What are the behavioural and performance consequences of the PES?
4. Does organisational hierarchical level (OHL) affect PES or its consequences? If so, 
how?
5. What other factors/conditions .affect PES impact on behaviour and performance; what 
are the mechanisms by which PES effects .are transmitted; .and do these factors and 
mechanisms interplay to influence PES? If so, how?
The study was conducted in a professional accounting services firm. The majority of previous 
studies were conducted in manufacturing firms, thus this study expands the literature in 
examining these questions in a service organisation. Moreover, accounting firms have 
experienced significant changes in recent years in both their internal and external 
environments which, from a contingency theory perspective, have implications for their 
organisational structure and other organisational control mechanisms. For example, recent 
corporate failures associated with accounting scandals and the direct involvement of 
professional accounting firms has brought increased public scrutiny, more regulatory 
oversight, increased risk of litigation, and a negative public image of the accounting 
profession. Furthermore, the stream of MCS literature focusing specifically on accounting 
firms (e.g. Pierce and Sweeney, 2004; 2005) provides evidence of changes in the internal 
environment of accounting firms that have implications for their control systems. For 
example, the move towards paperless audits and reduced audit file documentations; the
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increased use of strategic or risk-based audit methodology; and the change in the audit review 
process away from detailed review of audit papers to interview based audit reviews. These 
changes have been noted as impacting on audit firms control systems towards a more 
interactive than diagnostic use of control system features (Pierce and Sweeney, 2005).
Given this context, it becomes even more interesting relating the findings of the study to 
previous studies. For example, previous studies did not find a target focused performance 
evaluative style (TF PES) to have a significant effect on dysfunctional behaviour whilst 
budget attainability did. Given the change in organisational structure, i.e. more devolution of 
authority to staff at lower levels and a flatter reporting and performance evaluation structures, 
does TF PES now impact significantly on dysfunctional behaviour than previously observed? 
And given changes in organisational work processes, i.e. shift towards strategic-based audit 
methodology and audit review by interview, does budget attainability now impact more 
significantly on dysfunctional behaviour? Equally, does the shift in the control systems 
towards more interactive use of controls as a more prominent feature of accounting firms’ 
controls, not considered by previous studies, affect these relationships?
Providing answers to the research questions enumerated above will enhance our 
understanding of the way MCSs are used in performance evaluation, its consequences, and by 
what mechanisms these consequences are transmitted. The study therefore aims to provide a 
broader, more rigorous specification of PES. It also seeks to provide further insight into how 
PES emerges and how it works at different levels of the organisation. In addition, the study 
aims to provide further evidence on PES’ impact on behaviour and performance and insight 
into the mechanisms by which these effects are manifested. In so doing, this study will be 
contributing to the theoretical development of the subject and help to inform design of future 
empirical studies. Furthermore, findings of the study will be of practical importance to 
designers and users of MCSs in helping to inform better designs and use of MCSs particularly 
for performance evaluation and reward.
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In summary, the results of the study indicate that MCSs do encourage dysfunctional behaviour 
such as quality threatening behaviour (QTB), though unintended, while also promoting better 
managerial performance. Organisational hierarchical levels (OHLs) were found to influence 
the style of MCS use and also impacts on MCS’ effect on work effort. It was found that more 
quantitative financial measures are used at higher OHLs and more quantitative non-fmancial 
measures at lower OHLs, and that MCSs are used in a more target-focused manner at lower 
than at higher OHLs. Nonetheless, the study found that MCS used in a target focused style has 
similar effects on dysfunctional behaviour and intention to turnover (IT), whether based 
mainly on financial or non-financial measures. In addition, the level of goal difficulty (GD), 
interactive use of control systems (ICS), and supervisory trust (ST) were found to be 
important moderators of the impact of MCSs use on dysfunctional behaviour and IT, while 
GD was also found to be an important moderator of MCSs’ impact on managerial 
performance. Generally, high levels of ICS and ST diminish the positive impact of MCSs use 
on dysfunctional behaviour; while low' levels of these tend to exacerbate the effects. In 
addition, the impact of MCSs use on dysfunctional behaviour is worsened at high levels of 
GD, while the positive effect on performance is boosted at low levels of GD.
On the other hand, equity and fairness perception (EFP) and goal commitment (GC) were 
found to be important mediators o f the consequences of MCS use. Lower EFP magnifies 
MCSs’ effects on dysfunctional behaviour as MCSs do not seem to promote EFP, while 
higher levels o f GC suppress these effects because, in contrast, MCSs enhance GC. Finally, 
the interplay of ICS and EFP was found to influence the effects of MCSs use on dysfunctional 
behaviour. MCSs’ effect on dysfunctional behaviour is worsened at low ICS because MCSs 
reduce EFP significantly when there is low ICS which then leads to exhibition of even greater 
dysfunctional behaviour. Similarly, GD and GC interplay was found to influence the impact 
o f MCS use on performance. Though MCSs’ positive effect on performance decreases as GD 
increases, performance does not appear to be negatively affected by MCS use when the level
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of GD is high because GC suppresses the negative impact on performance. This is so because 
MCSs boost GC regardless of the level of GD, and GC is turn boosts performance.
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. Discussion of the concepts examined in this 
study and their relationships is provided both in the critical review of related literature in 
Chapter 2, and in the theory and hypothesis development in Chapter 3. The research design 
and methodology is presented in Chapter 4, while detailed evaluation of performance 
evaluative style, is provided in Chapter 5. Results of the data analysis and tests of the 
hypotheses are presented in Chapter 6. Finally, the summary and discussions of the results and 
the conclusions derived is presented in Chapter 7. Chapter 7 also highlights the limitations of 
the study and provides suggestions for future research.
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Chapter 2 Literature Review
This chapter reviews the literature on management control systems (MCSs) as information 
systems used in performance evaluation and reward, covering also the consequences of style 
of use of MCSs and the mechanisms by which these consequences occur. The chapter starts 
by looking at the different definitions of MCSs and how these have influenced the empirical 
study of the subject. Then the foremost theoretical framework of the empirical studies in this 
area of MCSs study is briefly reviewed. Finally, the existing gaps in the literature are 
identified and discussed focusing on how this study seeks to fill these gaps.
2.1 M anagem ent Control Systems: Definitions, Design & Use
MCSs, and more broadly organisational control, have been defined and described by various 
authors; e.g. Anthony (1965), Hopwood (1974), Ouchi (1977; 1979), Simons (1995, 2000), 
Anthony and Govindarajan (1998; 2004) - see Table 2-1 below for the summary of these 
definitions. Earlier definitions and empirical operationalisations of MCSs equate them with 
the more formal forms of organisational control (Anthony, 1965; Todd, 1977; Daft and 
Macintosh, 1984; Simons, 1987; Anthony et al., 1992). However, MCS has also been depicted 
as a subset of organisational control systems/package (Otley, 1980; Emmanuel et al., 1990). 
The common theme of the definitions and descriptions of a MCS highlighted in Table 2-1 is 
that a MCS represent those mechanisms (processes, practices and techniques, rules, 
information systems, and patterns of relationships) management uses to influence (i.e. 
motivate, coordinate, monitor and reward) organisational members’ behaviour towards 
attainment of some organisational objective (strategies or operational goals). Inherent in these 
definitions is a strong feature of MCSs, i.e. a means of assessing achievement of 
organisational objectives and thus of evaluating and rewarding performance. Also inherent in
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the definitions is the direct consequence of MCSs, i.e. the impact on behaviour and 
performance of organisational members.
Table 2-1 Summary o f  MCS Definitions & Descriptions
Author(s) Summary o f MCS Definitions
Anthony (1965) Management control is ...the process by which managers assure that resources 
are obtained and used effectively and efficiently in the accomplishment of the 
organisation’s objectives
Hopwood A. (1974) Rules and patterns of organisational relationships [i.e. administrative controls 
e.g. budgets, standards and hierarchical patterns of relationships]
Ouchi W.G. (1977) Organisation control is an evaluation process, which is based on the 
monitoring and evaluation of behaviour or of outputs
Ouchi W.G. (1979) Organisational control is the mechanism through which organisations are 
managed (cope with the evaluation and control problem) to achieve its
objectives
Daft & Macintosh (1984, p44) Organisational control includes the activities used to achieve desired 
organisational goals and outcomes
Goold & Quinn (1990) Control system is the process, which allows senior managers to determine 
whether a business unit is performing satisfactorily, and which provides 
motivation for business unit managers to continue to do so. It involves 
agreement of objectives, monitoring of performance against objectives and 
feedback on results achieved, together with incentives and sanctions for 
business management.
Maciarello, L. A.& Kirby C. J A MCS is a set o f interrelated communication structures that facilitates the
(1994) processing of information for the purpose of assisting managers in 
coordinating the parts and attaining the purposes of an organisation on a 
continuous basis
Simons (1995; 2000) MCS are the formal, information-based routines and procedures managers use 
to maintain or alter patterns in organisational activities
Flamholtz (1996) Organisational control system... a set of mechanisms -  both processes and 
techniques -  which are designed to ensure that people will behave in ways that 
lead to the attainment of organizational objectives.
Merchant (1997) MCS are the collection of control mechanisms managers use to help ensure 
that their organisation’s strategies and plans are carried out, or, if conditions 
warrant, that they are modified
Anthony R., & Govindarajan V. Management control is the process by which managers influence other
(1992; 1998, 2004) members o f the organisation to implement the organisation’s strategies
Berry, Broadbent, & Otley (1995, Management control is the process of guiding organizations into viable
2005) patterns of activity in a changing environment. Thus managers are concerned 
to influence the behaviour of other organizational participants so that 
organizational goals can be achieved.
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Empirical studies of MCSs have been conducted primarily with reference to the technical 
design or how specific management accounting techniques (MATs) are used particularly for 
performance monitoring, evaluation and reward. Thus the organisation’s objectives are taken 
as granted or defined generally in terms of better performance or achievement of performance 
targets, usually budgetary targets. MCS design and use are somewhat different though related 
concepts and most MCSs studies tend to focus on one or the other.
MCS design relates to the form of the formal control mechanisms that an organisation 
establishes within its structure and information systems with the most ubiquitous being the 
budgetary control system. Most empirical studies focusing on MCS design define it in terms 
of the predominant management accounting technique (MAT) that exists in an organisation, 
or in terms of the characteristics of the information produced by these techniques, or 
preferences for such information characteristics. Examples of MATs used to represent MCS 
design include traditional budgets and budget variance analysis techniques; activity based 
costing/budgeting; project management techniques; balanced scorecards; target costing 
techniques; economic value added; and strategic planning techniques. Examples of 
information characteristics also used to represent MCS design include internal and external 
focus, broad and narrow scope, financial and non-fmancial, timeliness, aggregation and 
integration (Larcker, 1981; Chenhall and Morris, 1986; Gul and Chia, 1994, Abemethy and 
Lillis, 1995).
On the other hand, MCS use relates to how the formal control mechanisms are actually used 
for its purported purposes distinct from its design or technical specifications. Empirical 
studies focusing on MCS use define it in relation to the two main purposes of MCSs generally 
acknowledged in the literature; i.e. decision making - involving planning and resource 
allocation (Merchant, 1985c; Abemethy and Brownell, 1999); and control — involving 
performance monitoring, evaluation and reward (Hopwood, 1972; Brownell, 1982a, 1982b; 
Govindarajan, 1984, 1988a; Merchant, 1990; Lau et al., 1997; Van de Stede, 2000). Earlier
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descriptions and conceptualisations of MCS use relate it to supervisory style or how MCS, in 
particular budgets, were used by supervisors in managing subordinates performance, i.e. on 
the control role (Argyris, 1952; Hofstede, 1968; Lowe and Shaw, 1968; Hopwood, 1972, 
Otley, 1978). Consequently, majority of MCSs studies focus on the control role with MCS 
use defined in terms of the manner and extent information from a MAT, particularly budgets, 
are used in monitoring and evaluating performance, and in allocating rewards.
This study also focuses on the style of use of MCS information for performance evaluation 
and reward termed here as Performance Evaluative Style (PES). In this study, however, MCS 
information is not limited to any particular MAT but more broadly to the control systems 
package, particularly the formal systems used for performance measurement and reward. This 
broader package of control systems for performance measurement and reward is termed here 
as the performance management and control system (PMCS). The focus on MCS use is due 
in part to the generally acknowledged assertion that the technical specification or design of a 
MCS do not by itself effect control of organisational activities, rather it is the way in which 
the MCS is used that much more determine its effectiveness in controlling organisational 
activities. Second, MCS designs in practice seem to change much slower than style of MCS 
use in response to changes in the business environment. For instance, Bums et al (1999) set 
out to investigate the reasons behind the slow change in accounting practices and systems in 
the UK in spite of the profound changes in the business environment. However, they 
surprisingly found considerable change in the way MAT is used rather than changes in MAT 
employed per se. They attributed their surprising finding to several factors such as 
globalisation, increasing competition, rapid changes in information technology, increasing 
focus on core competencies, and changes in management structures which emphasize 
decentralisation and team working. Otley (1994) had also hinted on the changing control 
practices within organisations in response to the changing business environment, but lamented 
that academic study lagged behind the developments in practice. This study therefore 
attempts to fill this gap and also to stimulate future studies.
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2.2 Theoretical Fram ework o f Em pirical M CS Studies
The foremost theoretical canopy of most MCS empirical studies has been contingency theory, 
with some studies also employing other socio-psychological theories like goal and role theory 
in developing their hypothesis or explaining their results.3 Chapman (1997) identified three 
streams of the contingency studies in management accounting viz.; the 4reliance on 
accounting performance measures' (RAPM) stream; e.g. Hopwood (1972), Otley (1978), 
Brownell (1982a,1983), Brownell and Hirst (1986), Hirst (1981, 1983), Brownell and 
Merchant (1990); the ‘strategy and accounting control’ (STAC) stream e.g. Snow and 
Hrebiniak (1980), Govindarajan and Gupta (1985), Govindarajan, 1988b; Simons (1987; 
1990), Covin (1991); and the ‘centralisation o f control and accounting’ (CECA) stream e.g. 
Bruns and Waterhouse (1975), Merchant (1981), Gordon and Miller (1976), Waterhouse and 
Tiessen (1978).
The common theme of the contingency studies is to explicate the conditions under which 
particular MATs (e.g. budgets) and the style of use of information from such MATs more 
positively impacts on an organisation’s performance considering its structure (the CECA 
stream); the strategic focus (the STAC stream); and impact on work motivation and attitudes 
o f its managers given its internal and external work environment (the RAPM stream). 
However, this body of studies has been criticised as not yet providing an overall framework 
for analysing relations of contingent factors with MCSs nor a cumulative body of knowledge 
because of the conflicting findings and methodological problems (Chapman, 1997; Dent, 
1990; Langfield-Smith, 1997; Otley, 1999). Nonetheless, the main premise of these studies, in 
particular the RAPM stream, seem to be the inappropriateness of using mainly accounting 
information (i.e. information from MATs like budgets) deemed incomplete for performance 
evaluation and reward in complex and uncertain conditions. On this point, the RAPM and the
3Another prevalent theoretic framework is institutional theory focusing mostly on how MCS is implicated in the 
legitimisation and advancement of the interests and power of different groups in an organisation (see Covaleski et 
al. 1993; 1996; 2003; Abernethy & Chua, 1996; Brignall & Modell, 2000; Scott, 1987, Abernethy & Vagnoni,
2004)
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STAC streams are of particular interest to this study because the central focus of most of the 
studies in these two streams is on the control role of MCSs, particularly as it relates to 
performance evaluation and reward. In this context, MCS is often operationalised in terms of 
performance evaluative style (PES). Excellent reviews and critique of this body of studies are 
provided by Briers and Hirst (1990); Chapman (1997); Langfield-Smith (1997); Hartmann & 
Moers (1999); Otley and Fakiolas (2000); Otley & Pollanen (2000); Vagneur and Peiperl 
(2000); Hartmann (2000); and Chenhall (2003). Thus, in the following sections only a brief 
critical review of the literature is provided focusing rather on the central theme of PES. 
Nonetheless, a summary of some of these studies is provided at the end of the chapter in Table 
2-2 on page 31.
2.3 RAPM  & Perform ance Evaluative Styles (PESs)
The stream of studies identified by Chapman (1997) as the RAPM studies can be traced 
initially to the pioneering work of Hopwood (1972) and Otley’s (1978) replication of his 
study. In his study, Hopwood contrasted two main performance evaluative styles (PESs), 
based on how accounting information as contained in budgets were used in performance 
evaluation, which he called the Budget Constrained (BC) style and the Profit Conscious (PC) 
style.4 The BC style entailed seeing the budget as a firm management commitment with 
performance measured and evaluated solely on the basis of meeting the budget without 
consideration of other pertinent factors. It reflected reliance on meeting the short term budget 
targets as the main criteria in evaluating performance and the use of this criterion in a manner 
intolerant of deviations, i.e. a rigid use of budgets. In contrast, the PC style reflected a concern 
for cost effectiveness i.e. use of budgetary and non-budgetary criteria in performance 
evaluation, and all used in a problem solving manner. In other words, the PC style did not 
consider budgets as firm commitments but rather as communication and planning tools
4 See Table 2-2 for other PES specifications based on the use of budgets, mostly derivations of Hopwood’s original 
specification.
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wherein other relevant information affecting performance are considered when budgets are 
used for performance evaluation, i.e. a flexible use of budgets. Hopwood also identified a 
third PES where budgets were not important in performance measurement and evaluation 
which he called the Non-Accounting (NA). However he did not analyse the NA style in detail. 
It was much more a residual of all other styles outside of the two main styles. For the 
empirical analysis of his study, Hopwood also constructed a fourth style as an intermediate 
point between the BC and PC styles, which he called the Budget Profit (BP) style. Hopwood’s 
main argument was that the BC style of performance evaluation led to some dysfunctional 
behaviour and thus was undesirable, whilst in contrast the PC style was less associated with 
dysfunctional behaviour and thus should be used more by managers.
Otley (1978) replicated Hopwood’s study by selecting a radically different context which he 
believed might be more conducive to heavy reliance on accounting performance measures, 
and did not find the same results as Hopwood. In particular, he did not find the link between 
the BC style and dysfunctional behaviour hypothesised by Hopwood. Many of the RAPM 
studies that followed later aimed to reconcile Hopwood’s and Otley’s results in terms of other 
contingent variables that may have impact on the results. However, many of the results were 
inconsistent between these studies due to several reasons including inconsistency between 
theory and the methodology used in testing them. Even more importantly, many of these 
studies failed to capture Hopwood’s original PES specifications.5 In some studies, RAPM in 
effect is equivalent to Hopwood’s Budget Constrained (BC) and the Profit Conscious (PC) 
style combined, while taking the Non-accounting (NA) style as the opposite end of RAPM. 
Thus, other possible roles of accounting information as captured by the PC style and other 
intermediate styles are not explicitly recognised by these studies. They embedded a narrow 
assumption of the ‘rigid’ use of accounting information. In a constantly changing 
organisational context, the shortcomings of casting the traditional role of accounting
5 See Briers and Hirst (1990). Otley and Fakiolas (2000), Otley and Pollanen (2000), and Vagneur and Peiperl 
(2000) for reviews of the RAPM literature and the evaluation of the conceptual differences in PES between 
majority o f the RAPM studies and Hopwood’s PES specifications.
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information as activity directing, and thus of studies that hold accounting in this light, is aptly 
captured by Otley (1994, pp.298, 299) thus:
The context and operation of contemporary organisations requires flexibility,
adaptation and continuous learning to occur, but such characteristics are not 
encouraged by traditional control systems. However, there is considerable amount of 
anecdotal evidence to suggest that practices within organisations have begun to take 
account of this changing environment. ...Management control ...is thus bound up 
with both strategic decisions about positioning and operating decisions that ensure 
the effective implementation of such strategies. Unfortunately, academic study of
these control processes has lagged considerably behind developments in practice,
being rooted in an overly narrow and accounting-based framework.
Briers and Hirst (1990) in their review identified 3 dimensions on which variation in 
Hopwood’s (1972) PES constructs were based as “ ...the range of criteria used for 
performance evaluation purposes; the flexibility with which variances from standards are 
interpreted; and the manner in which short/long run concerns are handled.” These dimensions 
seem to provide an articulate basis for specifying PES. However, Hopwood’s eventual 
empirical specification of PES was based on the ‘extent and manner’ budgets were used in 
performance evaluation. The BC and PC styles made extensive use of budgets in performance 
evaluation, but differed in the ‘manner’ in which the information was used, rigidly in the 
former and flexibly in the latter. The NA style differed from these two in the extent of budget 
use, with little or no use of budgets in performance evaluations (Otley and Fakiolas, 2000). 
Nevertheless, Hopwood’s constructs do attempt to encapsulate accounting roles as both 
activity directing/evaluative, and informing/problem-solving. Later RAPM studies measured 
PESs only on the ‘extent’ dimension and thus conceptually combine the BC and PC styles as 
one style -  high budget emphasis (HBE) and, presumably, the NA style as low budget 
emphasis (LBE). By this, their concepts of PESs seem to only capture the activity 
directing/evaluative role of accounting information given that most of the studies are cross­
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sectional studies with little or no detailed understudy of any one organisation. Summarising 
the noted differences in the concepts of PESs between Hopwood and the RAPM stream in 
general, Otley and Fakiolas (2000, p.509) identify opportunity for further research noting that: 
Future studies of the impact of performance measurement and its use by superior 
managers need to be sensitive to discovering the frameworks used for measurement 
in the target organisations...rather than assuming that budgets and accounting data 
play a central role in this process. Nevertheless, the methods used in studies on 
RAPM and evaluative style appear to be generalisable into this arena with minor 
adaptation. The door is open for researchers to build upon this foundation and make a 
central contribution to the management literature.
In addition, it is equally important for future studies to be sensitive to the frameworks for 
rewarding performance in their target organisations in order to enhance construct validity in 
the specification and measurement of PES. Since the PES construct hinge on the perceived 
importance of the performance measure(s) used, it is therefore important to capture the basis 
of the perceived importance in any construct of PES. Most frameworks of MCSs design and 
use suggest that performance measures are closely linked to rewards (e.g. Todd, 1977; Otley, 
1999; Ittner and Larcker, 1998a). To enhance the understanding and measurement of PES, 
measurement instruments therefore need to link the evaluative criteria to the basis of both 
extrinsic (e.g. incentive pay and promotion prospects) and intrinsic rewards. Given 
Hopwood’s field research prior to developing his widely used measurement instrument, this 
link may have underlined the measurement instrument for his sample. Given also the 
hierarchical level at which he conducted his analysis, i.e. cost centre managers, it is quite 
possible that the incentive structure was simple, e.g. standard merit increases, although he 
does not report on it. The incentive structure for other hierarchical levels may be more 
complex and thus not reflected at all or inappropriately captured by Hopwood’s instrument. 
Hartmann (2000) also criticised previous studies that are supposed to be based on Hopwood’s 
instrument for not providing formal proof for the equality or validity of the instruments used.
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Thus, the uncritical use of Hopwood’s instruments in analysing other hierarchical levels 
without explicitly relating it to the incentive structure add to question - in the absence of any 
other evidence - the validity of the PES constructs.
Briers and Hirst (1990) also note that Hopwood’s specifications of PES need not occur in all 
situations, and thus both the conceptualisation and measurement of PES stand to be improved 
upon. More importantly, Hopwood’s and the RAPM studies’ specifications of PES does not 
differentiate between the ‘accounting’ and the ‘target’ nature of the information used in 
performance evaluation. Thus, these studies may be confounding the effects on behaviour of 
the target nature of budgetary information with its accounting nature (Hartmann, 2000). It is 
important therefore, to ascertain which of these aspects of information used in performance 
evaluation trigger more dysfunctional behaviour.
Given the minimal attention to theoretical development of PES in these streams of studies and 
changes in the control practices o f contemporary organisations, it is argued here that the scope 
o f investigating PES should broaden beyond just considering the use of budgetary information 
(generally construed as financial/accounting information) to include all target related 
information, both financial and non-financial, as well as qualitative information. There is 
need, therefore, for PES constructs that broadly capture the roles of targets, budgetary or 
otherwise, in performance evaluation or more appropriately, the ‘manner’ in which the 
information provided by the comparison of actual with targeted performance is interpreted and 
used in performance evaluation and reward. Thus, there is need for a measurement instrument 
that reflect these concepts, and one general enough to be easily used in different settings and 
levels of analysis with minor adjustments to reflect the peculiarity of the research setting. 
Therefore, an extension of the budgetary control literature would be to consider PES in terms 
of both the extent and manner that targets in general, financial or non-financial, linked to 
rewards are used in performance evaluation. Such PES constructs would link better with other 
MCSs frameworks found in the management control literature. This study will attempt to
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provide a broader specification of PES as argued above, and an appropriate PES measurement 
instrument.
2.4 Other Categorisation of PES
Other categorisations of PES or style of use of MCS exist aside Hopwood’s and the RAPM 
studies’ specifications. For instance, Anthony and Govindarajan (1998) conceive MCS as 
essentially budgetary/financial control and provide a similar categorisation of style of use of 
MCS as essentially tight or loose budgetary control, although they state that “a company’s 
position on this tight/loose continuum depends on the amount of emphasis senior management 
places on meeting or exceeding budgetary objectives in the short run” (p.438). At one end, a 
tight control system is one in which performance is evaluated primarily on a manager’s ability 
to met budget targets. Similar to Hopwood’s BC style, budget targets are seen as firm 
commitments. At the other end in a loose control system, budget targets are not regarded as 
firm commitments but seen and used as planning and communication tools. They note that 
while tight budgetary control had two important benefits, preventing wastes/inefficiencies and 
motivating search for improvement of operations, it can produce several dysfunctional effects.
In a bid to address the dysfunctional consequences associated with the use of 
budgetary/financial controls the practitioner led Beyond Budgeting (BB) group added to the 
specification of PES. First, they advocate that budgets and thus budgetary control should be 
done away with, and that relative performance targets should be used in place of preset budget 
targets (Hope and Fraser, 2003a, 2003b; Hansen et al., 2003).6 Second, they advocate the use 
of various non-financial performance measures as well, and that performance evaluation 
should be done with hindsight by taking account of the actual operating and economic
6 Hope and Fraser (2003 a, p. ix) in their foreword note that Beyond Budgeting is not just about abandoning 
traditional budgets but “is a positive idea that uses the abandonment o f budgeting as a trigger for improving the 
entire management control process....(BB) offers an alternative general management model.”
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conditions during the period. In addition, they advocate reward systems that focus on teams 
rather than individuals and that are based on subjective performance evaluation (Hope and 
Fraser, 2003; Hansen et al., 2003). Thus from the foregoing other possible features of PES not 
incorporated in previous specifications is the use of operational measures and relative 
performance targets, i.e. benchmarking of performance against other units in the organisation 
or against leading competitors. Previous PES specifications were based on preset budgetary 
targets which are usually financial in nature. Another unique feature is group rather individual 
rewards which would imply that group rather than individual performance is the focus of 
performance evaluation in these situations. The BB proponents claim that such a performance 
management and control system (PMCS) cures much of the ills of traditional budget-based 
PMCSs. This raises an interesting issue on the effects of the type of benchmark used to 
evaluate performance as a feature of PES. However, not many empirical studies to date 
employ this PMCS model. The reason may not be unconnected to the fact that, as identified in 
the BB literature, only a handful of organisations actually employ such a PMCS, and thus 
access is limited to most researchers.
Simons (1990; 1991; 1995) presents additional insight on the ways top-level managers use 
accounting information in his levers of control model. His model recast the role of accounting 
information as both activity directing and, rather than or, planning and communication i.e. an 
informing role. He posits that accounting information is used in both a ‘diagnostic’ and 
‘interactive’ manner in what he calls diagnostic and interactive control systems. He defined 
diagnostic control systems as those formal information systems used by managers to monitor 
organisational outcomes and control deviations from preset performance standards (i.e. 
passive management by exception), while interactive control systems are those formal 
information systems used by managers to involve themselves regularly in the decision 
activities of subordinates (Simons, 1995; pp.59, 95). These systems were not unique types of 
control systems, but represent the ways in which senior managers choose to use specific 
controls such as budgets or profit plans. The main features of interactive controls being that
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they are used by the highest levels of management and require frequent and regular attention 
from operating managers at all levels. Also, information from the system is used to stimulate 
debate of underlying assumptions and action plans in face-to-face meetings of superiors, 
subordinates and peers and also used to monitor strategic uncertainties. Simons (1995) 
focused on top level managers but it is feasible that middle and lower level managers also use 
interactive controls. However, monitoring of strategic uncertainties as a feature of interactive 
controls would relate more to top level management than middle or lower level management 
use of interactive controls. Simons (1995) also indicated that for the control system to be 
truly interactive it must be linked to incentive rewards which are determined subjectively 
rather than by some formula. In contrast, management uses diagnostic controls as passive 
management by exception tools by setting targets, linking them to formula based incentive 
rewards, and monitoring performance against the target on an exception basis.
It would appear that interactive controls principally differ from diagnostic controls with 
regards to the frequency of top management involvement and attention to details, and the 
subjective basis of incentive rewards. However, Simons (1995, p. 120) state that budgets/profit 
plans could also be used both diagnostically and interactively citing Johnson & Johnson and 
Tuner Construction as examples of companies that have done so. This implies features of the 
MCS or particular MATs could be used in either a diagnostic or interactive style. Furthermore 
both style o f use of MCS features can exist concurrently, i.e. a feature(s) of a MCS can be 
used diagnostically and combined with an interactive use of other related features of the MCS. 
Simons (1995) also associates accounting measures with diagnostic controls, and the 
diagnostic controls with dysfunctional behaviour. He notes that accounting measures are 
predominant in many diagnostic control systems because they are objective, reliable and 
verifiable. He also notes that they are incomplete measures/inadequate indicators of actions -  
particularly individual actions - that affect organisations’ critical performance variables. 
Consequently, he argues that linking formula based incentive rewards to these incomplete 
accounting measures promote dysfunctional behaviour. His statements that diagnostic control
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systems are predominantly accounting based also implies that interactive control systems are 
based predominantly on non-accounting measures.
Although Simons’s framework refers to the overall control package and how top managers 
use it, Van der Stede (2001) in his investigation of the attributes of tight budgetary controls 
conclude that interactive budgetary control is consistent with tight budgetary control with 
respect to the intensity of information exchanges about budget related matters. However, 
Simons (1995, pp. 161-162) generally alludes to interactive controls as loose while hinting at 
the possibility of them being tight as well. His conception of interactive controls seems to be a 
different and much broader concept than just tight/loose use of controls. Thus interactive 
control systems could be perceived as a distinct feature of MCSs that could be present to a 
greater or lesser degree in conjunction with any PES. This view is supported by Simon’s 
conceptualisation of interactive controls as having to relate to an aspect of the MCS or a 
particular MAT. In addition, interactive use of controls relate to more frequent superior- 
subordinate interactions, beyond the interactions in setting of targets, as superiors monitor and 
intervene in ongoing decisions activities of subordinates. Moreover, it relates to top level 
rather than middle or lower level management although it can be conceived to apply to lower 
level management perhaps somewhat differently, e.g. without monitoring of strategic 
uncertainties as a feature. Thus it seems sufficiently different from Hopwood’s PES 
specification to be regarded as a distinct feature of control system use that could be combined 
or not combined with specific PES. This point may have significant consequences in respect 
of the effects of PES on dysfunctional behaviour and performance. A similar point is 
highlighted in Chenhall’s (2003, pi 31) criticism of contingency based MCSs research as 
...focused on specific elements of accounting controls, generic information 
dimensions of MCS, with limited number of studies examining broader elements of 
control, such as clan and informal controls, or integrative mechanisms. A difficulty in 
studying specific elements of MCS in isolation from other organizational controls is 
the potential for serious model under-specification. Thus, if specific accounting
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controls are systematically linked with other organisational controls, studies that 
exclude or do not control for these elements within the research method may report 
spurious findings
Furthermore, he reiterates that a crucial part of the control systems research agenda is to 
understand how controls are combined to suit the specific circumstances of the organisation.
2.5 Consequences of PES
Early budgetary control systems studies focused on a range of behavioural, and mental states 
(i.e. psychological and attitudinal) outcomes associated with the use of control systems, in 
particular performance evaluation systems (Argyris, 1952; Hopwood, 1972; Hofstede, 1968). 
The outcome measures were chosen based on different psychological theories and 
assumptions, the most prevalent being role theory with its central concepts of role conflict and 
role ambiguity (Hartmann, 2000; Briers and Hirst, 1990). Accordingly, the most prevalent 
role-theoretic variable used is job-related tension (JRT). Other related variables also 
considered include job anxiety, job satisfaction, job stress, job ambiguity; budget-related 
tension, and cost tension. Given the incompleteness of accounting measures as contained in 
budgets, the rigid use of budgets was argued to engender role conflict and ambiguity leading 
to high JRT. Individuals then attempt to relieve tension by engaging in dysfunctional 
behaviours such as data manipulation/invalid data reporting, gaming the system, gaming the 
budget/targets or budgetary slack, which results in lower performance. Conclusions from the 
empirical evidence seem to generally support the positive impact of PES, specified as rigid 
use of budgets or RAPM, on JRT (see Table 2-2 below for summary of PES studies). 
However, most of the studies provide little or no empirical evidence on the hypothesised 
effects of JRT on performance. In these studies, JRT is treated as a criterion rather than an 
intermediate variable.
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Later studies focused more on performance as the criterion variable rather than the 
psychological variables. They argued that performance is the appropriate criterion variable 
being the ultimate measure of effectiveness (Otley, 1978; Brownell, 1982a). Some authors 
question this arguing that the relationship between performance and PES are complex and 
unclear. It was considered that performance may also be an independent/contingent variable 
affecting PES (Otley, 1978; Langfield-Smith, 1997; Briers and Hirst, 1990; Hartmann, 2000), 
thus presenting a dilemma in the appropriate choice of criterion variable, particularly for 
single period studies. However, such dilemma is faced by almost all single period studies 
modelling causal relationships. This of course underlines the need and importance of 
developing strong theoretical justification of the causal relations being modelled. Nonetheless, 
these studies considered the impact of PES on performance as being moderated by other 
factors like participation in setting the budget and task uncertainty. Altogether, conclusions 
from these studies on the effect of PES on performance, both excluding and including the 
moderating factors, are mixed partly giving grounds for the heavy criticism of this body of 
studies (see Table 2-2 for summary of some of these studies and their results). Also, some of 
these studies considered moderating influences on the impact of PES on JRT with equally 
mixed results.
The apparent dilemma in choosing an appropriate criterion variable is fundamentally related 
to the need to more clearly specify the mechanisms by which PES affects behaviour and 
performance, and also the need to incorporate these in the empirical analysis. Many of the 
earlier empirical studies did not incorporate these mechanisms in their analysis even when 
such had been identified in their theory. Though a number of recent control systems studies 
(e.g. Chong & Chong, 2002; Wentzel, 2002) have begun to address this issue, they have 
however focused on target setting processes in budgeting and none so far, to the author’s 
knowledge, have considered the style of use of control systems information in performance 
evaluation and reward. Furthermore, it is generally acknowledged that PMCSs have both 
functional and dysfunctional consequences. Hartmann (2000, p474) recommends that “ ...the
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appropriateness of RAPM should be approached as a combination of functional and 
dysfunctional consequences.” This point is further reiterated by Covaleski et al. (2003, p 5) 
who note that “ ...although budgeting has potential benefits -  it can increase efficiency 
through planning and coordination and can support both control and learning through the 
comparison of actual results to plan -  budgeting also has large costs beyond the easily 
measured, out-of-pocket costs of operating the budgeting system.” However, very few studies 
consider both consequences of control system use in the same study, and none have, to the 
authors knowledge, considered them concurrently. This is quite important as it implies that 
appropriateness of a control system examined from only one angle may lead to misleading 
conclusions and recommendations.
2.6 Management Control Issues in Professional Accounting Firms
There is also a stream of control systems studies within the particular context o f audit service 
areas in professional accounting firms that is relevant to this study (e.g. Kelly and Margheim, 
1990; Carcello et al., 1996; Malone and Roberts, 1996; Otley and Pierce, 1996a; Pierce and 
Sweeney, 2004; 2005). This stream of management control literature highlight dysfunctional 
behaviours of staff in the audit service areas of accounting firms, and the general consensus of 
this literature is that there is a high level of dysfunctional behaviour, particularly among lower 
level audit staff (i.e. audit juniors and seniors) in response to the conflict between achieving 
high audit quality and keeping down the cost of an audit. These dysfunctional behaviours are 
usually defined in terms of auditors’ under-reporting of time on audits and other forms of 
behaviour generally grouped and referred to as audit quality reduction acts or quality 
threatening behaviour. Examples of the behaviours grouped together as quality reducing acts 
include prematurely signing off an audit step, accepting weak client explanations, not 
investigating an accounting principle, and reducing the amount of work performed on audit 
step (Kelly and Margheim, 1990, Otley and Pierce, 1996). At more senior levels, i.e. senior
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manager and above, other forms of dysfunctional or ‘inappropriate’ behaviour have also been 
identified in the literature. Examples include issuance of an unmodified audit opinion when 
there was an instance of either of the following: inadequate audit evidence gathered; a 
required auditing standard not applied; inadequate review of a critical area of audit 
engagement papers; client did not apply a required accounting treatment; or client provided 
unsatisfactory explanation for failure to record material audit adjustments (Carcello et al., 
1996).
It is also generally acknowledged in this literature that the incidence of dysfunctional or 
inappropriate behaviour at these more senior levels is much lower compared to the more 
junior levels. Nonetheless, at any hierarchical level the consequences of dysfunctional 
behaviour can be costly both for the individual and the firm. For example, it could lead to 
termination of employment for the individual; and for the firm, damage to reputation and risk 
of litigation (Pierce and Sweeney, 2005). The seriousness of these consequences are 
highlighted in the recent accounting scandals and corporate failures as in the case of Enron, 
Worldcom, and Xerox. These events have generally resulted in an increasing negative image 
of accountants and thus increased public scrutiny as well as increased risk of litigation (Lin et 
al., 2003; Barrett et al., 2005).
This stream of literature highlights an important feature of accounting firms’ environment that 
pose particular problems in the application of traditional forms of control such as output or 
behaviour controls, particularly in the audit service areas. To continue functioning, 
professional accounting firms, and indeed any other profit oriented organisation, need to 
maintain commercial viability, but for the audit service areas of these firms quality of work is 
seen as of overriding importance.7 On one hand, it is perceived that audit quality is enhanced
7 For instance, Paragraph 11 of the International Standard on Quality Control (ISQC) 1 issued by the Auditing 
Practices Board (APB) stresses the importance of accounting firms recognition that their business strategy is 
subject to the overriding requirement to achieve quality in all their engagements, and thus that commercial 
considerations do not override the quality of work performed, and that performance evaluation, compensation, and 
promotion systems are designed to demonstrate this overriding commitment to quality.
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with more time allowed auditors to do their job, but on the other hand costs are positively 
related to the amount of time spent on engagements.
Thus the main control issue is identified as resolving the conflict between maintaining audit 
quality and keeping costs down via a tight lid on the main cost driver, i.e. auditor chargeable 
time and therefore improving profit. Whilst engagement time and costs are measurable and 
easier to control, audit quality is not easily observable and thus difficult to measure and 
control. Therefore, it is difficult and problematic to apply traditional output or behaviour 
controls in this context, whereas input controls are easier to implement. Formal controls tend 
to be heavily focused on input controls via control of time budgets, although not best suited 
for this context in view of the overriding importance of maintaining output, i.e. audit, quality. 
The heavy focus of control via tight time budgets while emphasising the importance of 
maintaining audit quality exert pressure on auditors consequently resulting in auditors 
engaging in the specific forms of dysfunctional behaviour highlighted in the earlier paragraphs 
as a way of coping with the time budget pressures. Empirical evidence from the literature also 
consistently shows significant positive association between time budget pressure and auditor 
dysfunctional behaviours ((Kelley and Margheim, 1990; Otley and Pierce, 1996a; Pierce and 
Sweeney, 2004).
Furthermore, this stream of literature also highlights significant recent changes in accounting 
firms’ environment that impact on the use of performance management and control systems. 
The main changes that have been identified include the shift towards strategic-based or risk- 
based audit methodology; change in audit review processes towards less detailed 
documentation and a review by interview approach; buoyancy in the general economic 
climate resulting in diversification of advisory services, high staff turnover and shortage of 
staff; and not least the increased public scrutiny and risk of litigation occasioned by the 
corporate failures and accounting scandals mentioned earlier (Rich et al., 1997; Winograd, 
2000; Lin et al., 2003; Pierce and Sweeney, 2004; Barrett et al., 2005). These changes have
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been noted as having implications for organisational structure and control systems in 
accounting firms, as well as responses to the control systems.
For instance, Pierce and Sweeney (2004) observe that high turnover and staff shortage results 
in less staff continuity and difficulty in recruiting suitable staff. This then leads to faster 
promotion and also flatter reporting and performance evaluation structures. Furthermore, less 
reliance on formal audit programmes coupled with the shift towards strategic-based audit 
methodology has led to more devolution of authority to respond to customer circumstance 
lower down the hierarchy. All these they argue contribute to increase difficulty in ensuring 
audit quality, impact on costs, and also make it difficult to detect dysfunctional behaviour. 
Less documentation, either to increase efficiency or reduce risk of litigation, has also meant a 
change in the audit review process with less time devoted to audit file review and a shift 
towards a ‘review by interview’ process with the implication of more frequent face to face 
meetings between supervisors and their subordinates (Barrett et al., 2005; Pierce and 
Sweeney, 2005).
In addition, Pierce and Sweeney (2005) note that these changes have generally impacted the 
manner in which controls are used from a diagnostic use towards a more interactive use. This 
view is supported by Barrett et al.’s (2005) observation that there is increased interaction 
occasioned by the review by interview process (i.e. the interactive use of the audit review 
control process). They also note that the increased interaction had the potential to increase 
trust by providing opportunity for increased communication, or conversely to dampen trust 
when such interactions are viewed as interrogative. These changes may have significant 
impact on the effects of previous factors considered to impact on work behaviour and 
performance like budget attainability. In addition, the changes necessitate consideration of 
additional factors not included in previous studies, for e.g. interactive use of controls and 
trust. The changes also necessitate reconsideration of style of performance evaluation, a factor
Chapter 2 Literature Review 28
that has received the least attention in this stream of studies although acknowledged as being 
an important factor affecting behaviour and performance.
A limitation of this stream of management accounting research is the exclusive focus on the 
audit service areas of professional accounting firms despite the acknowledged diversification 
of services by these firms, and the acknowledgement that diverse advisory services represent a 
major income stream for these firms. Although Barrett et al. (2005, p.3) justify the focus on 
audit services arguing that “while these firms have expanded into a wide range of business 
services, audit work remains a significant element of these firms, provides an important basis 
for their claims (across all areas of work) to be professional and objective, and is said to 
fundamentally influence the ‘culture’ of these organizations” Nonetheless, this stream of 
studies can be extended in considering other service areas of professional accounting firms 
given Barrett et al.’s assertion that the ‘culture’ of these firms is heavily influenced by their 
audit service area. It would be useful to know if the level of dysfunctional behaviour is 
different in different service areas and what factors explain dysfunctional behaviour in 
accounting firms in general.
Furthermore, the non-experimental studies in this stream of research focus almost exclusively 
on lower level staff within the audit service areas of professional accounting firms, i.e. audit 
juniors and seniors who have been typically between 1 -  4 years in the firm.8 Part of the 
reason given for the focus on relatively junior audit staff, particularly audit seniors, is that 
“audit seniors are around the mid-point in the firms’ hierarchy, and occupy the most 
pressurized position in the firm (Kelley and Seiler, 1982) [note reference included in original 
text}” (Otley and Pierce, 1996a, p. 70). Pierce and Sweeney (2004, p.424) also argue that 
audit juniors and seniors, at least those included in their study, “formed a largely homogenous 
group in terms of demographic details and professional aspirations.” Nonetheless, it seems the
8 Exceptions include Carcello et al.’s (1996) survey of audit partners and senior managers; Pierce and Sweeney’s 
(2005) interviews with audit partners; and Sweeney and Pierce’s (2006) interviews with audit seniors and partners.
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time pressures faced by audit juniors and seniors are initially faced by the more senior staff, 
perhaps in a slightly different form, who then transmit them down the hierarchy. Evidence of 
this is seen in Pierce and Sweeney’s (2006) study where they found that junior staff under 
report time due to both explicit and implicit requests from managers to do so. This suggests 
that these managers are under some kind of pressure to make such requests, and might also be 
coping with these pressures in other ways aside making these requests. An earlier study by 
Carcello et al. (1996) found that the commonest factor associated with audit partners and 
senior managers inappropriate behaviour is fixed-fee audit contracts which make the audit 
partner more concerned with audit hours resulting in gathering of insufficient evidence, 
inadequate review of engagement papers, and other inappropriate behaviours. In such 
situations, it is likely that pressure at these senior levels gets transmitted down to junior staff 
via explicit or implicit requests for juniors to under report time as found by Pierce and 
Sweeney (2006). Thus a useful contribution to this stream of studies will be to examine the 
impact of control systems use on behaviour at both junior and more senior levels, and to 
investigate if these effects significantly vary at different levels of the hierarchy, i.e. whether 
hierarchical levels moderate control systems effects.
2.7 Summary of review
This review has summarized some of the definitions of MCS found in the literature and how 
these have influenced the empirical study of the subject. It also highlighted the key criticisms 
of the MCSs literature, and identified gaps to be filled in the literature. The importance of 
studying combinations of different aspects of control systems while recognising the different 
roles that MCSs play in organisations was highlighted. It was concluded that there was need 
for a broadened concept of the style of MCS use for performance evaluation and reward, and 
for an updated measurement instrument. The importance of theory development and hence 
choice of criterion variables was also highlighted in the review. Criticisms of the validity of 
the criterion variables used in previous MCS studies were related to inadequate theory
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development. This highlighted a gap in the literature for more clear specifications of the 
mechanisms by which PES affects behaviour and performance. Where these mechanisms have 
been identified in theory, they have not been fully considered in the empirical analysis. On the 
other hand, recent empirical work addressing some of these issues have focused on target 
setting and none so far have considered performance evaluative styles and its consequences. 
Also, recent calls to fully consider the consequences of MCSs both functional and 
dysfunctional were highlighted. Furthermore, the stream of research focusing specifically on 
auditors’ dysfunctional behaviour was also reviewed and opportunities for contributing to this 
specific stream of research also identified. In the chapter that follows, the focal and criterion 
variables focused on in the present study are identified, and the model of relationships being 
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Chapter 3 Theory Development and Hypothesis Formulation
This chapter starts by identifying the focal independent and criterion variables of interest in 
the study. It then goes on to link the research questions to the gaps identified in the literature 
review. This is accomplished via presentation of the models of the hypothesized relationship 
between the variables of interest, which are then summarized into testable hypotheses. The 
models of relationships investigated by most of the control systems studies are represented in 
Figures 3.1 - 3.3 below; while that employed in this study is represented in Figure 3.4 with 
construct mappings in Figure 3.5.
3.1 Identifying Focal and Criterion Variables
Identifying the focal independent variable of interest in a study is important as it brings focus 
and clarity to the study. It also determines the choice of criterion variable(s) and has a direct 
bearing on theory development. Briers and Hirst (1990) note that the choice of dependent 
variables is constrained by the focal independent variable and that theory development 
involves not only providing explanations for the relations among the variables of interest but 
also choosing the dependent variables. Similarly, Hartmann (2000, p474) note that 
“ ...understanding of the multiple roles of accounting and of RAPM (reliance on accounting 
performance measures) may be enhanced if researchers explicitly consider which aspect of 
RAPM they address...” To this end therefore the focal variable of interest to this study is 
performance evaluative style (PES) conceptualised as encompassing the nature of information 
used in performance evaluation, the way this information is used in evaluating performance 
and how it is linked to rewards. A detailed discussion of the conceptualisation of PES, its 
measurement and empirical application is provided in Chapter 5.
In terms of the criterion variables, behaviour and performance are the focal variables. In this 
study, mental state variables are modelled as the intervening influences between PES and its
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impact on behaviour and performance, thus they are not criterion variables as such. Also, both 
functional and dysfunctional behavioural effects of PES are examined. Functional behaviour 
investigated is work effort and dysfunctional behaviour is represented by quality threatening 
behaviour and intention to turnover, as a surrogate of real turnover. Performance on the other 
hand is gauged by actual job performance ratings and managers self rating of performance. 
Other variables of interest in the present study are introduced in the discussion o f the models 
of relationships investigated starting from the simple direct or overall effects of PES on to the 
more complex relationships combining mediating and moderating influences.
3.2 Theoretical Models of Relationship Examined
Over time, MCS researchers have employed three main models of relationships in studying 
control systems and its consequences. In historical sequence, researchers have explored this 
relationship using a direct or overall effect model, a moderated effect model, and a mediated 
or indirect effect model.
a) The direct/overall effect model, graphically depicted in Figure 3.1 below, represents the 
generic model of relationships investigated by early control systems studies as highlighted 
in the literature review that focus on PES (see also Covaleski et al., 2003). With this 
model researchers explored the direct relationships between control systems and its 
consequences. In relation to PES, researchers investigated the direct consequences o f PES 
on mental states, behaviour and performance (e.g. Argyris, 1952; Hopwood, 1972; Otley, 
1978).
b) The moderated effect model, graphically depicted in Figure 3.3 below, represents the 
relationships studied by the second stream of control systems studies. With this model, 
researchers explored the factors that moderate the direction and/or strength o f the 
relationship between control systems and their consequences. In relation to PES, 
researchers explored the factors moderating the direct effects of PES on mental states,
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behaviour and performance (e.g. Brownell, 1982a; 1985, 1987; Hirst, 1983; 1987; 
Govindarajan, 1984; 1985; Brownell & Hirst, 1986). These studies were motivated by the 
conflicting findings from the first stream of studies and tried to explain these in terms of 
possible moderating influences that could account for the conflicting findings,
c) The mediated or indirect effect model, graphically depicted in Figure 3.2 , represents the 
form of relationships investigated by later control systems studies (e.g. Nouri & Parker, 
1998; Shields et al., 2000; Chong & Chong, 2002; Wentzel, 2002). These studies 
generally hypothesize and investigate an indirect effect of control systems features, 
predominantly participation, on job performance via other variables -  predominantly goal 
commitment and goal difficulty. However, in relation to PES it does not appear to the best 
of my knowledge that any of the studies focusing on PES investigated this model of 
relationships perhaps because of the prime focus on explaining conflicting findings of 
earlier studies in terms of contextual or moderating factors. This model entails identifying 
and examining the factors that intervene in the relationship between PES and the criterion 
variables. To this end, the mental state variables are modelled as the mediating factors and 
behaviour and performance as the criterion variables.
In addition to the above forms of relationships, this study also examines a fourth and more 
comprehensive form of relationship which, to the best of the author’s knowledge, has not been 
studied in the performance management and control systems literature. This study integrates 
into one comprehensive model all the 3 models previously examined separately in what is 
termed a mediated moderation model.9 With this model both the moderating and mediating 
influences on the overall effect of PES on behaviour and performance are examined 
simultaneously. Thus the reality' of the complexity of the mechanism by which PES affects 
behaviour and performance is explored enhancing our understanding of control systems and 
its effects. The mediated moderation model is graphically depicted in Figure 3.4 below.
9 This form of relations is currently discussed in the social psychology literature as mediated moderation and 
moderated mediation. For a more detailed discussion and distinction between the two see Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 
2005; Simons et al., 1993; and Baron & Kenny, 1986.
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The approach adopted in this study in using this model is to first develop hypotheses on the 
overall effects of PES on performance and behaviour in line with the direct effects model. 
Then hypotheses are developed incorporating the moderating influences on the overall effects 
of PES on performance and behaviour in line with the moderated effects model. Furthermore, 
hypotheses are also developed incorporating the mediating influences on the overall effects of 
PES in line with the mediated effects model. Finally, hypotheses are developed incorporating 
both the moderating and mediating influences in the mediated moderation model. This models 
the mediating influences as the mechanisms by which the moderation effects are produced. To 
this end, possible moderating influences considered include organisational hierarchical level, 
the interactive use of control systems, trust in supervisor or supervisory trust, organisational 
commitment, and goal difficulty. And the mediating variables considered include equity and 
fairness perceptions, goal commitment, job related tension, and job satisfaction.
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3.3 M odel Developm ent & Form ulation o f Hypothesis - O verall Effects M odel
We start the model development and formulation of hypothesis by looking at the direct effects 
of PES on both performance and behaviour as did the initial control systems studies (links A 
& B in the model, Figure 3.4). PES is hypothesized to affect two types of behaviour -  
functional and dysfunctional behaviour. Dysfunctional behaviour refers to those behaviours 
exhibited by employees which are ordinarily considered to threaten the best interests of the 
firm and thus its long term success, whereas functional behaviour is considered to enhance the 
firm’s interests.
3.3.1 PES and Dysfunctional Behaviour:
Link A - Quality Threatening Behaviour (QTB)
As was mentioned earlier, the overall conclusion from the contingency studies in management 
accounting seem to be the inappropriateness of using only accounting information (as 
represented in budgets) in complex and uncertain conditions for performance evaluation and 
reward. In these conditions accounting information is deemed incomplete in measuring 
performance. Therefore when used in performance evaluation without due consideration of 
other factors, it elicits dysfunctional behaviours. Hopwood (1973) asserts that an 
uncompromising use of accounting information can lead to feelings of high pressure. Then as 
the level of tension increases individuals seek relief by engaging in dysfunctional behaviour 
like invalid data reporting, strategic behaviour (e.g. creation of slack), and resistance. 
However, Hartmann (2000) states that empirical evidence from the RAPM literature does not 
support such universal claim of the effect of uncertainty on the appropriateness of RAPM. 
Van der Stede (2001, p. 120) supports this assertion noting that there is inconclusive evidence 
in the literature on whether tight budgetary controls encourages or discourages dysfunctional 
behaviour, increases or decreases job pressure, and is good or bad for performance.
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Nonetheless, Anthony and Govindarajan (2004) maintain that relying solely on financial 
measures is generally inadequate and can be dysfunctional for several reasons such as 
encouraging managers to:
a) take short-term actions not in the long-term interest of the organisation;
b) avoid taking long-term (costly) actions in order to met short-term targets;
c) avoid high-risk investments choosing low-risk ones with lower returns; and
d) distort communication with superiors as managers build in slack or over-optimism.10 
These concerns are also similar to those expressed by Simons (1995) regarding accounting 
based diagnostic controls. Thus extensive use of and emphasis on targets for performance 
measurement, evaluation and reward, i.e. target focused PES (TF PES), is argued to be 
positively associated with quality threatening behaviours and short-termism which are not in 
the best interests of the organisation.
Link A - PES and Intention to Turnover (IT)
In addition, high TF PES has been associated with employee withdrawal behaviours (Hirst, 
1981; 1983; Hopwood, 1973).11 It is argued that high TF PES engenders conflict and poor 
relations not only between subordinates and their superiors but also between managers of 
different units. Subordinates disagree with the extensive use of and emphasis on accounting 
targets that are incomplete measures of their performance, and as the conflict with their 
superior intensifies they may try to cope by engaging in temporary or permanent social and/or 
psychological withdrawal.
In the organisational psychology and social psychology literatures, temporary employee 
withdrawal is identified as manifest in employee absenteeism, withholding of effort, lateness 
to work, and high intention to turnover, while permanent withdrawal is identified as manifest
10 In several literatures, such dysfunctional behaviours are generally referred to as ‘short-termism’. See for e.g. 
Hoskisson and Hitt (1988), and Demirag (1995) for definitions of short-termism.
11 Hirst (1983, p. 597) affirm that “social withdrawal is a type of dysfunctional behaviour and can be classified as a 
form o f resistance.”
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in actual turnover i.e. leaving the firm (Van Yperen et al., 1996; Kammeyer-Mueller et al, 
2005; Somers, 1996; Harrison et al., 2006). Meta-analytic studies have also established a 
strong positive relation between intention to turnover and actual turnover (Steel and Ovalle, 
1984; Cotton and Tuttle, 1986). Moreover, individuals high on intention to turnover are more 
likely to exhibit undesirable attitudes that affect others in the organisation they formally and 
informally relate with, and this may impede organisational effectiveness.
On the balance of evidence, there is general agreement among commentators that performance 
management and control systems (PMCSs), especially those based on accounting targets, 
elicit unintended dysfunctional consequences. This conclusion is also generalised to PMCS 
targets whether accounting or non-accounting based. This leads to the proposition that the 
target focused style of using control system information for performance measurement, 
evaluation and reward is positively associated with dysfunctional behaviour (link A in the 
models). In other words, dysfunctional effects arise from the extensive use of and emphasis on 
‘quantitative targets’ in performance measurement, evaluation, and reward.
Hypothesis 1
a) TF PES is positively associated with Quality threatening behaviour (QTB)
b) TF PES is positively associated with Intention to turnover (IT)
3.3.2 TF PES: Financial vs. Non-financial Targets
Anthony and Govindarajan (2004, p.495) go further to proffer the solution widely 
championed by proponents of the balanced scorecard, stating that “the solution is to measure 
and evaluate business unit managers using multiple measures, nonfmancial as well as 
financial.” Aside the issue of how managers balance or make trade offs between achieving 
multiple objectives, it is still unclear if these dysfunctional consequences are really due to the 
‘target’ or the ‘accounting’ nature PMCSs. In most cases, dysfunctional behaviours arise from 
the tensions between attainment of short-term goals and need for long-term effectiveness. This
Chapter 3 Theory Development and Hypothesis Formulation 46
tension seems to be at the heart of the contentions about the dysfunctional behavioural effects 
of emphasis on accounting numbers in performance evaluation (e.g. Hopwood, 1972). There 
is also very little empirical evidence that the proffered solution works, especially if the non- 
financial or operational measures are used in pretty much the same way as the financials 
measures. Rather, anecdotal evidence suggests the use of quantitative targets, whether 
financial or non-financial, generally results in such dysfunctional behaviours, even though 
targets may still motivate higher performance.
A typical case that illustrates this point is the UK government’s emphasis on targets (largely 
non-financial) to control the performance of NHS Trusts with the introduction of the NHS 
Plan in 2000. Following the UK Audit Commission’s report on the assessment of the National 
Trusts published in 2003, there has been wide spread media reports of several dysfunctional 
consequences of these NHS targets.12 In addition, experimental evidence provided by 
Schweitzer et al. (2002) also indicate that the use of targets in performance measurement, in 
this case non-financial targets, lead to unethical behaviour such as misrepresentation of 
performance. This occurred especially when individuals were close to meeting their targets. 
The conclusion therefore is that the dysfunctional effects of the extensive use of and emphasis 
on quantitative measures would be similar whether the quantitative measures are financial or 
non-financial measures. This leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2
a) The level of QTB associated with Target-Focused (TF) PES based mainly on 
financial measures is similar to that associated with TF PES based mainly on non- 
financial measures.
12 The BBC and other news media reported instances of figures being altered to meet targets and other 
dysfunctional behaviours such as not admitting patients in Accident and Emergencies to cut waiting list times. See 
for example the transcript of the BBC Panorama programme at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/spl/hi/prograinmes/panorama/transcripts/fiddlingthei1gures.txt (last accessed on 
22 August 2006). The programme detailed how some NHS managers ‘fiddled with the figures’ to meet the NHS 
targets.
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Hypothesis 2
b) Similarly, there is no difference in the level of IT associated with TF PES based 
mainly on financial measures compared to that associated with TF PES based 
mainly on non-financial measures.
3.3.3 PES and Effort, & Performance 
Links A & B
Effort (EFF) as a measure of functional behaviour may be seen as the process by which goals 
are translated into action. A critical part of a manager’s job is to translate organisational goals 
into personal goals for subordinates, and to ensure they direct high levels of effort towards the 
accomplishment of the goals. Effort is defined here as the conscious exertion of power, a 
serious and sustained attempt to achieve the required level of performance.
EFF and performance would be expected to be perfectly positively correlated absenting any 
errors of measurements and other exogenous factors that significantly affect performance. The 
more direct (positive) relationship of effort with performance is represented in the various 
psychological models that equate performance as a function of ability and effort/motivation 
(Libby and Luft, 1993; Bonner, 1999; Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002). Organisations select 
individuals with the ability to perform the tasks assigned, and influence improvement in 
ability through training. Ability may vary among individuals in an organisation, but 
performance relative to ability will be a function of effort. Effort would vary between 
individuals but more importantly may be exerted towards attainment of organisational 
objectives or in directions inimical to the organisation’s interest. PMCSs in the most part are 
designed to motivate higher effort in the manner or ‘right’ direction desired by the 
organisation. Given the imperfect correlation between effort and performance, the relations 
between PES and effort, and PES and performance are considered separately in the empirical 
analysis of this study as the two relationships might differ significantly.
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A Target-Focused (TF) PES can be viewed as the progressive use of explicit and thus specific 
goals in performance evaluation and reward. Goal theory predicts positive performance effects 
of specific goals, in particular moderately difficult ones, more than general or no goals 
especially when there is goal commitment. These predictions are based on the premise that 
goals or targets provide effort direction and aim thereby motivating higher performance. But 
excessively difficult goal levels lead to reduced performance. In relation to PES, Hirst (1987, 
p774) states that “specific budget goals are those that are expressed in quantitative terms (such 
as “sell x units of product y”), whereas non-specific or general goals are expressed in non- 
quantitative terms (such as “sell as many units of product y as possible”).” Several empirical 
studies in social psychology literature provide evidence support the goal theory premise and 
predictions (Riedel et al., 1988; Wright, 1989; Locke and Latham, 1990a, 1990b). However, 
empirical evidence from the PMCS contingency studies is inconclusive on the effects of 
different PES on performance and effort.
It is hardly the case that quantitative targets can or do capture all the important dimensions 
affecting performance e.g. cooperation. Nonetheless, it is expected that both effort and 
performance would be higher when explicit targets are used (i.e. medium to high TF PES) 
compared to when no targets are used (i.e. low TF) in line with goal theory predictions (Locke 
and Latham, 1990b). However, a more balanced use o f both targets and non-target related 
information in measuring and evaluating performance would motivate even higher effort and 
performance compared to exclusive use of targets. This suggests a curvilinear relationship 
between TF PES and performance, and between TF PES and effort. In other words, effort and 
performance is expected to be higher for the PES situation where explicit targets are used and 
emphasised compared to PES situation where no explicit target is used and qualitative factors 
are emphasised, but highest for the PES situation where explicit targets and qualitative 
information are equally emphasised. This leads to the following hypotheses:
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Hypothesis 3
a) There is a convex, i.e. inverted U-shaped, relationship between TF PES and EFF
b) There is a convex, i.e. inverted U-shaped, relationship between TF PES and 
Performance
3.4 Moderated Direct Effect Models:
Links D, E, & F
In section 3.3 above arguments were presented leading to hypotheses about the direct effects 
of PES on behaviour and performance. In this section, further hypotheses are developed which 
identify moderating influences on the direct effects proposed in the previous section. A 
number of factors are identified as moderating the effects of PES on behaviour and 
performance including organisational hierarchical level (OHL), interactive use of control 
systems (ICS), goal difficulty (GD), organisational commitment (OC), equity and fairness 
perception (EFP), and trust in supervisor i.e. supervisory trust (ST).
3.4.1 PES and Goal Difficulty
As discussed in Section 3.3.2, goal theory predicts positive performance effects o f specific 
and moderately difficult goals more than general or no goals, but at excessively difficult goal 
levels performance is reduced. In relation to PES, a high TF PES compared to a low TF PES 
implies the use of more specific goals and a tighter coupling of rewards to performance 
against targets. Thus TF PES is likely to lead to higher performance when the goal level is set 
at the average level of performance, i.e. when goals are perceived to be achievable, rather than 
at low or very high levels. Hirst (1987, p774) describes moderately difficult goal levels as 
“where they (goals) are set at the average level of performance for a given task.”
This effect of goal difficulty (GD) likely results from individuals adjusting their efforts 
relative to the expected outcome. Thus, when individuals are evaluated and rewarded based on
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their performance against targets they would increase their efforts if the goals were 
moderately difficult i.e. achievable. However, if the goals are very difficult to achieve they 
may then adjust their effort downwards since higher effort is unlikely to yield more rewards 
and may also have a psychological cost to them if goals where not attained. Empirical 
evidence of this adjustment of effort relative to the level of goal difficulty is seen in the 
experimental study of Wright (1992b). He found that goal level, i.e. level of goal difficulty, 
interacted with the level and type of incentive (whether piece meal rates, hourly rates, or 
bonus based on goal performance) to affect performance. He found that under high incentive 
level conditions (high levels of each incentive type) performance increased with goal levels, 
however performance was lower for those rewarded based on goal attainment (i.e. with 
bonuses). He suggested that the goal attainment bonus subjects were more cautious in 
committing to the goal because of the negative consequence of not achieving the goal.
Merchant and Mazoni (1989) also found in their field study that superiors allowed 
subordinates’ goals to be set at tight but achievable levels for a number of reasons including 
discouraging dysfunctional behaviour in the form of earnings management. Other reasons 
they found include: increasing motivation resulting from the feel good factor o f achieving 
targets; reducing the need for control intervention that arise when performance is below target 
levels; and protecting against over consumption of resources that result when high expected 
performance also lead to belief that more resources can be consumed. Some of the reasons 
support the premise that non-attainment of performance targets carries a high psychological 
cost to the subordinates. Thus individuals may resort to dysfunctional behaviour in order to 
increase their chances of achieving their performance targets particularly where rewards are 
tightly coupled to performance against targets, especially difficult ones.
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Hypothesis 4
GD moderates the effect of TF PES on performance and behaviour such that:
a) Quality threatening behaviour (QTB) is more positively associated with TF PES 
when GD is very' high than when it is low or moderate
b) Intention to turnover (IT) is more positively associated with TF PES when GD is 
high than when it is low or moderate
c) Effort (EFF) is more positively associated with TF PES when GD is moderate 
than when GD is low or high
d) Performance is more positively associated with TF PES when GD is moderate 
than when it is low or high
3.4.2 PES and Organisational Hierarchical Level
Organisational hierarchical level (OHL) is identified in the following paragraphs as playing 
both an antecedent and a moderating role. As an antecedent variable it influences the PES that 
superiors adopt, and also likely moderates the effects of PES.
OHL as an Antecedent of PES
While uncertainty has been identified and investigated as a moderator of the effects of PES on 
behaviour (Hirst, 1983; Govindarajan, 1984; Chapman, 1997), Galbraith (1977) describes it in 
terms of the level of difference between the information organisations posses and that required 
to carry out its functions. He suggested that organisations bridge this difference through their 
structure thus variations in organisational structure reflect “ ...variation in the capability of the 
organisation to process information about events that could not be anticipated in advance... 
[the information in turn being]... a function of the output diversity', division of labour, and the 
level o f performance” (Galbraith, 1977, pp55-56). On one hand, organisational structure could 
be viewed as the grouping of resources and individuals who carry' out similar tasks together 
into units and the grouping of these units together in some configuration based on work 
processes, or outputs, and/or geographical location. Starting at the bottom of the organisation,
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the basic building block of organisational structure is the formation of work units around 
similar and/or related tasks aimed at a work output depending on the nature of the task. In 
investigating the effects of PES, previous studies have adopted this view of structure as 
organisations’ response to uncertainty by looking at differences between different types of 
organisations and work units/departments. Galbraith (1977) posits that the nature of tasks at 
each OHL require different roles and organisational behaviour. Generally, tasks are 
progressively more complex and non-programmable higher up the hierarchy and so also does 
the time frame between actions and the full realisation of its consequences increase higher up 
the hierarchy (Jaques, 1964a; 1979; 1990).13 Thus, higher up the OHL, knowledge of cause 
and effect relationships decreases as tasks become increasingly non-programmable and the 
action-result time frame lengthens. This implies that it is more feasible and probably less 
costly to monitor the effectiveness of task related effort lower down than higher up the OHL. 
As a result, the type/nature of information, i.e. performance measures and ‘targets’, used to 
evaluate performance at each hierarchical level likely differs and, probably, so would the 
manner in which the information is interpreted and assessed.
On the other hand, organisational structure, i.e. organisational hierarchical levels (OHLs) 
could also be viewed in terms of the people carrying out the tasks and the various authority or 
superior-subordinate(s) relationships underpinning the various work units. Simons (2000) 
discusses organisational structure in terms of the ‘span of control’ and ‘span of accountability’ 
structures within the firm. Thus, OHL as sets of superior-subordinate relationships in an 
organisation reflect both span of control and span of accountability. Simons posits that both 
span of control and span of accountability determine the ‘span of attention’ of managers -  i.e. 
the domain of activities within a manager’s field of view that he attempts to gather 
information on and influence. Span of control indicates the number of direct subordinates or 
functions under a manager, while span of accountability' expresses the range of performance
13 This applies particularly to managerial jobs. Though some lower level jobs, e.g. nursing in the context of a 
hospital, may appear to be quite complex but in large part they are still programmable i.e. consists o f clear and 
detailed steps to take in defined circumstances.
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measures used to evaluate a manager and at the basic level defines the financial statement 
elements a manager is held accountable. Thus, span of control and span of accountability are 
inherent elements of the organisational design which vary across the OHLs. For most types of 
organisations, it would appear that lower down the OHL, the number of subordinates a 
superior directly supervises, i.e. span of control, tends to increase while span of accountability 
narrows, i.e. they tend to be held accountable for specific single line items in the financial 
statements.
As span of control increases at lower levels, i.e. the more people a superior has to evaluate, so 
would the need to be perceived as objective and fair in evaluating and rewarding performance. 
This for instance may drive the predominant use of quantitative performance measures, which 
are perceived as more objective compared to non-quantitative measures. Also, as span of 
accountability is narrower at these levels, less aggregated information is needed, all implying 
that quantitative non-financial information may be used more extensively to measure, evaluate 
and reward performance at low OHLs. Given also that tasks are more programmable at lower 
OHL and that the action-results time frame is short, this makes the use of the non-quantitative 
measures in a TF PES amenable at these levels.
On the other hand, task is less programmable at higher OHL and effort less easily monitored. 
Also, span of accountability is broader and action-results time frame longer. Thus while more 
quantitative non-financial information may be used more extensively at lower OHLs, more 
aggregate measures of performance, usually financial measures, are required for higher OHL. 
In general, financial information usually reflects aggregate actions of many lower level 
subordinates making it somewhat predictable, thus it may be seen as ameliorating some of the 
difficulty in measuring performance posed by non-programmability of tasks at higher OHLs. 
However, it is also much more likely that the quantitative measures would be used in 
combination with qualitative information in evaluating and rewarding performance at higher 
OHL given the non-programmability of tasks and the longer action-results time frame.
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Financial information usually relates to shorter time frames and thus do not fully reflect the 
impact of all the relevant contemporaneous actions/decisions of managers. Moreover, because 
financial information is highly aggregated at higher OHLs, it may also mask other managerial 
deficiencies making its combined use with additional qualitative information more desirable.
In summary, it is argued that OHLs would influence PES in determining both the nature/type 
of information used as well as the manner such information is used. Though quantitative 
measures are used across OHL, the discussion above suggests that more non-financial 
(financial) quantitative measures are used at lower (higher) OHL. In addition, the quantitative 
non-financial measures are likely to be used extensively and emphasised at lower OHL, i.e. a 
high TF PES. However, the financial measures are less likely to be used in such a manner at 
higher OHL. Financial measures are more likely to be used in some balanced combination 
with other qualitative information, i.e. a low to moderate rather than high TF PES.
Hypothesis 5
a) There is no difference in the amount of quantitative information used to evaluate 
performance at low vs. high OHL.
b) Non-financial information is used more extensively to evaluate performance at 
low OHL than at high OHL; and conversely financial information is used more 
extensively at high OHL than at low OHL.
c) PES dominantly used at high OHL will be different from that used at low OHL; 
i.e. the manner in which quantitative information is used for performance 
evaluation would be different at low compared to high OHL - with high (low) TF 
PES dominantly used at low (high) OHL
OHL as a Moderator of PES Consequences
Empirical evidence from early studies suggests that OHL not only influences PES used but 
also possibly moderates the impact of TF PES. For example, Otley (1978, p. 143) attributed 
the difference in the distributions of PES observed in his study compared to that in 
Hopwood’s (1972) study to the type of responsibility' centre studied -  profit centres in the
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case of Otley and cost centres in the case of Hopwood. Similarly, Brownell (1982a) also 
attributed the difference in the PES distributions between his study and Otley’s to the same 
factor. Brownell (1982a, p. 16 footnote 4) suggests that “apparently, profit centre managers 
(Otley’s sample) are evaluated much more on the basis of accounting information than cost- 
centre managers (Hopwood’s sample and the sample in this study), as reflected in the 
dominance of the non-accounting sty le in Hopwood’s and my samples, o f only trivial 
importance in Otley’s sample.” Responsibility' centre type in these studies obviously reflects 
the OHLs of the managers surveyed. The results of these studies were also significantly 
different with regards to the effects of PES, and these differences spurred the RAPM series of 
studies (Hartmann, 2000). While Hopwood and Brownell found some evidence that (at lower 
OHL) high RAPM compared to low' RAPM sty le of performance evaluation was less 
associated with performance, and more associated with dysfunctional behaviour and stress, 
Otley found no such evidence (at higher OHL). Otley found that (at higher OHL) high RAPM 
was more associated with performance and had no significant association with dysfunctional 
behaviour. These results suggest differential effects of high RAPM at different OHL, which 
implies that OHL moderates the effects of PES on behaviour and performance. On the other 
hand, the pattern of dominant PES also suggests that OHL is an antecedent o f PES.
One strong explanation that has been offered as accounting for the differences in PES 
distribution among the three studies cited above makes it difficult to base any hypothesis 
about the antecedent and moderating effects of OHL on the empirical evidence provided by 
these studies without controlling for this factor -i.e. the financial/economic condition faced by 
an organisation. The organisation Otley (1978) studied was facing difficult economic 
conditions, which may not have been the situation with Hopwood’s (1972) and Brownell s 
(1982a) sample firms. Otley found that tighter control systems were adopted in the units 
having the greatest impact on the profitability' of the firm, and he suggested that “in the most 
difficult economic conditions, a tight system of control was adopted..., in slightly easier but 
changeable conditions, a highly participative style was adopted...., in relatively easy and
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stable conditions, a less rigorous approach prevailed ... intervention occurring only when 
profitability appeared threatened.” (p. 141). Imosili (1989, p.332) reaffirmed this explanation 
for the differences in PES and effects of PES as he notes that:
...perhaps when organisations are facing financial hardship, the differential effects of 
performance evaluative style on work outcomes may be difficult to isolate empirically. It 
is likely that when companies are undergoing periods of declining profitability, there might 
be so much emphasis on financial data in performance evaluation that it may be difficult to 
truly classify managers into different styles on the basis of how much consideration is 
given to budget data in performance evaluation. In this study however, this factor is ruled 
out as the case organisation is not facing financial difficulties, to the contrary it is one of 
the most successful in its industry as indicated by their financial statements. Thus, any 
confounding effects of economic conditions on PES and its effects are substantially 
controlled for in this study. Empirical and anecdotal evidence from the stream of literature 
focused on control systems in professional accounting firms also indicate that the 
incidence of dysfunctional or inappropriate behaviour is lower at more senior compared to 
more junior levels in the organisation (Kelly and Margheim, 1990; Pierce and Sweeney, 
2004; . For instance, Kelly and Margheim 0990) found that dysfunctional behaviour was 
more common among lower level auditors. Similarly, Pierce and Sweeney (2004) found a 
higher level of dysfunctional behaviour among audit juniors compared to audit seniors, 
though difference was not tested for statistical significance.
These results further suggest that OHL may moderate the impact of PES on dysfunctional 
behaviour. Moreover, OHL provides a context within which the appropriateness o f a TF PES 
may be adjudged given the discussions in the preceeding sub-section, and therefore likely to 
moderate PES effect on behaviour. A high TF PES may be seen as inappropriate at high OHL 
given less knowledge of cause and effect, less programmability of tasks, and longer action- 
result time frames. At lower OHL however, high TF PES may be perceived as fairer, and thus
Chapter j Theory Development and Hypothesis Formulation 57
more appropriate, than low TF PES given greater span of control at these levels. Therefore 
the following proposition is put forward:
Hypothesis 6
OHL moderates the effects of TF PES on behaviour and performance such that:
a) QTB is more positively associated with TF PES at higher than at lower OHL
b) IT is more positively associated with TF PES at higher than at lower OHL
c) Effort is more positively associated with TF PES at lower than at. higher OHL
d) Performance is more positively associated with TF PES at lower than at higher 
OHL
3.4.3 PES and Interactive Use of Control Systems
From a series of studies Simons (1995; 2000) identified the different ways in which senior 
managers use control systems as levers of control. He found that top managers use some 
elements of the control systems in a diagnostic manner which he described as diagnostic 
control systems, and use other elements in an interactive manner which he described as 
interactive control systems. Simons (1995, 2000) notes that rewards and thus performance 
evaluation can be linked to diagnostic as well as interactive control systems. As a distinct 
element of the control system, interactive control systems could be systematically linked to 
PES as another different feature of the control system. Chenhall (2003, p l3 1) illustrates this 
point as he noted that:
...a  study focused only on formal budget systems may argue that they are unsuitable in 
uncertain operating conditions as they include incomplete information and lack 
flexibility. However, evidence may indicate that successful organizations rely 
extensively on formal budgets....It may be that successful organizations operating in 
uncertain conditions have formal budgets but they are systematically combined with 
open and flexible communications between managers. The formal budgets are useful in 
assisting planning and curbing excessive innovation, while the informal
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communications provide broader information in flexible ways. Simons (1987; 1991;
1995) showed that formal budgets can provide interactive controls in uncertain
conditions...
Thus the degree of presence or absence of ICS is likely to impact on the effects of PES.
Indeed, interactive use of control systems (ICS) seem related to informal controls, and is 
systematically linked to PES to the extent or not that managers using different PESs 
frequently review and discuss performance against targets, budgetary or otherwise, with their 
subordinates, and to the extent that they use the control systems information to get involved in 
the important decisions made by their subordinates. Chenhall (2003, p. 138) also propose that 
“ ...where MCS focused on tight financial controls are used in uncertain external 
environments they will be used together with an emphasis on flexible, interpersonal 
interactions.” This suggests that flexible interpersonal interactions mitigate the unintended 
consequences of tight financial controls in successful organisations. As ICS encourages 
increased interaction between superiors and their subordinates, it thus enhances the flow of 
information between them. As noted earlier, the dysfunctional effects of TF PES is often 
attributed to the increased tension it provokes due to role ambiguity, uncertainty on how ones 
actions bear on achievement of set goals, and the linking of rewards to performance against 
set goals. ICS alleviates the tensions and tendency to engage in dysfunctional behaviour due 
to the increased interaction and information flows it engenders. On one hand, these 
interactions provide subordinates with opportunities to communicate emerging job relevant 
information to their superiors; to clarify their roles, their superiors’ performance expectations, 
and also their strategy for achieving the set goals; or simply to win the sympathies of their 
superiors. On the other hand, it affords superiors the opportunity to reveal their values to 
subordinates and for closer monitoring leaving subordinates less room to engage in 
dysfunctional behaviour. In addition, ICS might also promote feelings o f trust and fairness 
which may further discourage subordinates from engaging in dysfunctional behaviour, and 
probably encourage more effort and better performance. Therefore, when there is high ICS the
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dysfunctional effects of TF PES would most likely be alleviated compared to when there is 
low ICS, and effort and performance is also likely to improve. This leads to the following 
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 7
ICS moderates the effects of TF PES on behaviour and performance such that:
a) QTB is more positively associated with TF PES when ICS is low than when ICS 
is high or moderate
b) IT is more positively associated with TF PES when ICS is low than when ICS is 
high or moderate
c) Effort is more positively associated with TF PES when ICS is high than when ICS 
is low or moderate
Hypothesis 7
d) Performance is more positively associated with TF PES when ICS is high than 
when it is low or moderate
3.4.4 PES and Organisational Commitment
Another potential moderator of the effects of PES on work performance and behaviour is 
organisational commitment (OC). Two important dimensions o f OC are generally identified in 
the literature, i.e. affective and continuance commitment. Affective commitment relates to the 
definition of OC given by Porter et al. (1974, p.6G4) i.e. “the strength o f an individuaTs 
identification with and involvement in a particular organization.” This is characterized by a 
belief in and acceptance of organizational goals and values, a willingness to exert effort to 
accomplish those goals, and a strong desire to maintain organizational membership. On the 
other hand, continuance commitment relates to the description provided by Becker (1960, 
p32), i.e. “when a person, by making a side bet, links extraneous interests with a consistent 
line of activity.” In other words, individuals remain committed to an organization because 
they need to because of the perceived costs of leaving the organisation; e.g. loss o f attractive
Chapter 3 Theory Development and Hypothesis Formulation 60
benefits, loss of seniority, and disruptions in personal relations in moving to another location 
and job (Meyer et al., 1989).
Empirical evidence show affective and continuance commitment to be orthogonal and 
differentially related to work behaviours like turnover intentions and job satisfaction. For 
instance, Meyer et al. (1989) found affective and continuance commitment to be uncorrelated. 
They also found affective commitment to be positively correlated with job satisfaction and 
performance, while continuance commitment was negatively related to these variables. They 
theorize that “employees with a strong affective commitment remain with the organization 
because they want to, whereas those with strong continuance commitment remain because 
they need to do so....those who value and want to maintain membership should be willing to 
exert considerable effort.... In contrast, those who feel compelled to remain to avoid financial 
and other costs may do little more than the minimum required to retain their employment.” 
(Meyer et al., 1989 p. 152). Meta-analysis of the relations between OC and work outcomes 
conducted by Randall (1990) also support the differential associations of affective and 
continuance commitment with work outcomes like tardiness, absenteeism, and turnover 
(reverse coded and conceptualised as coming to work on time, attendance, and remaining with 
the organisation). She found that affective commitment was more strongly and positively 
associated with these work behaviours than continuance commitment. Similar results were 
also found by Mathieu and Zajac (1990) in their meta-analytic study.
Management accounting research in general tends to focus on affective rather than 
continuance commitment (Ketchand and Strawser, 1998; 2001). For e.g., Otley & Pierce 
(1996a) hypothesized and found support for their hypothesis that higher OC (affective 
commitment) is associated with low levels of dysfunctional behaviour referred to as audit 
quality reducing behaviour (AQRB) and premature signoff of audit tasks, but not for under 
reporting of time. AQRB involved accepting weak client explanations, superficial review of 
documents, failing to research an accounting principle, and reducing work below what was
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considered reasonable. From the foregoing it is hypothesized that: the acceptance of 
organisational values coupled with willingness to exert more effort and strong desire to 
maintain membership in the organisation would incline individuals toward exhibiting lower 
dysfunctional behaviour, and possibly higher performance even when a high TF PES is use. 
Thus the effects of TF PES on behaviour particularly dysfunctional behaviour may not be 
significant when OC is high.
Hypothesis 8
OC moderates the effects of TF PES on behaviour and performance, such that:
a) QTB is more positively associated with TF PES when OC is low than when OC is 
high
b) IT is more positively associated with TF PES when OC is low than when OC is 
high
Hypothesis 8
c) Effort is more positively associated with TF PES when OC is high than when OC 
is low or moderate
d) Performance is more positively associated with TF PES when OC is high than 
when OC is low or moderate
3.4.5 PES and Supervisory Trust
Some studies have identified ST as a moderator of (or mitigating) the negative consequences 
of PES. Ross (1994, p.629) argues that “ ...trust is likely to moderate the relationship between 
the style of performance evaluation and job related tension by improving acceptance of the 
performance evaluation process.” In support of his argument, he cites Henderson (1980, plO) 
who argued that lack of trust is the most important factor that evoke negative feelings towards 
performance evaluation systems. He also cites Brion (1989, p371) who contended that trust is 
an important factor that will mitigate the consequences of evaluation. However, Ross (1994; 
1995) also argues that such moderating effects of ST would not hold for low TF PES (i.e.
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Hopwood’s NA style) because this PES entail the use of subjective criteria which makes a 
superior’s biases and idiosyncrasies more evident.
Ross (1994) also found evidence supporting his arguments. He found that JRT was 
significantly higher when low compared to high TF PES was employed at high ST levels, but 
did not differ significantly between low and high TF PES at low ST levels. Ross’s results also 
showed that the mean ST levels were higher (though not tested for significance) at high TF 
PES compared to low TF PES. In contrast Hopwood (1972) and Otley (1978) found that ST 
was higher when TF PES was low compared to high TF PES, though their results differed 
with regards to the difference in levels of JRT between high and low TF PES. While 
Hopwood found JRT to be higher for high TF PES, Otley did not find any significant 
difference in JRT between high and low TF PES. Nonetheless, the evidence reviewed 
suggests that ST moderates the negative consequences of PES, i.e. when ST is at high levels it 
mitigates the impact of TF PES on dysfunctional behaviour.
Hypothesis 9
ST moderates the effects of TF PES on behaviour such that:
a) QTB is less positively associated with TF PES when ST is high compared to 
when ST is low
b) IT is less positively associated with TF PES when ST is high compared to when 
ST is low
3.5 Mediating Effect & Mediated Moderation Effect Models:
Links C & G, C & H; & Links D, J, & I.
The discussion in Section 3.1 suggested that the apparent dilemma in choosing the appropriate 
criterion variable is related to the need to more clearly specify the mechanism(s) by which 
PES affects behaviour and performance. In other words, the moderating as well as the
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mediating or intervening variables, and their interactions that affect the impact of PES on the 
outcome variables need to be identified and such relationships clearly specified. This task is 
the focus of this section. First, the possible significant intervening variables are identified and 
their relations with PES and the outcome variables also specified. Afterwards, how these 
intervening variables explain the effect of the moderating variables discussed in section 3.4 
are then explored. Four variables -  equity and fairness perceptions, goal commitment, job 
related tension, and job satisfaction -  are identified as mediating the effects of TF PES on 
behaviour and performance. Figure 3.5 below depicts the model of relationships discussed in 
the subsequent sub-sections.
3.5.1 Intervening Effects of Equity and Fairness Perception
Equity theory predicts that individuals compare the ratios of what they give to the 
organisation, their labour/effort input, to what they get (i.e. total rewards) to a corresponding 
ratio for a comparison others (Adams, 1963; Adams and Jacobsen, 1964). The theory posits 
that people feel distressed when they perceive their input as unequal to the outcome they get; 
either as feelings of guilt when over-rewarded or resentment if under-rewarded (Greenberg, 
1987b, 1990; Huseman and Hatfield, 1990; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Allen and White, 
2002). When this happens, they try to restore equity. If over-rewarded they may either adjust 
fast to the over-reward (get used to it) or increase effort to alleviate the guilt, and if under­
rewarded they generally reduce effort or seek to increase the reward outcomes.
Empirical studies of equity theory provide much evidence that suggests individuals lower 
their performance when they feel under-rewarded, but give inconclusive evidence regarding 
reactions to over-reward (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Huseman and Hatfield, 1990)14. Huseman 
and Hatfield (1990 p.99) describe some of the ways employees reduce their inputs or seek 
increased outcomes when under-rewarded as:
14 Greenberg (1987a) also notes that equity theory has limitations in explaining improprieties in organizational 
procedures found in this study that the outcomes received had no effect on ratings of the fairness of the 
procedures used.
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...doing less or careless work, coming to work late, “forgetting” to carry out 
instructions, taking extended breaks and lunch hours, using up sick days, and 
sabotaging their work and the work of others.... Increasing outcomes involves 
seeking... more pay or benefits, promotions, increased job security, and better 
working conditions.
Feelings of inequity and unfairness not only lead to the temporal social withdrawal behaviour 
described above, but are also likely to lead to permanent withdrawal in the form o f turnover 
particularly when such feelings persist over time. For instance, Van Yperen et al.’s (1996) 
study, set in 2 Dutch manufacturing plants, found that perceptions of inequity were significant 
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Extant research discusses equity theory in terms of organisational justice differentiating 
between two concepts of justice/equity' - the fairness of the actual outcomes an employee 
receives, termed distributive justice (more in line with equity'' theory), and the fairness o f the 
procedures used to determine the outcome an employee receives, termed procedural justice 
(Greenberg, 1987a, 1990). Perceptions of procedural justice is enhanced when the decision­
making procedure allow' individuals a voice, i.e. an opportunity' to express their view's, in the 
decision process. This effect is explained by the expectations of individuals given this 
opportunity'' that their view's will influence the outcome. An alternative explanation is that 
individuals given this opportunity' believe they are valued as members o f the group enacting 
the decision. Empirical evidence from the justice literature, though sparse, suggests positive 
effects of procedural justice on goal commitment and performance (e.g. Earley and Lind, 
1987; Lind et al. 1990; Janssen, 2001).
Equity' and fairness perception (EFP) is linked to PES in that performance evaluation is an 
inherent and pivotal part of the process of determining and distributing rewards. Thus the PES 
experienced would be adjudged as either a fair process leading to an equitable outcome or not. 
And given that EFP relating to the process and outcomes of performance evaluation is an 
important factor influencing individuals’ behaviour as well as. performance, EFP would 
therefore mediate the relations between TF PES and behaviour, and TF PES and performance. 
When PES is perceived to be fair and thus the consequent outcome equitable, i.e. when EFP is 
high, effort and performance would be increased. It is also more likely that the level of 
dysfunctional behaviour such as QTB and IT would be reduced when EFP is high compared 
to when EFP is low. However, it is unclear how TF PES would impact on EFP as this, likely 
depends on other factors which would be explored in the subsequent paragraphs. At the 
moment it is sufficient to conclude that EFP mediates the impact of PES. This leads to the 
following hypotheses:
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Hypothesis 10





3.5.2 EFP Mediation o f Organisational Hierarchical Level (OHL) M oderation Effects
In Section 3.4.2, it was suggested that any moderating effect of OHL might be explained by 
the mediating process(es) between TF PES and the outcome variables. For instance, Ross 
(1995, p5) contends that OHL may affect the effects o f PES and uncertainty given that there 
are likely to be differences in both attitude and behaviour between lower, middle, and upper 
level managers. He cites Porter and Lawler (1965) who reported such differences between 
OHL in both job attitudes and job behaviours. He also cites Hammer and Tosi (1974) who 
found that upper level managers are mote likely to react negatively to role ambiguity. 
Consequently, it is argued here that the perceived fairness o f  TF PES, and thus how equitable 
the consequent outcomes are perceived to be, depends, on the perceived appropriateness o f  the 
PES given the person’s level in the organisational hierarchy among other things. It was also 
argued in Section 3.4.2 that the use o f high (tow) TF PES at high (low) OHLs enhances 
feelings o f inequity and unfairness, implying that EFP explains the mechanism by which OHL. 
moderates the effects of TF PES on the outcome variables. At lower OHL, the use o f high TF 
PES will enhance EFP, which in turn would be positively related to performance and effort; 
whereas the use of high TF PES at higher OHL would be perceived as unfair because of 
incomplete knowledge of and measurement of factors affecting performance.15 This leads to 
the following hypotheses:
11:5 This implies a mediated moderation effect. However this becomes a moderated mediation effect if there is no 
e v i d e n c e  o f  an overall moderation effect o f OHL on the relations between TF PES and the outcome variables as
hypothesized in Section. 3.4.2, i.e. the mediation effects o f  EFP is observed at one or another hierarchical level but 
not at all levels. Hypothesis 11 may then be restated as "Ike in d ire c t effects o f  'TFPES o n  b e h a v io u r  v ia  EFP is
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Hypothesis 11
EFP explains the moderating effect of OHL on the relationship between:
a) TF PES and QTB, such that at lower (higher) OHL TF PES is positively (negatively 
or non-sign ificantly) related to EFP which in turn is negatively related to QTB
b) TF PES and IT, such that at lower (higher) OHL TF PES is positively (negatively or 
non-significantly) related to EFP which in turn is negatively related to QTB
c) TF PES and EFF, such that at lower (higher) OHL TF PES is positively (non- 
significantly) related to EFP which in turn is positively related to effort
d) TF PES and Performance, such that at lower (higher) OHL TF PES is positively (non- 
significantly) related to EFP which in turn is positively related to performance
3.5.3 EFP Mediation of Interactive use of Control Systems (ICS) Moderation Effects
In Section 3.4.3, it was argued that ICS moderates the effects of TF PES due to the increased 
interaction and information flow it encourages between superiors and their subordinates. Such 
increased interaction and information exchanges also mean more openness which promotes 
more positive EFP in the acceptance of the process of determining and allocating rewards. For 
instance, Lindquist (1995) found that fairness perceptions (enhanced by allowing individuals a 
voice in the decision making process) positively affected acceptance of and satisfaction with 
performance targets irrespective of whether those targets were attainable or not. 
Consequently, EFP may also partly explain the mechanism by which ICS moderates the 
effects of TF PES on behaviour and performance.
Hypothesis 12
EFP explains the moderating effect of ICS on the relationship between:
a) TF PES and QTB, such that at high (low) ICS TF PES is positively (negatively or 
non-significantly) related to EFP which in turn is negatively related to QTB
m o d era ted  by OHL such that a t low er OHL TF PE S is p o sitiv e ly  a ssocia ted  with EFP, which in turn is negatively  
a sso cia ted  with dysfunctional behaviour. H owever, a t higher OHL such associations m ay be insignificant or 
reversed .”
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b) TF PES and IT, such that at high (low) ICS TF PES is positively (negatively or non- 
significantly) related to EFP which in turn is negatively related to QTB
c) TF PES and EFF, such that at high (low) ICS TF PES is positively (non-significantly) 
related to EFP which in turn is positively related to effort
d) TF PES and Performance, such that at high (low) ICS TF PES is positively (non- 
significantly) related to EFP which in turn is positively related to performance
3.5.4 EFP Mediation of Supervisory Trust (ST) Moderation Effects
In Section 3.4.5 it was hypothesized that ST moderated the impact of TF PES on 
dysfunctional behaviour in line with Ross (1994) arguments that ST lead to acceptance of 
performance targets. In an earlier study, Fulk et al.(1985) found that ST influenced how 
fair or unfair individuals perceived their evaluation to be. They found that the higher 
the trust, the more individuals perceived their perform ance evaluation as being fair. 
The foregoing also suggests therefore that EFP possibly explains the m echanism  by 
w hich ST moderates the negative effects o f PES.
Hypothesis 13
EFP explains the moderating effect of ST on the relationship between:
a) TF PES and QTB such that at high (low) ST, TF PES is positively (negatively) related 
to EFP which is in turn negatively related to QTB
b) TF PES and IT such that at high (low) ST, TF PES is positively (negatively) related to 
EFP which is in turn negatively related to IT
3.5.5 Intervening Effects of Goal Commitment
Goal commitment (GC) has been variously defined as: the willingness to commit resources 
toward the accomplishment of a goal (Naylor and Ilgen, 1984); an individual’s attachment to 
or determination to reach a goal regardless of its origin (Locke and Latham, 1990b), and the 
level of determination and persistence put towards achieving a goal (Renn, 2003). GC is
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linked to PES, in that many of the antecedents of GC identified in the goal-setting literature, 
e.g. supervisor supportiveness and trustworthiness, and reward structures (Hollenbeck and 
Klein, 1987) are conceptually related to PES. For instance, supervisor supportiveness entails 
not only support to achieve the required level of performance but also showing understanding 
of the prevailing circumstances underlying performance when evaluating performance. On the 
other hand, supervisor trustworthiness relates to felt fairness of evaluation as discussed in the 
previous paragraph. In other words, supervisors are trusted more when they are perceived to 
be fair in their style of evaluating performance. Reward structures are also related to1 the 
amount of discretion superiors have in rewarding or punishing subordinates, and rewards 
generally increase goal commitment especially when based on goal attainment (Hollenbeck et 
ah, 1989b; Wright, 1989). Though (high) TF PES could be perceived as fair or unfair and as. 
reflecting or not reflecting supervisor support, it is however more tightly coupled to rewards, 
thus in general it should increase GC.
Evidence from the goal setting literature generally indicate that commitment to a goal or 
target, in particular moderately difficult ones, is positively associated with performance 
(Locke and Latham, 1990b, Klein et a l  1999, Hollenbeck et a l ,  1989a). Hollenbeck et al. 
(1989b, p.954) also suggests that “ ...all else being equal, if  evefyooe has difficult goals, 
performance will be highest for those that are more highly committed.” This suggests, 
therefore a possible mediating role of GC in the PES/perfonnance relations. Some evidence of 
this mediating role of GC is also found in the accounting literature. For example, Wemtze! 
(2002) studying resp on sib ility -area managers o f a large urban hospital found that budgetary 
participation fosters a sense of fairness, leading to higher commitment to budget goals and 
better managerial and budgetary' performance subsequently. However, fairness perceptions 
appeared to have no direct effect on performance when goal commitment was considered (see 
also Chong and Chong, 2002).. With regards to dysfunctional behaviour, it Is not clear how 
goal commitment might affect it as priori expectations is tenuous to specify given also no 
empirical or anecdotal evidence. In general It would be expected that as individuals commit to
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achieve a goal they' will increase effort in the right direction, i.e. work hard. However, it is 
conceivable that when goal commitment is high then the higher psychological costs, in 
addition to the material costs, of not achieving the goal might also lead to more dysfunctional 
behaviour like data manipulation or short-termism. as individual seek to achieve the goal and 
avoid the costs.
Hypothesis 14
GC mediates the impact of TF PES such that TF PES is positively related to GC which in turn
a) is negatively related to quality threatening behaviour (QTB)
b) is negatively related to intention to turnover (IT)
c) is positively related to effort (EFF)
d) is positively related to performance
3.5.6 GC Mediation of Goal Difficulty (GD) Moderation Effects
As was noted in Section 3.4.1, the goal setting literature provides evidence indicating that 
specific and difficult goals (GD) lead to higher performance than vague and easy goals. 
However, goal commitment is the most often cited condition necessary-' for this relationship. 
Thus commitment to difficult but achievable goals leads to higher performance. Sheilds et al.
(2000, p i90) also highlight that “ several theories of motivation, including level o f aspiration 
(Stedry, I960), expectancy (Rouen & Livingstone, 1975), agency (Chow, 1983), and goal 
setting (Hirst & Lowy, 1990), have been used to predict that, assuming a standard is accepted 
as attainable, performance is an increasing function of standard difficulty'.” It was also argued 
that individuals were more likely to commit to moderately difficult goals than very difficult 
goals, especially when they are rewarded based on attaining those goals, because it was. costly 
to exert more effort towards unattainable goals. So GC is likely to be at the highest level and 
thus performance when goal difficulty is at a moderate rather than a low' or high level. 
Equally, when GD is moderate GC is more likely to lead to reduced dysfunctional behaviour 
as individuals increase effort towards achieving their goals. Therefore GC explains the
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moderating effect of GD on the TF PES and performance relations as put forward in the 
following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 15
GC explains the moderating effects of GD on the relationship between:
a) TF PES and QTB such that TF PES is positively related to GC, and GC in turn is
more negatively related to QTB when GD is moderate than high or low
b) TF PES and IT such that TF PES is positively related to GC, and GC in turn is more 
negatively related to IT when GD is moderate than high or low
c) TF PES and EFF such that TF PES is positively related to GC, and GC in turn is more
positively related to effort when GD is moderate than high or low
d) TF PES and Performance such that TF PES is positively related to GC, and GC in 
turn is more positively related to performance when GD is moderate than high or low
3.5.7 Intervening Effects of Job Related Tension
Studies o f PMCSs especially those based on accounting information generally explain its 
unintended dysfunctional consequences as indirect via the increased job related tension (JRT) 
these systems cause, particularly when used in a high target focused or uncompromising 
manner. The general premise is that used in a very target focused manner, a PMCS lead to 
increased job tensions which then lead to increased dysfunctional behaviour - as a way of 
coping with the increased tension. Altogether effort and performance is also negatively 
impacted (Hopwood, 1972; Argyris, 1952). In contrast, Ross (1994, p630) cites Brion (1989, 
p. 368) in arguing that a PMCS used in a low' target focused manner also leads to higher 
feelings o f anxiety because of evaluator biases and idiosyncrasies, and the inherent ambiguity 
a low TF PES entails. However, very few' studies have empirically tested for the mediating 
role of JRT on the effects of PES on behaviour and performance, Shields et al. (2000, p. 186) 
observe that ‘7he predicted or estimated effects o f a control-system component on a dependent 
variable can depend on which other variables that are affected by that component are 
included in the study.” For instance, they find evidence that the overall relationship between 3
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control systems components (participation, standard tightness, and standard-based incentives), 
and performance were explained better via the mediating effects of JRT than directly.16
In general, (cognitive) consistency theory has been identified as the theoretical base for 
linking PMCSs to behaviour and performance via JRT. The theory' posits that individuals 
strive for an equilibrium cognitive structure and disequilibrium conditions leads to cognitive 
conflict which in turn leads to stress. In the context of control systems, cognitive conflict 
results from the inappropriate use of controls, in a given circumstance, which leads to 
increased JRT. In their review of the budgetary control literature, Covaleski et al. (2003, p. 
23) observe that “stress is a frequently used dependent variable in psychology-based 
budgeting research because it is a direct consequence o f being in disequilibrium and it leads 
to dysfunctional behaviour” such as gaming, reduced effort, or poor communications 
(Argyris, 1952).
On the other hand, it is also acknowledged that JRT does not necessarily lead to only 
dysfunctional effects, but that up to some moderate level JRT can have positive effects on 
performance (Hopwood, 1972; 1973). According to Shields et al. (2000), the arousal model - 
a variant of the Yerkes-Dodson Law -  provides the theoretical basis explaining this effect. 
The model predicts that up to some (moderate) level of JRT increases motivational arousal 
which causes increased and focused effort, and thus higher performance. But above this level 
o f stress additional arousal causes interference, anxiety, and disorganisation, leading to 
reduced and diffused effort and thus reduced performance. However, Shields et al. (2000) also 
note that empirical evidence provided by several studies generally do not support this 
prediction but rather supports a linear negative relation between JRT and performance. In 
general, evidence from several PMCS studies also suggest that a TF PES leads to increased
16 In Shields et al.’s (2000) study, participation referred to the amount of influence subordinates had in the setting 
of their performance goals; standard tightness referred to the level of performance achieved in relation to the 
amount o f resources available to achieve it; while standard based incentive referred to the degree that valued 
rewards related to performance against performance standards.
Chapter 3 Theory Development and Hypothesis Formulation 74
JRT (Hopwood, 1972; Kenis, 1979; Otley, 1978; Brownell, 1982a; Imosili, 1989; Lau & 
Buckland, 2001). Therefore it appears that JRT mediates the relationship between PES, 
behaviour and performance such that TF PES increases JRT which then engenders more 
dysfunctional behaviour, reduced effort and performance. This is put forward in the following 
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 16
JRT mediates the impact of TF PES such that TF PES is positively related to JRT which in 
turn is
a) positively related to QTB
b) positively related to IT
c) negatively related to performance
d) negatively related to effort
3.5.8 JRT Mediation of Interactive use of Control Systems (ICS) Moderation Effects
The effect of JRT on behaviour and performance is also explained by the task demand- 
performance capability model based on the person environment fit literature (Edwards, 1996). 
Similar to the predictions of the cognitive consistency model, this model predicts that JRT 
increases as the gap between the job performance demands and individual’s performance 
capability increases. As task demands increase over performance capability ambiguity about 
task demands increases or individuals have more uncertainty about how their efforts affect job 
outcomes resulting in feelings of role ambiguity and/or loss of control. This then causes a 
reduction and diffusion in effort and hence performance. As argued in Section 3.4.3, ICS 
alleviates the tensions and tendency to engage in dysfunctional behaviour due to the increased 
interaction and information exchanges it engenders given that these interactions provide 
subordinates with opportunities to communicate emerging job relevant information to their 
superiors; to clarify their roles, their superiors’ performance expectations, and also their
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strategy for achieving the set goals. In other words, JRT might also provide an explanation of 
the mechanism by which ICS moderates the effects of TF PES, i.e. the absence of or low ICS 
means subordinates feel an increased anxiety and tension without the opportunity to bridge the 
gap between their capability and the job demand by tapping into the experience o f their 
superiors. Increased tension then leads to reduced and diffused effort, which also negatively 
impacts performance. This is put forward in the following hypotheses thus:
Hypothesis 17
JRT explains the moderating effects of ICS on the relationship between
a) TF PES and QTB such that TF PES is more positively associated with JRT at low 
compared to high ICS, and JRT in turn is positively related to QTB
b) TF PES and IT such that TF PES is more positively associated with JRT at low 
compared to high ICS, and JRT in turn is positively related to IT
c) TF PES and Effort such that TF PES is more positively associated with JRT at 
low compared to high ICS, and JRT in turn is negatively related to effort
d) TF PES and Performance such that TF PES is more positively associated with 
JRT at low compared to high ICS, and JRT in turn is negatively related to 
performance.
3.5.9 Intervening Effects of Job Satisfaction
There does not appear to be a well articulated theory of the relationship between TF PES and 
job satisfaction (JS) and there are insufficient empirical evidence on this (see also Table 2-2). 
Chenhall (2003, p. 133) notes that “interestingly, there have not been many MCS studies that 
have examined the effects of MCS on job satisfaction.” The few empirical studies that exist 
though generally suggest a negative association between TF PES and JS, albeit not 
statistically significant. For instance, Kenis (1979) hypothesized that a punitive evaluation 
style, i.e. high TF PES, will result in lower JS and found a negative but non-significant 
association. Harrison (1992) also found a negative non-significant association between TF 
PES and JS, but Brownell (1982a) reported a positive but also non-significant association.
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These studies also suggest that TF PES impact on JS may be dependent on other factors 
though it generally appears to be negative.
In relation to the criterion variables, dissatisfaction with one’s job is often seen as a precursor 
to poor performance, dysfunctional behaviour, and intention to quit the job. The more 
(dis)satisfied people are with their job the (more) less inclined they are to change/leave their 
job. In the psychology literature for instance George and Jones (1996) found a negative and 
significant correlation between JS and intention to turnover (IT). In the economics literature 
also, Sousa-Poza and Henneberger (2004) found JS to be among the 3 strongest predictors of 
IT among several factors they investigated in their cross country survey of 25 countries 
including the UK.17 Their study showed the UK had the 4th highest score for IT and ranked 
18th for JS. They attributed the high IT in the UK to the low JS which they reasoned arose 
from poor working conditions. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that people are more likely 
to engage in dysfunctional behaviour such as doing shoddy jobs if they are not satisfied with 
their jobs than if they are satisfied with their jobs. The negative relation between JS and IT 
and dysfunctional behaviour is consistent with expectations that would be derived from equity 
theory, particularly when perceptions of inequity significantly contribute to the dissatisfaction.
On the other hand, several studies in the psychology literature provide evidence of a positive 
relation between JS and performance, although on average the correlation is low and different 
opinions exist as to the causal direction of the relationship (Vroom, 1964, Lawler and Porter, 
1967). However, Petty et al. (1984) meta-analytic study reported a positive correlation of .31 
(corrected for attenuation) between JS and performance, which led them to concluded that 
“the results o f  the present study indicate that individual job satisfaction and job performance 
are positively correlated the size o f the mean correlation that is reported in the present
17 The other 2 strongest influences on IT they identified include "job security” (how secure respondents thought 
their jobs were) and “firm pride” (how proud respondents felt to be working for their organisation). The other 
factors they investigated include age, level of education, flexible working time, union membership, and public 
sector employment.
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study between overall satisfaction and job performance is impressive.” (Petty et al., 1984. 
p.719). Following from these discussions, JS is hypothesized therefore to mediate the 
relationship between TF PES and IT, performance, and QTB.
Hypothesis 18
JS mediates the impact of TF PES such that TF PES is negatively related to JS which in turn 
is
a) negatively related to QTB
b) negatively related to IT
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Chapter 4 Research Design & Methodology
This chapter discusses the research design and data collection method employed in this study. 
The rationale for the case study design is provided in the first section and the actual process of 
negotiating and gaining access into a suitable organisation is detailed in the second section. 
The third section discusses the web survey methodology employed in the study and describes 
the construction of the survey. The survey items and the constructs they measure with a brief 
description of their reliability are presented in the final section.
4.1 Case Selection
This study was designed to examine the management control practices of a single large 
organisation using survey and field research methods. The study was planned in three stages; 
the first stage involved interviewing some employees at different levels in the organisation to 
gain insight into the organisations operations, and to enhance the validity and structure of a 
pre-developed survey instrument. The second stage involved developing and pre-testing a 
survey instrument, and last stage involved gathering of data for quantitative analysis via an 
online survey.
It is expected that control practices have changed since the time of earlier accounting studies 
in the 1970s and 1980s given the changing emphasis on budgetary control with more firms 
adopting more non-financial measures of performance (Hope and Fraser, 2003a; Kaplan & 
Norton, 1994, 2001; Otley, 1999). In this context, a single case based research method was 
chosen in order to develop an understanding of the operation of organisational control 
processes. Furthermore, a single firm study design is likely to increase understanding of how 
the variables in the study interact in a specific setting before generalisations can be made. This 
design also controls for other possible confounding firm effects likely to arise in a cross- 
sectional study such as firm culture, firm size and internal structure, and degree of 
environmental uncertainty. However, the downside of this study design is limited
Chapter 4 Research Design & Methodology 83
generalisability, although theoretical generalisation should not be affected (Eckstein, 1975 ; 
Flyvbjerg, 2001). For the case study, access was sought at a large firm with many branches in 
the UK. Large firms are more likely to have distinct hierarchical structures and highly 
developed and formalised performance management control systems (PMCSs) — properties of 
interest in the study. Secondly, such firms would provide a reasonable sampling frame. 
Therefore the prime targets were the four big banks in the UK, then secondarily general 
retailers i.e. the big supermarkets, and lastly the big professional accounting firms. These 
firms were targeted as they were considered more likely to meet the criteria mentioned above; 
i.e. they have similar operations in different geographical locations with large number of 
employees, they have distinct organisational hierarchies, and highly developed performance 
management systems.
4.2 The Process o f Gaining Access & Case Descriptions
Successfully gaining access to a suitable case organisation was a difficult and time consuming 
process. It took about a year to get an organisation interested in participating in the study and 
another year to move from talking to the organisation to actually conducting the study. Along 
the way, there were many unfruitful efforts but persistent efforts finally paid off. This long 
and difficult process is detailed in the subsequent paragraphs below which outlines:
a) the process of ‘choosing’ a case organisation and the different strategies employed
b) the inherent practical difficulties of adopting the case study research design and the 
potential costs in both research time and possible compromise to the substance of the 
research in order to secure access; and
c) practical lessons and considerations for future researchers wishing to adopt the case 
study methodology in this field.
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The quest for access to an organisation began in October 20-03'. At first, the four large UK 
banks were targeted, and as a fall back option large retail organisations were also considered 
in case access was not gained at any of the banks. The initial strategy employed was. to' 
approach the target organisations one at a time rather than simultaneously. This was a 
conscious decision to ensure that the situation did not arise where two or more organisations 
granted access at the same time, making it difficult to' follow up" on both simultaneously. I did 
not wish to excuse myself from following up' any access granted as that may make future 
access opportunities into such organisations more difficult for me as well as. for future 
researchers. Moreover, the study was designed to examine- a single organisation and. there 
w ere insufficient resources, in terms of both time and funds, for intensive study o f  mom  than 
one organisation at the time. The following sub-sections discuss the approaches made to 
different organisations, and the strategies employed.
4.2.1 Bank A PLC (November 2003 -  January 2004)
The first organisation approached from the target list will be refemred to' as Bank A. A faculty 
member at the Accounting and Finance department o f Lancaster University Management 
School (LUMS) provided a contact to a director in Bank A from previous work done in. 'the 
Bank some years back. This contact was sent a letter in. November 2003 which ©rtlined the 
research proposal and potential benefits to Bank A o f participating in the study. H e  letter to 
Bank A is similar to that shown in Appendix 1, which is the generic mtrodoctoiy letter used 
by this study but modified in each case to suit the particular circumstances o f  t i e  Mmrn 
approached. In December 2003, while still awaiting response from the Bank A director, .am 
interview with one of the bank’s local branch manager was successfully arranged. The 
interview was arranged with the help of a customer services- officer o f the bnaadfai during a 
personal visit to the branch. At this stage the aim o f  the interview was to gain some insight 
into the general operation of the bank’s PMCS in order to enhance the study 'design..
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A semi-structured interview with the local bank manager took place the same month and 
proved quite useful. Not only did it offer insight into the general operation o f the bank’s 
PMCS, but it also offered some theoretical insight to the study. It became evident that the 
tension between short vs. long-term goals achievement were more likely cast in different 
terms in different organisations. This tension it seems is not always cast in terms o f the nature 
o f performance measures in use i.e. financial vs. non-financial, or objective vs. subjective 
measures. In this organisation for example a branch managers’ performance was measured in 
3 main areas viz. how well control standards, sales, and service targets were met. Sales and 
services relate to dealing with walk-in customers, and exploiting the opportunity o f selling 
other bank products to them, which they may not be aware of or may get elsewhere.. Sales and 
services targets are usually broken down into ‘income’ and ‘numbers’ e.g.. ‘x ’ number of 
mortgages, new accounts, savings accounts within a year, but changes year to year depending 
on the strategy; e.g. sale of other products to existing customers to meet customers’ potential 
needs. Controls relate to dealing with health and safety issues e.g. ensuring limited money 
within premises in case of a raid (money was moved every other day by Securieor), fraud 
awareness of staff, and ensuring that staff know' and follow the laid-dowm procedures for 
serving customers. Control targets are usually stated in terms of passing reviews.. The control 
and service performance measures were seen as more long-term oriented while the sales 
performance measures were regarded as more short-term oriented. Tensions appeared to' exist 
in attempting to meet targets in all 3 areas. For instance, meeting control standards were 
perceived to restrict how well the sales targets are likely to be met. 'This is the- case despite the 
fact thflf most of the measures in both areas had similar characteristics Le, they were 
objective/quantitative targets, and set in both financial and non-financial tennis.. This insight 
made Bank A interesting to study but unfortunately access, was not gained The director 
contacted did not respond necessitating follow up' calls to the secretary'.. In the end the reply 
was not favourable and thus ended the approach to Bank A.
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4.2.2 Bank B Group (February 2004 -  M arch 2004)
The next bank approached in the target list will be referred to as Bank B. Unlike in the first 
approach, there was no prior contact available for Bank B so a ‘cold call’1 was in.ade this time. 
Inevitably, we were then seeking the appropriate contact in Bank B, To this end. Bank B’s 
2003 annual report was scanned to identify potential contact details, Bank B’s group strategy 
director was identified as a possible entry route, firstly, on the basis, that he would be 
interested in successful implementation of strategic objectives given Bank B’s recent 
acquisition of another bank. Thus, a study on the impact of PMCSs on implementation o f 
strategic objectives was likely to be of interest to him. Secondly, the brief description o f his 
role seemed to include performance management inter alia, and Ms position on the 
organisational hierarchy was considered high enough that he could authorise the study if  it 
interested him. He was contacted in February 2004 via a letter, as in Appendix 1, enquiring if 
Bank B might be interested in the research study.. About 3 weeks later, after email 
correspondences with his secretary, a decision was eventually received from him declining the 
bank’s participation in the study.
Given the time it took to get responses from the first two organisations, 'the limited time to- 
complete my PhD study and the seemingly low probability o f striking it lucky with the next 
organisation, a change in strategy was deemed necessary. Instead o f  approaching 
organisations one at a time, it was decided to1 simultaneously .approach, as many as was 
practical at the time. Therefore, in April 2004, 3 organisations were approached at 'the same 
time; specifically the remaining 2 banks in the initial target list, referred to .as. Bank C and 
Bank D, and 1 oil company referred to as E Pic.
4.2.3 Bank C Pic; Bank 1) Pic; & E P k (April 2004 -  June 2004)
The approach to Banks C and D were ‘cold calls’ while E Pic was approached via a contact 
supplied by another faculty member at the Accounting and Finance department o f LUMS. Ttie 
‘cold calls’ to Banks C and D were initiated through their focal branch managers. First, in a
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visit to a local branch of each bank, appointments were secured to' meet with the managers 
from the customer service personnel at each branch. The reason for seeking the appointment 
was explained in part to the customer service personnel. The primary aims for the meetings 
were to get a feel for the possibility of gaining access into' the banks for the study, and where 
possible to obtain contact details of the appropriate person(s) to address the access request to.
In mid April 2004, I met with the local branch manager of Bank C and the meeting yielded a 
name in Bank C’s regional office, but the correspondence to this person was to be addressed 
via the branch. A few days later, the introductory letter cum proposal was sent to this 
manager. The main content of the letter is similar to that shown in Appendix 1. Two weeks 
after sending the letter, a follow' up telephone call was made to the manager. A second follow' 
up call was again made two weeks later. In the end, a reply was received to the effect that the 
organisation declined to participate for which no particular reason was offered.
On the other hand, the meeting with Bank D‘s local branch manager, held the same week as 
that with Bank C’s manager, did not yield any contact names or details. However, the 
manager agreed for the introductory letter cum proposal to be written care of her for onward 
delivery to the appropriate person in the organisation. Again, the main content o f the letter is 
similar to that shown in Appendix 1. Interestingly, I observed on several visits' to the branch 
both prior, during, and after the meeting that the branch seemed to be having staffing 
difficulties. There were long queues in the banking hall and the customer services person was 
different every week within the period I visited. And an informal chat with one o f customer 
service representatives confirmed this. Apparently some o f them had been called in from other 
branches in the region to help out this branch. Two weeks after delivering the letter to the 
branch manager, a follow' up telephone call was' made tO' learn of the response and the 
manager asked to be called again a week or two later. Two weeks  ^ later, I called at the branch 
in person and was then informed the authority(ies) had left it to' the branch to decide whether 
to participate or not. Unfortunately, the branch decided it was not convenient for them to
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participate, presumably because of their staffing difficulties at that time. It could not be 
ascertained whether the response from the authority(ies) meant other branches could be 
approached individually or not. However, no further requests were made at this point.
The approach to E Pic, the oil company, differed slightly. As mentioned earlier, a faculty 
member at LUMS offered a contact name with details. This contact was from his MBA 
student days. Telephone calls were made to this person but with no replies. However, a 
message was left on the answering machine on each occasion. After several o f these calls and 
messages left on the answering machine with no response from this person, the request could 
not be progressed any further.
4.2.4 Change of Approach Strategy
After exhausting the initial list of companies and contacts without successfully gaining access 
to any organisation, another approach strategy was adopted. This was to extend the quest for 
access by seeking indirect contact through professional organisations in addition to exploiting 
any corporate relationship that units in LUMS might have. Thus in June 2004, the Director of 
Research at the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Scotland (ICAS) was approached 
through the Director of Doctoral Research at the Accounting and Finance department of 
LUMS. It was hoped that ICAS might have well-placed members who could help. The request 
for help communicated to the ICAS research director also indicated a large bank as the ideal 
organisation but that a large multi-divisional commercial organisation would suffice in place 
of a bank. In addition, the head of International Strategy' and Policy Co-ordination at the 
Financial Services Authority' (FSA) was also contacted via another LUMS faculty’ in the 
Economics department. Furthermore the Management Development Division (MDD) and the 
External Relations & Corporate Communications at LUMS were approached as well as many 
more faculty members in other academic departments of LUMS with the hope of tapping into 
their contacts with large businesses. Each of these sources for contacts was provided with a 
general synopsis of the research as well as a sample of the introductory cum proposal letter for
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distribution to their potential contacts. Over the course of the next 4 months, constant follow 
ups were made on these sources of contacts as well as the contacts they eventually provided.
4.2.5 3 More Banks, and the F PLC (June 2004 -  August 2004)
The Director of Research at ICAS informed us she had approached 3 banks, and in reply to a 
follow up email in July 2004 said “these things take time Vm afraid as it is quite a big 
committement from  the banks point o f  view. Most o f them have said that they need to get 
clearance from  head office etc so it will take a while” The eventual feedbacks from the banks 
received in the 3rd week of August 2004 were unfavourable, all declined to participate. On the 
other hand, the FSA contact, did not respond to our initial communication via email and no 
other follow up was made. A faculty member at the Marketing department of LUMS provided 
contact details o f the CEO of a large general retail company, which will be referred to as F 
Pic. This contact was from his previous work for the group company some years back. In mid 
September an introductory letter, with the main content similar to that shown in Appendix 1, 
was sent to this CEO. However, no reply was received and the request could not be 
progressed any further.
Nevertheless, there were positive developments in September 2004. The MDD at LUMS 
provided warm links to another oil company which will be referred to as G Pic. The MDD 
were currently running an executive training program for the company. In addition, another 
faculty member at the Accounting and Finance department of LUMS provided warm links to 
a senior person in one of the big four accounting firms which will be referred to as Firm ABC 
LLP. The contacts at both G Pic and ABC LLP expressed interest in the study to the MDD 
and the faculty member respectively, before their details were passed on.
4.2.6 G PLC (September 2004 -  November 2004)
As mentioned earlier, contact with G Pic originated from the executive education program 
organized by the MDD at LUMS for the company’s senior management including their
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directors. Prior to the contact with G Pic., I had had several meetings with the MDD program 
director coordinating the executive program to solicit her assistance in negotiating access to 
an organisation, and eventually to determine which would be suitable with a good probability 
o f success. G Pic was identified as such an organisation on account of the nature of the 
training program they were receiving which bothered on motivation and performance 
management.
In the last week of September 2004, an invitation was secured to one o f the program review 
meetings between the MDD programs facilitator and a group of G Pic’s directors. In addition 
to this general meeting, separate meetings were also held with 2 directors responsible for 2 
key business areas of the company’s upstream business sector. The general meetings, served 
as preamble to the separate meetings. In the general meetings, it wfas highlighted to the 
directors that some of the benefits to the company in participating in this research study 
directly addressed some of the issues Identified In their review meeting with the MDD1 
program facilitator. G Pic management were at a stage of reviewing their PMC'S and 
realigning their senior management team and culture. So it seemed a good time to conduct the 
study. Over the course of the following 6 weeks, 2 meetings were held with a newly appointed 
director o f a key business segment who strongly wanted a change in the PMCS, the culture, 
and a realignment o f the top management of the business segments under him. In addition, a 
meeting was also held with a director of another key business segment, and with the human 
resources (HR) director.
On the whole, the outcome o f each meeting with each business segment director was positive 
with them expressing optimism for their businesses to1 participate in the research project. On 
the other hand, the meeting with the HR director appeared at first to be an appraisal o f  my 
credentials in carrying out such a study. My curriculum vita was reviewed and questions 
asked on the purpose and methods ot carrying out the study. Once it seemed satisfactory' 
answers were provided, the meeting then progressed to a discussion o f G Pic s PMCSs, and
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unto the reasons why the two business segments were particularly interested in participating in 
the study. G Pic had expanded its operations with recent acquisitions in these business 
segments, and the directors were concerned that these business segment’s PMCSs were 
inconsistent with the overall PMCS in G Pic. Therefore, they were interested in finding out 
the actual performance practices in these business segments, and how best to align it with G 
Pic’s overall PMCS. However, other meetings with the directors of these 2 key business 
segments revealed other agenda that raised concerns for carry ing out the research study. The 
concerns relate to what appeared to be the main agenda in their agreeing to participate. The 
information/findings from this study were to be used as further basis for implementing desired 
changes in the top management structure of the respective business segments. For instance, 
the main operation and the management of the business segment under the new ly appointed 
director were located in another region different from head office where the director was 
based. This director felt that the top management of this business segment were keeping 
information from him and were also trying to whip employee sentiments against him as they 
perceived him as being fairly inexperienced (on account of his age and time in this segment) 
and as an ‘outsider’. The director had appointed another person as part of the top management 
team of this business segment, but this person w as almost completely shut out of the decision 
making process by the old management team. This study was therefore seen as an opportunity 
to find out more of w hat was going on and as a basis for implementing radical changes in the 
top management team. This is a reminder of the political/social aspect of PMCSs and the 
possible use of control systems or accounting information as catalyst for political change. 
Thus, case study researchers need to be sensitive to any such political agendas within their 
research site, and how it might impact on their study.
After these series of meetings the expectations was for another meeting to be held individually 
with the directors of the 2 business segments to finalise arrangements to visit these business 
segments, and to be introduced to their management. Strangely, the next communication 
received from the MDD program facilitator in the 3rd w eek of November 2004 w as that G Pic
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was no longer going ahead with the initial plans to participate in the study. Further enquiries 
revealed the reason for this turnaround to be that G Pic’s parent company in France did not 
approve of their participation. G Pic was going to contact me if the situation changed, and of 
course this did not happen.
4.2.7 ABC LLP (September 2004 -  September 2005)
In September 2004 a faculty member at the Accounting and Finance Department of LUMS 
provided a contact in one of the big four accounting firms in the UK. This firm will be 
referred to as ABC LLP. The faculty member first approached his contact, a director and 
board member in ABC LLP and also the Head of Human Capital (HC), with a brief outline of 
this study. After interest in the research study was indicated the contact details were then 
passed on, and in the 2nd week of September 2004 an email was sent to this person. The email 
briefly introduced the aims of the study but carefully stated there was flexibility still in what 
the study will cover to accommodate what might be of interest to ABC LLP that may not have 
been apparently covered in the brief introduction. The email also suggested a meeting to 
explore possibilities for mutual collaboration that might be of mutual benefit. A copy of this 
email is shown in Appendix 2, but names have been omitted for confidentiality. The email 
was replied in the 2nd week of November 2004 indicating the director was happy to meet for 
further discussions, and the meeting eventually took place on the 2nd of December 2004 in 
ABC LLP’s London office. The meeting was to make initial contact to elicit and confirm the 
director’s interest to co-operate with the research study, as well as to understand what wfas of 
particular interest to ABC LLP from the study. The meeting paved way for subsequent 
meetings with her and her staff to discuss the research study and ABC LLP s participation in 
more detail. It was anticipated that meetings will be held in January and February to discuss 
the study requirements including the mechanics for administering the survey part of the study 
billed for implementation in April 2005.
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However, the second meeting of a series of meetings with ABC LLP representatives was 
eventually held on the 3 of February' 2005 at the London office. This meeting lasted a little 
over an hour and was attended by the HC Director, the People Strategy' Director, and the 
Global Performance Management Project (GPMP) manager. In the meeting, the aims of the 
research study were explained as well as the expected means of data collection. The HC Head 
also explained ABC LLP’s interest in the study and what were of particular interest to them. 
ABC LLP was interested in how employees perceived the feedback they receive on their 
performance, and how this helped them in their career choices. They' were also generally 
interested in their performance management practices, particularly in gaining more insight on 
the clarity of objectives and of the leadership provided by superiors, and the perceived link 
between performance and reward. Thus information from the study was going to be useful as 
a prelude to the planned revision of ABC LLP’s global PMCS expected to be implemented 
around July 2005. Furthermore, schedule of potential meetings with the HC director and her 
staff as well as anticipated timeline for the study was discussed in the meeting. It was 
concluded that the study should be done in a single geographical region in which ABC LLP 
had offices. The GPMP manager was also appointed as the gate keeper/coordinator for the 
research project reporting to the HC Director. Hard copies of the proposed survey questions 
were also provided to each person.
After a series of email exchanges with the GPMP manager, another meeting was held on the 
23rd of February 2005 at ABC LLP’s regional office. In the meeting, the GPMP manager 
described ABC LLP’s structure and performance management processes and their concerns 
about their PMS. In addition, the survey sample size, duration, and expected time line for final 
development and launch was discussed. It was concluded that interviews with managers in 
ABC LLP’s three lines of serv ice were needed in order to gain more insight into the PMS and 
to ensure the terminologies of the survey questionnaire were understandable by' staff in the 
different lines of service. Items to be included on the survey questionnaire were also briefly 
discussed and the GPMP manager w anted the surv ey questionnaire to be run through the HC
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department experts before the interviews with managers. Furthermore, the mode of 
administering the survey was also discussed. ABC LLP’s internal satisfaction surveys were 
conducted online and it was agreed that a web based survey would therefore be more desirable 
than a paper based one.
The fourth meeting was held on the 21st of April 2005 with the GPMP manager and a senior 
manager in the HE department. The senior manager from HC subsequently became the main 
contact point for all the interactions with ABC LLP till the survey was successfully deployed. 
Discussions at this fourth meeting focused on the mechanics and timeline o f the survey. Other 
issues discussed: included which and how many staff to include in the survey; how best to 
communicate to and enlist the participation of these staff; when to launch the survey; how 
long the survey will be open, and when to send follow up messages. In addition, the managers 
raised some issues about the wording of survey items as well as the length of the survey. They 
generally wanted the length of the survey reduced.
Discussions on the survey items and their wordings continued via email exchanges. Based on 
these ongoing discussions, slight modifications were made to the survey questionnaire and 
sent to the managers. However, at this point the HC manager raised concerns to the effect that 
it was uncertain that ABC LLP was going to be able to go ahead with participating in the 
survey. The concerns related to the wordings of some of the questionnaire items which she 
perceived as rather leading and questioning of their integrity. The survey questionnaire was 
then revised to address the perceived negative tone of some of the questions and emailed to 
the HC manager for further review.
Another meeting was held with ABC LLP’s managers on the 22nd o f June 2005 via a 
conference call facility. The meeting was attended by the HC manager and one of ABC LLP’s 
senior IT staff previously involved in administering ABC LLP’s internal surveys. The meeting
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focused on agreeing the final survey items to be included and on the mechanics of pilot testing 
the survey as well as the final survey deployment. Specific issues discussed included:
•  the content and format of the survey, i.e. the ordering of demographic questions, 
what options to provide for certain questions, further changes to the questionnaire 
items and wordings, and how staff were to access the survey;
• the survey sample, i.e. which regions to cover, how many staff to invite to participate 
in the survey and who was to send the cover email invitation; and
• the timeline for the deployment and duration of the pilot tests and the final survey 
The survey questionnaire was revised again in the light of the above discussions, and the 
agreed final draft was then sent to a small group of ABC LLP’s staff in the selected region for 
pilot testing. Though the survey was going to be web based, a paper version was sent to the 
staff members as interv iew s w ere also arranged with these staff members to discuss the surv ey 
questions and gather any more relevant information before pilot testing the web version.
The interviews of the staff members took place on the 20th of July 2005. Six people were 
interviewed then, and two others unavoidably absent were interv iewed over the telephone 2 
days later. From the feedbacks of these interviews, further adjustments were made to the 
survey questionnaire. Then another telephone conference meeting was held with the HC 
manager and the senior IT staff on the 29th of July 2005 to discuss the feedback from the 
interviews, the changes to the survey on account of the interview feedbacks, the proposed 
pilot test of the web version and the covering email to be sent to the participants. With all 
changes finally agreed, the web based survey w as to be pilot tested by a small group o f staff. 
The web address link and password to access the survey was emailed to 12 ABC LLP’s staff 
members in the region by the IT manager. The pilot test started on the 5th of August 2005 and 
ended on the 9th of August 2005. Few adjustments were made to the web survey from the 
feedback of the pilot test and after some email correspondences and telephone conversations 
with the HC manager. The final surv ey was then launched on the 25th o f August 2005 with an
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email invitation from ABC LLP’s regional chairman to the target staff in the major offices in 
the Midland region.
4.2.8 About ABC LLP
ABC LLP is one of the largest professional services firm in the world, and one of the big four 
Accounting firms in the UK. As a limited liability partnership (LLP) its legal structure is 
different to that of a company. The global firm is organised as a collection of autonomously 
run member firms in each country of operation, and the senior partners of the member firms 
form a global board of partners in the 'umbrella' organisation based in the UK. The UK based 
umbrella firm provide co-ordination and strategic direction for the member firms.
ABC LLP has over 15,000 partners and staff in the UK, and the global firm employs over
140,000 people in 149 countries with aggregated worldwide net revenues over $20 billion for 
fiscal year 2006. In the same fiscal year the firm served over 84% of the FT Global 500 
companies. The firm generally operates 3 major lines of service (LOS) viz.:
•  Assurance -  which provides audit and assurance services including actuarial insurance 
services, assistance with the capital market transactions and regulatory compliance and 
reporting.
•  Tax -provides tax planning, tax compliance, and transfer pricing services.
•  Advisory - provides consulting services covering performance improvement; business 
transactions; human resources; and crisis management in a range of specialist areas.
The professional staff of ABC LLP are graduates who usually join the organisation at the 
entry level within any of the three LOS, and usually are in a training contract. Most of the 
graduate joiners tend to start in Assurance (i.e. audit) and most take the ACA qualification. 
However, those who join the specialist area of Tax may sit ATT and CTA, while some of 
those who join the specialist area of advisory may sit the CFA qualification. Therefore new 
joiners tend to join under a training contract, the specifics of which depend on the particular
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requirements of the qualification they are training for. In Advisory, new staff also join as 
experienced hires usually above the Associate level. Some of the issues covered by training 
contracts include the starting time which can be at any time of the year; the length which can 
be between three and five years; the minimum hours of technical work based experience that 
would be undertaken over the length of the contract; timescales for ongoing review and 
structured learning; what the firm will give in study leave and how the exams should be fitted 
around work; the number of exam attempts the firm will support; and any pay increases that 
are linked to successful exam results. The training contracts are usually different from the 
employment contract. However, employment contracts are usually structured to allow people 
to continue progressing with the firm after successfully completing their training, and most of 
those who do tend to remain with the firm.
In all 3 LOS, the general career progression is along the line of the hierarchical levels in the 
firm. Staff will normally progress from an Associate, which is the graduate entry level, to an 
Executive, then to Manager, Senior Manager, Director, and ultimately onto a Partner. 
However, there are also different grades within some of these levels onto w hich staff progress 
depending on performance and experience. For example, at the Associate level there are 3 
grades; grades 1, 2, and 3; and 4 grades at the Executive level. In Assurance for instance, 
individuals would normally start at Associate level grade 1 and are promoted to the other 
grades as they progress through their exams moving onto the Executive level upon completion 
of all exams within the expected time frame, normally the same as the length of the training 
contract. However, from the executive level there is no set timeline for promotion to Manager 
and other levels. Such promotions depend on an individual gaining the relevant experience 
and demonstrating the relevant skills and competencies required at that level. Normally staff 
at Executive level grades 2 — 4 would have successfully completed their training and are 
perceived as ‘assistant managers’, though this designation is not officially used in the firm.
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ABC LLP UK is organised into regions with a regional Chairman overseeing the entire 
operations in a region. Within ABC LLP UK’s operations there are usually different units in 
each LOS with unit leaders overseeing the day to day operations. Also each LOS has an 
Operations Leaders overseeing the day to day operations, and a Business Unit or Group 
Leader with oversight for a group within the region.18 Client service workflows are generally 
organised around projects with a team working on each project and a team leader responsible 
for each project. As such an individual could be working in more than one team with different 
team leaders. As the regions Assurance Operations Leader put it “ .. .you very rarely work in a 
single team...what we tend to do is...we are constantly bringing together teams to survey 
particular business issue, a particular client’s needs. But they disband quite quickly, and form 
other teams for a different client. So its very rare that you get the same group of individuals 
who work on more than one client...I mean you sometimes get partners and managers that 
work together on say 3 or 4 clients....but by and large what we do is we bring together very 
different teams... .so a manager might have 5 different partners that he works for.”
In terms o f performance evaluation, an individual gets feedbacks from each team leader that 
he has worked for, and sometimes the feedbacks could also be from the peers as well as 
subordinates. However each individual, in his unit, has a counsellor or appraiser that pulls 
together all the feedbacks that arises on that individual and proposes their performance rating 
based on assessment of these feedbacks against the core competences mapped for the grade 
and role of that individual. In most cases, individuals would have agreed a set of goals or 
objectives with their counsellor/appraiser 12 months before, usually around July/August, and 
these provide a platform for their appraisal and personal development plans. Usually, the 
individuals are meant to personally pull the feedbacks from the team works they have 
participated in and do a self appraisal as a starting point for the formal appraisal with their
18 The Operations leader is usually responsible for the day to day financial operations; oversees the resources 
planning department and allocation of individuals to client teams at manager and staff level, and oversees the HR 
function being involved in the annual appraisals, the moderation process o f these appraisals, and the appraisal 
translation to rewards.
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counsellor/appraiser. The counsellor in most cases would also consult the individuals that 
gave the feedback.
The performance appraisal rating scale generally used is 1 - exceptional performance, 2 — 
above expectations, 3 - meeting expectations, to 4 - performing below expectations. The exact 
wordings used differ slightly between the 3 LOS, and one LOS use a 5 ratings scale which 
only expands the middle ratings in the 1 -  4 scale. The appraisal ratings also feed into the 
reward systems including salary increments and bonuses. With the bonus scheme for instance, 
those rated as performing below expectations, i.e. those rated 4 or the equivalent, do not get 
any bonus while those rated as exceptional performers get the most bonus -  as much as 25% 
o f their base salary. The initial appraisal ratings, however, go through a moderation process 
before being signed off; first at the unit level for all units within the LOS, then at the LOS 
level for all the LOS in the region. The counsellor/appraiser argues/defends the ratings he has 
given at the unit level moderation meeting with other counsellors and the unit leaders. Then 
these are again moderated at the LOS level with the unit leaders, partners and business unit 
leaders. After the full moderation process is complete, the counsellor then confirm to the 
individual the final rating given. The moderation process is based on the anticipation of a 
distribution of ratings; for e.g. 15% of individuals are expected to be rated exceptional and 
where a unit or LOS rates more than 15% of their people exceptional then this is challenged at 
the moderation process. Though the Assurance Operations Leader for the region 
acknowledged the ratings had important implications with respect to rewards, he was of the 
view that the appraiser/counsellor was considered more of a facilitator in a process that gets 
signed off by the partnership and group leaders than as a boss. However, he also 
acknowledged that the ratings are always an issue that is keenly contested at all levels. As 
indicated earlier, ABC LLP was keen on improving its performance management system 
particularly the feedback process when they were approached to participate in this study. This 
must have triggered their interest in the study.
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4.2.9 Sum m ary and Lessons Learnt
What conclusions and lessons can be drawn out of this process of seeking access to a suitable 
organisation? One obvious lesson is that it can be a daunting and very drawn out process. 
Inexperienced researchers, particularly PhD students, seeking to conduct a field or case study 
may not appreciate the enormity of this statement. Often, the quest for access is started a bit 
late in the second year or so of their studies. The reason for this late start is often because they 
or their supervisors may feel that earlier than their 2nd year they are not quite ready yet, and
they may flounder if granted access then or get inundated with data thus making it more
difficult to manage the research. Though there is some merit in the argument, often though 
little or no consideration is given to the time it might take to successfully negotiate access to a 
case organisation. The advice therefore would be to start as early as possible to consider 
access issues. Efforts at gaining access should be started once the researcher has some idea 
and outline of the study, even if not fully developed, which often times happens within the 1st 
year o f study. This is particularly important when the researcher does not have warm contacts 
in industry to call on immediately.
This raises the second issue on the importance of having contacts, as can be seen from the 
above accounts. The most positive and most timely responses were received from warm links. 
It may seem obvious then that cold calls don’t work but even previous contacts from Tong 
ago’ may be difficult to obtain a favourable response from. These issues are not highlighted 
prominently in the literature and thus inexperienced researchers do not often appreciate their 
enormity, which if  they did early in their research could save them some time and stress.
While it may not always be the case that gaining access to an organisation can be veiy 
daunting, it is certainly the case that adapting the research to the site is a lengthy process that 
is not always explicitly portrayed in the literature. Even after securing access to an 
organisation interested in the study, agreeing and administering the survey in this study was 
still a long process that spanned over 8 months and involved several meetings, emails
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correspondences, conference calls, and interviews with some key staff. Being flexible to their 
schedule was very important, and more importantly it also entailed making compromises on 
the original questionnaire items in terms of both the number of questions (i.e. the length), and 
the specific wordings of the questions. Though the changes to the original survey entailed 
reducing the topics covered, it however improved the relevance of the survey to the research 
site, and probably also increased the response rate of the survey. Shortening of the survey 
instrument was one of the big pressures at the time. Nonetheless, validation of the survey 
items in later sections show no evidence that the instrument lost much value given the 
Cronbach alphas and the response rate. Researchers should be aware and ready to make 
compromises to accommodate the interests of the case organisation.
Another related lesson is that organisations more likely to be interested in participating in 
research are those thinking of or already in the process of making changes to their systems, 
e.g. the PMCS, the top management team, or the perceived culture in the organisation. So, on 
one hand, researchers could target such organisations as the chances of successfully 
negotiating access seem higher. However, such organisations may agree to participate in order 
to use the research as an opportunity to implement the already desired changes as if they were 
necessitated by the outcome of the research. In order words, there may be political motives in 
agreeing to participate in a study that may not be related to the study aims. Such political 
contexts could fundamentally shape the research agenda as well as the outcome. This implies 
that the researcher is unavoidably embroiled in the politics of the organisation. Thus the 
researcher is always going to be on somebody’s side, and can t always be neutral. On one 
hand, researchers need to be conscious of such possibilities so as to recognize such situations 
and try to ride the crest of the politics as it were. And on the other hand, researchers need to be 
conscious of such possibilities in order to recognize and take account of the possible impact 
on the outcome of the research, for e.g. biasing the study results to be representative only of
such organisations.
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4.3 Data Collection Method
Data was collected in two ways; via interviews with a small group of ABC LLP’s staff and via 
a web survey of ABC LLP’s staff in the selected region. The interviews were used primarily 
to enhance the development of the measurement instruments in order to enhance construct 
validity, and also ensure the survey was understandable and relevant to the target participants. 
But it also provides some context for the interpretation of the survey results enhancing the 
internal validity of the study. Data for quantitative analysis was collected via a web based 
survey. The sections below provide an overview of the questionnaire development in general 
and the web-survey development process in particular starting with a brief review of the issues 
generally identified with the survey methodology and how these relate to web based surveys. 
The aim is to provide a rich set of information that would be of use to future researchers that 
may consider using this medium for data collection.
4.3.1 Survey Development -  Two Stage Process
The development of the survey questionnaire could be classed as a two stage process 
involving, of course, several sub-processes. The first stage of development involved adapting 
instruments previously used in the literature, developing new ones, and pilot testing to 
validate the measures. The second stage of developing the survey primarily involved adapting 
the survey questionnaire, from the first stage development, to the context of the case 
organisation.
Following a review of the literature, several measures for the concepts o f interest were 
identified and adapted for this study. In addition, some new measures were also developed. 
Conceptual validity of these measures was sought by discussing the measures with several 
faculty members at Lancaster University including a senior faculty member with extensive 
experience and expertise in management accounting research. The instrument was modified 
after analysing their comments and suggestion, and the modified instrument was then pilot
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tested with some academic and non-academic staff at Lancaster University Management 
School and with some research students as well. Their responses were discussed with them 
individually to further ascertain the degree of face validity of the measures, and the changes 
that might increase response validity. Based on the outcome of these discussions, slight 
modifications were made to the presentation of the survey items ready for the final process of 
this first stage development. The final process in this first stage of developing the primary 
survey questionnaire involved nicely reformatting the questionnaire and then pilot testing the 
paper version with a group of 20 Malaysian mid-managers of a multi-national company 
located in Malaysia. This was done after the initial pilot tests with students, faculty and admin 
staff at LUMS to pre-test the survey with real managers prior to the launch of the survey in a 
case organisation. The Malaysian managers were used on account of the convenient and easy 
access to them via a colleague. In addition, it was also thought to be a good thing in testing 
how generalisable the survey items were to settings outside the UK. At this point, no further 
modification was made to the questionnaire.
The paper version of the primary survey questionnaire was submitted to the case organisation 
after preliminary contacts with the firm. Following the first substantive meeting with the firm 
involving discussions with a director and 2 senior managers, main areas of interest to the firm 
were identified and mapped onto the areas covered by the primary survey questionnaire. This 
yielded a second draft of the survey questionnaire with additional measures to cover the few 
areas of interest to the firm not covered by the primary survey questionnaire. This second 
draft was discussed -  among other things - in a meeting with the Global Performance 
Management Project (GPMP) manager and a senior Human Capital (HC) manager held at the 
firm’s office. They raised concern about the questionnaire length and thus the time it might 
take to complete the survey. Consequently, a decision was made to cut down the 
questionnaire length keeping only the major items of interest to the study, and the revised 3 
draft was promptly emailed to the two managers for their review. Still they expressed doubts 
about the firm’s continued participation in the survey, as they thought a lot more time and
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effort was needed to develop the questionnaire further before it could be implemented. As it
turned out, the main concern related to the wordings of some of the questionnaire items. For
instance, in one email the HC manager expressed that:
“...the survey itself appears to be quite unusual in that it includes a number o f  
behavioural type questions which are asked in a rather leading way, fo r example about 
the trustworthiness o f managers. In its present format it leaves the feeling that 
something is wrong with our current performance management processes eg whether 
as a business we trust our managers. It appears as i f  it will prompt sta ff to question 
some o f  the behaviours o f their managers and participants may fee l dissatisfied at the 
end o f  the survey.”
Consequently, the relevant questionnaire items were modified to make the perceived negative 
tone of the survey more positive. The revised fourth draft was then emailed to the HC 
manager for approval. Again, concerns were expressed about the length of the survey to the 
effect that a much shorter survey was preferred as this would also encourage more staff to 
participate. In the light of this, the survey was further trimmed to reduce the length. 
Questionnaire items measuring each variable were critically reviewed and duplicate items 
which were judged not to be critical to the reliability of the measure were then deleted. The 
fifth draft of the survey was finally approved by the firm for pilot testing before the eventual 
launch. Pilot tests and interviews were conducted with a small group of staff, following which 
slight modifications were made to scale anchors and wordings of a few questionnaire items to 
provide more clarity and consistency with terminologies in use at the firm. This sixth version 
of the survey, as it were, was pilot tested again but as a web-based survey before being finally 
administered. The pilot tests were done with a small group of the case organisation staff, and 
with some faculty and PhD students at LUMS.
As noted above, the survey development was in two stages with the second stage being the 
final adaptation of the survey to the context of the case organisation. It is worthwhile to note 
that this second development process briefly described in the paragraphs above added value in
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two ways. First, it ensured the questionnaire related well to the case organisation’s context, 
and wras well understood by the target respondents thus enhancing content as well as response 
validity. Secondly, the survey efficiency and probably the response rate were increased by the 
use of minimal number of item measures. However, the downside of using fewer items in 
each scale is the potential cost to the reliability' o f the measures.
4.3.2 Web Surveys in Management Accounting Research
The use of survey methodology' in management accounting research is well established, 
although with many critiques (especially in the US). For instance, Van der Stede et al. (2005) 
report that from 1982 to 2001, over 30% of all empirical management accounting published in 
8 main accounting journals used the mail survey method.19 The use of the World Wide Web 
(the web) as a means of collecting large amounts of data is. increasing dramatically not only 
among survey professionals and large organisations but also in other fields of management 
study. However, management accounting research using the web survey method is very scant 
despite this mode of data collection becoming established in other fields of management 
study, e.g. marketing. One recent example of a management accounting research using a web 
survey is Lowe and Locke’s (2005) study of UK academics perception of the ranking of peer 
reviewed accounting journals. The scarcity of studies using the web survey method may be 
because most management accounting researchers have little expertise in the use o f the web 
technology for research purposes. Although there are similarities between the mail and web 
survey methods, the construction and successful deployment of web surveys demand different 
skills sets from those required by the traditional mail survey, i.e. computer programming 
ability and webpage design skills. With the growing number of internet users and ongoing 
advances in computing devices and computer programming, the use o f the web to conduct 
surveys and collect large amounts of data is likely' to become prevalent in both .academia and 
industry. This presents huge opportunities as well as. significant challenges.
19 The 8 journals included in Van der Stede et al. (2005) study are 405 , CAR, J A E ,  JAR J M A R ,  M A R ,  TAR, and 
B ehavioural Research in Accounting.
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Web surveys are very attractive compared to the traditional mail or telephone surveys because 
it is relatively much cheaper to deploy (no interviewer, stationery or postage required). It also 
provides instant access to a wider audience irrespective of their geographical location; and by 
the same token achieves faster response rates. In addition, it offers the facility for the direct 
recording and automatic encoding of survey responses in a format readable by most statistical 
packages like Excel, SPSS and SAS. Moreover, this is achieved while the survey is still in 
progress enabling survey responses and other information to be captured in real time and in 
the desired format. Thus it reduces considerably, and in some cases completely eliminates, the 
data encoding and entry time required by the traditional survey methods. Furthermore this 
eliminates potential data errors introduced by such manual data encoding and data entry. For 
instance, it avoids missing responses and ambiguous ticks. It is therefore not inconceivable 
that in the near future web surveys may dominate mail surveys as the method for large data 
collection in management accounting research.
4.3.3 Issues in Constructing a Web Survey
Web surveys are similar to mail surveys in many respects and thus are not immune to some of 
the issues that are generally identified with the survey methodology; rather they raise new 
dimensions to them. Salant & Dillman (1994) identified the main sources of errors that affect 
the ‘accuracy’ of survey results as coverage error, sampling error, measurement error, and 
non-response error. Coverage error results when the known probability of including all the 
units of a population in the sample is not greater than zero. This can be a great concern for 
web surveys particularly when the target population may not all have access to the internet. 
On the other hand, sampling error results when only a subset of the survey population is 
surveyed and this is completely unavoidable except if the entire population of interest is 
surveyed. Related to this, non-response error results when a significant number of non- 
respondents from the survey sample are different from the respondents in a manner that 
significantly affects the survey results. In other words, had the non-respondents participated,
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they would have provided a significantly different distribution of answers to the issues of 
interest than that obtained from those who responded.
Finally, measurement error results from inaccurate responses to questions. This may be due to 
poorly worded questions and/or the survey method. However, Salant and Dillman (1994) note 
that measurement error is more critical for questions dealing with sensitive or abstract ideas. 
Sensitive questions were more likely to result in measurement error in face to face or 
telephone interviews compared to other survey methods because of the personal contact 
between respondents and the researcher. On the other hand, abstract idea questions were more 
critical with mail surveys and by extension web surveys because the researcher is not 
physically present to clarify respondents’ misunderstandings. This may be more acute in mail 
surveys than in web surveys as web surveys are not as limited in the format and presentation 
o f additional information as the mail surveys. For example, further information explaining a 
concept can be provided by way of pop-up widows that are activated by the respondent only 
when more clarification is required, and so it does not obstruct the main survey if not needed. 
Thus more interactivity can be built into web surveys than is possible with mail surveys.
In this study, coverage and measurement error are not much of an issue by the fact that the 
target sample was pre-identified and the questionnaire sufficiently developed in prior 
discussions with the target organisation using the Microsoft Word version of the survey.20 
Moreover, staff in the case organisation all had internet access, and worked with computers 
and emails regularly in their day to day work. Several pilot tests of the word version of the 
survey had also been carried out both within and without the target organisation. However, in 
designing the survey web pages several other factors were of particular concern, some relating 
to non-response error. The factors included ease of access and navigation of the survey, 
identification of individual responses and issues of confidentiality, and the integrity of the
20 A whole region of ABC LLP was identified as the sample, but thereafter it is a population as the whole region 
was included in the survey.
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data collected. Therefore, the main aim in the design of the web survey was to create web 
pages that were accessible only to the target sample and that would enhance the likelihood of 
the target sample responding, and doing so in the manner intended. Another objective was to 
integrate the web pages with a database such that responses to each web page were 
automatically captured on the database, and to ensure that the data were not ‘corrupted’ by 
uninvited responses from people straying onto the survey on the web. Therefore, secure but 
accessible and easy to navigate web pages needed to be constructed such that the chances of 
responding to the survey did not depend on a number factors such as: the computer skills of 
the respondents; the transmission limitations, the computer equipment or internet browser 
used by respondents. Thus, the web pages were generally constructed within the perceived 
limits of what respondents’ computers, browsers, and transmission lines can deal with. During 
the web survey construction, tests were run using different computers and screen sizes, 
different operating systems, different browsers and from three different locations using 
different connection speeds.
4.3.4 Description of the Web Survey
The web survey pages started with a welcome screen that introduced the survey and thanked 
respondents for agreeing to participate in the survey. Screen shots of the web pages are 
presented in Appendix 3. The ease of completing the survey and the anticipated completion 
time were also emphasised, while providing instructions on how to progress to the next page 
and the rest of the survey. The page after the welcome screen required participants to login 
into the survey using a pre-assigned username and password. The required username and 
password was earlier communicated to the target sample in the cover email invitation sent out 
on behalf of their regional Chairman. Prior to the cover email, an earlier mail had been sent 
out on behalf of the regional Chairman intimating staff of the survey. In the cover email, the 
web link to the survey was included such that a mouse click on the link opened up the survey 
welcome screen page on their internet browser. Since anonymity was agreed beforehand with 
the case organisation, one username and password was used by all participants in accessing
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the survey rather than individual usernames and passwords. However, the web pages were
constructed such that once a respondent logged in a unique randomly generated id was
automatically linked to that login session. This unique id is then used to track the person’s
responses through the whole survey. The potential drawback of using a single username and
password is that an individual might complete' the survey more than once. However, this was
considered very unlikely as the target sample are all graduates and accounting professionals,
have a busy work load, and have done several internal online surveys previously without such
an issue arising. Furthermore, the invitation to participate came from their Chairman and he
indicated that the outcome' of the survey' was going to be useful to the firm in reviewing their
current performance management systems. Finally, it was. felt that the anonymity’' o f the
survey would encourage not only more responses but more honest ones as the risk of any
reprisal is completely removed. Though respondents had the option of providing their email
addresses at the end of the survey, and 31% did, the confidentiality' and anonymity of
responses was also emphasised both on the welcome screen and in the Chairman’s cover
email invitation. An excerpt from the cover email highlighting this is. given below:
The survey is being conducted on a confidential and anonymous basis.. Although ABC  
LLP knows whom this request is being sent to, it will not know' who has replied. Nor 
will any results be released to ABC LLP on individual responses, or which could allow 
any individual to be identified. A report containing aggregate results will be provided 
to ABC  LLP to help enable us to review' our own current performance management 
frameworks.
Due to the confidentiality' and anonymity’' promised, the option o f using ‘cookies’ to’ ensure' 
only one response is submitted from any one computer, and also o f .gathering other unique 
information, was not used.
On successful login, the next web page presented the first page o f the questionnaire. As 
mentioned earlier, the format o f the web questionnaires were constructed to resemble the
21 Cookies are pieces of infomalicin contained in vary small text hies that can be stoned on. users;" computer bard! 
drive by web servers they visit. These can be used to remember login information .and other data,, which can only 
be read by the web server that stored them.
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format o f the paper/word version. The questionnaire started with questions that were easily 
comprehended and completely visible at one time on the computer screen, and ended with 
mostly demographic questions, This was. done to enable respondents to' flow into the survey 
and to ease them out of it at the end, thus making the survey easier and less stressful. The last 
page optionally asked respondents’ comments on the survey and their email address,
In terms o f the mechanics of the web survey, the web pages were constructed in a table format 
such that the 1st column cells contained the question numbers, the 2nd column cells contained 
the questions, and the last column cells contained the response categories, The table size and 
thus its columns were limited to a set percentage of a browser’s screen to' ensure that the 
question wordings all appear on the computer screens o f respondents, Thus respondents did 
not need to scroll across their screens to read all the questions or to see all the response 
categories. In addition, a ‘progress bar’ and text, e.g. 85% complete, were placed at the top of 
the screen to keep respondents informed of their progress. A key feature built into the web 
questionnaire required respondents to provide an answer to each question on each page before 
being allowed to proceed to the subsequent page. This ensured respondent did not 
inadvertently miss some questions as they were redirected to that question. However, this 
feature was not built into optional questions, thus these could be skipped if so desired. The 
potential problem with this feature is that respondents who are unable or may not want to 
provide an answer to a question may terminate the survey prematurely. However, given the 
extensive discussions held with the case organisation and the pilot tests o f both the 
paper/word version and the web version, this was thought to be unlikely. Moreover, .grouping 
and presenting questions page by page enabled the use of another feature that allowed only 
relevant questions to1 be presented based on answers to' previous ones, thus respondents 
skipped irrelevant questions, without even being aware of it.
The web survey was also set up such that responses were captured and recorded on the 
database page by page. A ‘continue’ button was included on each page and once clicked it
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opened up the next page and simultaneously transmitted the completed response for that page 
onto the database. Therefore the browser tool bars with the back and forward buttons were 
disabled such that respondents could not easily go back to a page once completed. It was 
thought that spontaneous responses were likely to be more accurate than if respondents were 
allowed to change their answers after seeing questions on the following pages. However, 
while on a page, answers to any question could be changed by simply choosing the preferred 
response category.
Once the web pages were fully constructed and the database back-end set up, the web survey 
was pilot tested by faculty members and students at LUMS Accounting and Finance 
Department to ensure the technology was working well. Issues raised during this process 
relating to difficulties experienced in assessing some questions were promptly addressed. 
Then another pilot test was conducted with a small number of the target sample and 
everything confirmed to be ok before the launch of the survey.
4.4 Construct Definitions & M easurement
Most of the constructs of interest were measured using established instruments in the literature 
or adaptations of such instruments, most of which are multi-items instruments. However, a 
few constructs were based on single item measures, some of which have been previously used 
in the literature. As noted earlier, some modifications were made to the adapted and new 
instruments in the light of the case organisation’s context in order to improve the instruments’ 
reliability and validity. Both the primary and final survey items measuring each variable are 
presented in each subsection where applicable. The primary survey items are the initial survey 
items presented to ABC LLP while the final survey questionnaire items are the items as used 
in the web survey after the moderation process with ABC LLP.
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4.4.1 Effort & Job Demand
Effort (EFF) is measured by a single item with a preamble which asked respondents to 
‘indicate your belief about the effort you need to put into your job’ followed by the statement 
‘compared to similar jobs positions in the organisation how much effort would you say you 
put into your job ’. Job demand (JD) is also measured by a single item with the same preamble 
above and the statement ‘compared to similar jobs in the organisation how much effort does 
your current job position require’. Both items were measured on a scale of 1 (well below 
average) to 7 (well above average).22
4.4.2 Performance Evaluative Style
Performance evaluative style (PES) was measured using two instruments shown in Tables 4-1 
and 4-2 below. The first is a new instrument developed in this study which taps into the three 
dimensions of PES, i.e. type of performance criteria used, supervisors’ attitude to adverse 
variance from set targets, and the basis of rewards. Table 4-1 below shows this instrument 
with the questionnaire items arising from the first and second stages of the survey 
development. In the final questionnaire, ‘appraiser’ was defined as “the person conducting 
your annual performance review/appraisal”; ‘goals’ as “the pre-set specific levels o f 
performance specified in your performance o b je c t i v e s and ‘rewards’ as “bonuses, 
promotions, high profile job assignments, development opportunities, public recognition etc.” 
The items were measured on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).23
Given the nature of this instrument, its internal consistency cannot be assessed by classical 
reliability measures like Cronbach alpha. In Factor analysis and structural equation parlance, 
the scale items are not all reflective indicators (effects) of PES, some are formative indicators 
(causes) of PES. Though high internal consistency validates the reliability of ‘effect indicator’ 
scales, low internal consistency does not invalidate ‘formative indicator’ scales (Bollen and
22 For the screen shot of the survey item see Appendix 3 page 280.
23 For the screen shot of the survey item see Appendix 3 page 279.
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Lennox, 1991). Full discussion of the construct development and scale used to measure PES is 
detailed in Chapter 5 -  Conceptualisation and Operationalisation o f PES).
Table 4-1 Target Focused PES - Measurement Items: N ew  Instrument
SCALE: 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree 
1st Stage - Initial Questionnaire Items 2nd Stage - Final Questionnaire Items
Preamble. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with Preamble: Thinking about your last annual performance
the statements below review (even if you have not yet had an annual appraisal),
please indicate the extent to which you agree with the 
statements below
1 • My appraiser mainly uses quantitative information (e.g.
financial, time and deadline targets) in evaluating my 
performance
2. My appraiser mainly uses qualitative information (e.g. 
quality of work done) in evaluating my performance
3. My appraiser uses qualitative and quantitative 
information in equal proportions in evaluating my 
performance
4. Normally my superior expects me to operate in line with my 
short-run Targets but is not as concerned with unfavourable 
short-run variances as he is concerned that I meet the long- 
run Targets
My appraiser is more concerned with my overall 
performance than with not meeting specific goals in the 
short-term
My superior is more concerned with other non-target related 
outcomes than with unfavourable short-run variances
5. Normally my superior expects me to operate in line with my 
Non-fmancial Targets in the short-run but accepts good 
reasons for any unfavourable variance
Normally my appraiser expects me to meet my goals but 
accepts good reasons for any shortfalls in performance
Normally my superior expects me to operate in line with my 
Financial Targets in the short-run but accepts good reasons 
for any unfavourable variance
6. My superior expects me to meet my Non-Financial Targets 
in the short-run and is unwilling to accept explanations for 
unfavourable variances
My appraiser expects me to meet my goals and is 
unwilling to accept explanations for any shortfalls in 
meeting them
My superior expects me to meet my Financial Targets in the 
short-run and is unwilling to accept explanations for 
unfavourable variances
7. My bonus pay and salary increments depend heavily on 
other non-target related information
My rewards depend mainly on information other than 
how well I meet my specific goals
My promotion prospects depend heavily on other non-target 
related information
8. My bonus pay and salary increments depend heavily on how My rewards depend mainly on how well I meet my goals
well I met my Targets
My promotion prospects depend heavily on how well I met 
my Targets
~9 My bonus pay and salary increment depend partly on non- My rewards depend equally on how well I meet my goals
target related information and partly on how well I met my and on non-goal related information
targets
My promotion prospects depend substantially on non-target
related information and substantially on how well I met my targets___________________________________________
PES was also measured using an adaptation of Hopwood’s (1972) original instrument. The 
primary instrument used here modified Hopwood’s wording notably the word ‘budgets’ was
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replaced with targets/goals’ to reflect the broadening of the basis of performance evaluation 
from (financial) budget targets to targets in general. In the final instrument used, 
modifications were also made to reflect terminologies in use at the case organisation, and 
items were added and deleted as well. Items which were not identified as relevant 
performance criteria from the interviews were deleted and others identified as relevant were 
added. The items were measured on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all important), to 7 (very 
important). Table 4-2 below' presents both the primary and final survey items used.
Table 4-2 Target Focused PES - Measurement Items: Adapted from H opwood’s Instrument*
SCALE: 1 = Not all important to 7 = Very important 
Initial Questionnaire Items Final Questionnaire Items
Preamble: Listed below are some criteria managers indicate are Preamble: Listed below are some criteria that
important in their superior’s evaluation of their performance, people in other businesses have indicated to be
Please indicate how important you think each criterion is in important in their appraiser’s evaluation o f their
your superior’s evaluation of your performance: performance. Please indicate how' important you 
believe each criterion is in your appraiser’s 
evaluation o f your performance (even if you 
have not yet had an annual appraisal)
1. How well I cooperate with colleagues 
How well I get along w ith my subordinates
How' well I communicate and build relationships 
with colleagues and clients
2. How well I get along with my superior Howf well I get along with my appraiser
3. How well I met my targets [goals] in the short-run How' well I met my goals and deadline targets
4. My concern with quality' (e.g. quality of output, quality' 
of customer service etc.)
The quality' o f my w'ork
5. My actions that produce long-run effectiveness rather 
than short-run results
My actions that produce long-run effectiveness 
rather than short-run results
6. How much effort my superior perceives I put into the 
job
How' much effort my appraiser perceives I put 
into the job
7.
My attitude towards my work
How' long I have been in my current position
8. Are there any others? (Please list.) Are there any others? (Please list.)
♦The criteria in Hopwood’s original instrument are: cooperation with colleagues; concern with costs; getting along  
with my boss; effort put into the job ; concern with quality, meeting the budget; attitude to the work and company; 
and ability to handle the men.
Using this instrument, PES was measured from two perspectives. First it was measured from 
the subordinates’ perspective in line with previous studies, i.e. ‘received PES’ as presented in 
the Table 4-2. Secondly, PES was also measured from the superiors’ perspective, i.e.
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transmitted PES. However the preamble of the final survey questionnaire and the form of 
the criteria were changed to reflect this.25 For e.g., item 1 in Table 4-2 was changed to ‘how 
well they communicate and build relationships with colleagues and clients' and the preamble 
o f the question was changed to ‘listed below are some criteria that appraisers in other 
businesses indicate are important in the evaluation o f their sta ff members’ performance. 
Please indicate the level o f importance you attach to each criterion, on average, when 
evaluating your staff members ’ performance.’ Respondents to this question were also asked to 
rank the criteria in order of importance. In addition, they were asked to indicate if the order of 
importance remained the same across different periods.
4.4.3 Organisational Hierarchical Level
Organisational hierarchical level (OHL) was measured directly as respondents’ current grade 
in the organisation, from support staff to partner. A scale of 1 to 6 was used to measure OHL 
with 1 representing support staff; 2 -  associate/executive assistant; 3 -  manager; 4 -  senior 
manager; 5 -  director; and 6 -  partner. Accounting firms are known to be highly hierarchical 
and current grade directly captures respondents’ position on the organisation’s hierarchy.26
4.4.4 Equity & Fairness Perceptions
The primary instrument used to measure equity and fairness perceptions (EFP) is based on the 
6 item instrument used by Janssen (2001) to measure fairness perceptions. The questionnaire 
was cut down to 5 items, and the wordings were also modified to make it more positive in 
tone. The scale reliability of the cut down instrument (Cronbach alpha 0.84) compares 
favourably with the scale reliability of .90 reported by Janssen (2001, p. 1042). The items were 
measured on a scale of 1 -  7, anchored as 1 -  strongly disagree, 4 -  neutral and 7 -  strongly 
agree. Both the initial and final questionnaire items are reported in Table 4-3 below.27
24 Superiors and subordinates cannot be connected, only individuals with both roles respond to both PES measures.
25 For the screen shot of the survey item see pages 281 and 294
26 For screen shot of survey items, see Appendix 3 page 290.
27 For screen shot o f survey items, see Appendix 3 page 284.
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Table 4-3 Equity and Fairness Perception - Measurement Items
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Initial Questionnaire Items Final Questionnaire Items
Scale: 1 = totally disagree to 7 = totally agree Scale: 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree
Preamble: Please indicate the extent to which you Preamble: Rewards, for the purposes o f  this survey, refer to
agree with the following statements salary, bonuses, promotions, high profile job assignments, and
other forms o f recognition. Please indicate the extent to which 
you agree with the following statements
1. The rewards I receive are not proportional to 
my investments
The rewards I receive are appropriate to the effort I put into 
my work
2. I give a great deal o f time and attention to the 
organisation, but do not feel appreciated
I give a great deal o f time and attention to the organisation, 
and this is appreciated
3. I feel unfairly treated in my job I feel I am fairly treated by my employer regarding allocation 
o f work, projects, and job assignments
4. I invest more in my job than I receive in return I feel I am fairly treated by my employer regarding promotion 
and advancement opportunities
5. I work too hard considering my rewards I feel fairly treated by my employer regarding my 
compensation (salary awards and bonus pay)
6. I put more energy into my job than it is worth
4.4.5 Goal Commitment & Goal Difficulty
The primary survey questionnaire contained 7 items as measures of goal commitment (GC) 
synthesized from the instruments used by Hollenbeck et al. (1989a, 1989b) and Latham and 
Steele (1983) and adapted for the context of this study. Hollenbeck et al. (1989a) used their 7 
item instrument to measure individuals’ commitment to difficult goals. Two of these items 
that did not apply to the context of this study were dropped. Similarly, Latham and Steele’s 
(1983) used their 4 item instrument to measure individuals commitment to a goal based on 
their acceptance of the goal. Only two of these measures were adapted for this study as 
Hollenbeck et al.’s instrument had 2 items probably adapted from the other half of the Latham 
and Steele’s measure. Both instruments were used in an educational context i.e. using 
undergraduate students as subjects. On the other hand goal difficulty (GD) was measured 
using 3 items adapted from Kenis’s (1979) measure of budget goal difficulty. All the 
measures are listed under the 4 initial questionnaire items column of Table 4-4 below. Items 3 
and 9 are those adapted from Latham and Steele (1983); items 4 to 8 are adapted from 
Hollenbeck et al. (1989a); and items 1, 2 and 10 are adapted from Kenis (1979).
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Initial Questionnaire Items Final Questionnaire Items
Scale: 1 -  totally disagree to 7 = totally agree Scale: 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree
Preamble: Please indicate the extent to which you agree Preamble: Rewards, for the purposes o f this survey,
with the following statements refer to salary, bonuses, promotions, high profile job
assignments, and other forms o f  recognition. Please
indicate the extent to which you agree with the
following statements
1. I should not have too much difficulty in reaching I should not have too much difficulty in reaching my
my goals/targets goals
2. It takes a high degree o f effort, skill and know­ It takes a high degree o f  effort, job skill and know-how
how on my part to fully attain my goals/targets on my part to fully attain my goals
3. I strive very hard to attain my performance 
goals/targets
I strive very hard to attain my performance goals
4. I think my performance goals/targets are good I think my performance goals align well with my units
goals to shoot for objectives
5. I am committed to attaining my performance 
goals/targets
6. It wouldn’t take much to make me abandon my 
performance goals/targets
7. Quite frankly I don’t care if I achieve my 
performance goals/targets or not
8. Its unrealistic for me to expect to reach my 
performance goals/targets
9. It is very important to me to at least attain my 
performance goals/targets
10. My goals/targets are quite difficult to attain
In the final survey questionnaire, however, only 4 of the 10 items were retained - 2 items from 
the adapted goal difficulty measures and 2 from the GC measures.28 Preliminary factor 
analysis (principal components factoring) using SPSS was carried out to explore the factor 
structure of the 4 items. All items loaded unto one factor explaining 46.5% of the total 
variances. Factor loadings were greater than .7 except for item 1 with a loading of .26. The 
internal consistency, i.e. Cronbach alpha, for the 4 items was 0.55. However, when item 1 is 
removed from the scale, the alpha improves to 0.67.29 Also, factor analysis show one factor 
for the 3 items explaining 61% of the variance, and factor loadings for the 3 items improve 
just slightly. Thus item 1 (reverse coded) is interpreted as a single measure o f GD while GC is 
assessed by the other 3 items.
28 For screen shot o f  survey items, see Appendix 3 page 286.
29 Following Nunnally (1978) proposed rule o f thumb; alphas o f .7 or higher are generally reported in the literature 
as indicating internal consistency o f a scale. Nevertheless, Nunnally (1967, p.306) also proposed alphas o f .5 or 
higher as adequate for research purposes.
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The GD measures were grouped with the GC measures not only because they are conceptually 
linked, but more so due to the considerable similarity of both item measures. The more 
widely used operational measures of GC (e.g. Hollenbeck et al., 1989a; Latham and Steele, 
1983) focus on a statement of commitment to a goal (i.e. target) and then perceptions of the 
achievability of the goal. However, attainability of goals i.e. goal/target difficulty is 
conceptually different from GC although it may significantly affect GC.
4.4.6 Performance: Actual Performance Rating & Managerial Performance 
Performance is generally acknowledged as multi-dimensional and different studies measure 
performance differently. Generally, performance measures in management accounting studies, 
whether for an individual or unit, can be classified into two types -  objective and subjective 
measures. Objective measures of performance are usually derived from archival data like 
official performance ratings, and/or accounting numbers. On the other hand, subjective 
performance measures usually consist of self- or superior-ratings of a single item asking of 
overall performance in comparison to some others, and/or several items asking for rating of 
several dimensions of performance.30 Performance was assessed at an individual level with an 
item asking respondents to indicate the outcome of their last performance rating -  termed 
actual performance rating (AP). In addition, respondents at manager grades and above were 
also asked to indicate what they believed was the level of their performance compared to their 
peers -  termed managerial performance (MP).jl In the case organisation, the outcome of the 
annual performance review' was performance ratings w hich also formed part of the basis for 
rewarding staff. In addition to the actual performance rating received, respondents were also 
asked to indicate the performance rating they expected and what they thought accounted for 
any difference between the expected and actual rating. The questionnaire items are given in 
Table 4-5 below:
30 The most commonly used multi-item instrument measuring managerial performance is the Mahoney et al (1963; 
1965) instrument. It measures performance along the following dimensions; overall, planning, investigating, 
coordinating, evaluating, supervising, staffing, negotiating, and representing.
31 For screen shot o f survey items, see Appendix 3 page 291. This page appeared only to managers who had 
experienced a performance review, those who hadn’t were presented with Appendix 3 page 292, and those who 
were not managers were presented with Appendix page 293.
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Table 4-5 Performance - Measurement Items
Actual Performance Rating Measure 
Scale: 1 to 5*
Managerial Performance Measure 
Scale: 1 = well below average to 7 = well above average
Preamble: This question relates to the outcome o f  
your last performance review (although you may not 
use the exact ratings indicated here, please specify as 
near as possible)
1. What was the outcome o f your last Considering everything, how would you rate your level o f
performance review (your evaluation rating) performance as a manager/supervisor compared to your
peers (other managers/supervisors) in your Business 
Area/Region
2. What do you feel the rating should have been
3. If there is a difference between your answers 
above, why do you believe this is justified
*No anchoring statements were used here because exact wordings differed slightly in some Lines o f  Service and 
the consultations, interviews and pilot tests all supported not using any anchoring statements. However, ‘1’ was 
consistently used to denote the best performers. In addition, some parts o f the case organisation use a 4 ratings 
scale while others use a 5 ratings scale. However, it was agreed with the organisation that the 5 rating levels should 
be used as every staff is able to relate to it, and staff interviewed prior to launch also concurred. Thus the 5 point 
scale was used with no anchoring statement.
4.4.7 Job Related Tension
Job related tension (JRT) is assessed by an adaptation of the 15-item index of job-related 
tension developed by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan (Kahn et 
al., 1964). Following Shields et al. (2000, p i94) the 15 items were trimmed to the 9 items 
listed in ‘initial questionnaire items’ column of Table 4-6 below. Furthermore, the 
applicability and appropriateness of each item was assessed in the light of the interviews of a 
sample of managers in the case organisation. This resulted in a further trimming of the 
measures to the 4 items listed in ‘final questionnaire items’ column 2 of Table 4-6.32 Internal 
consistency o f the 4 items measured by Cronbach alpha was 0.69, which compares well to the 
0.70 alpha reported by Shields et al. (2000) for their 9 item measure of JRT. Given the 
reduced number of items in this scale, the Cronbach alpha of .69 reasonably compares well 
with those reported by previous studies using the original scale (e.g. a = 0.85 - Kenis, 1979; a 
= 0.78 - Hirst, 1983; a = 0.76 - Dunk, 1992; a = 0.89 - Lau and Buckland, 2001)
32 For screen shot of survey items, see Appendix 3 page 284/285.
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Scale: 1 -  Never, 2 -  Rarely, 3 -  Sometimes, 4 = Often. 5 = Almost Always 
Initial Questionnaire Items Final Questionnaire Items
Preamble: The following is a list o f things that Preamble: The following is a list o f things that
sometimes bother people in their work. How frequently sometimes concern people in their work. How
do you feel bothered by each o f them? frequently do you feel concerned by each o f them?
1. Feeling that you have too heavy a workload, one 
that you can’t possibly finish during an ordinary 
working day
Feeling that you have too heavy a workload, one that 
you find very difficult to finish during an ordinary 
working day
2. Thinking that you’ll not be able to satisfy the 
conflicting demands o f various people over you
Thinking that you’ll not be able to satisfy the conflicting 
demands o f  various people in positions o f  authority 
above you
3. Feeling unable to influence your immediate 
superior’s decisions and actions that affect you
Feeling unable to influence your immediate superior’s 
decisions and actions that affect you
4. Thinking that the amount o f work you have to do 
may interfere with how well it gets done
Thinking that the amount o f work you have to do may 
affect how well it is done
5. Not knowing what your superior thinks o f you 
how he evaluates your performance
6. The fact that you can’t get information needed to 
carry out your job
7. Feeling that you have too little authority to carry 
out the responsibilities assigned
8. Not knowing just what the people you work with 
expect o f  you
9. Being unclear on just what the scope and 
responsibilities o f your job are
4.4.8 Dysfunctional Behaviour - Quality Threatening Behaviour
Dysfunctional behaviour was assessed directly with a new instrument developed for this 
study. This measure taps into some of the behaviours described in the accounting and finance 
literature as potential consequences of performance evaluation and reward considered 
unethical or problematic by organisations, and at times the society at large (Hopwood, 1972; 
Otley, 1978; Merchant, 1990; Demirag, 1995; Coates et al., 1995, Grinyer et al., 1998; Otley 
and Pierce, 1996a, 1996b; Murphy, 2004; Sweeney and Pierce, 2004). Respondents were 
asked to indicate the extent they had experienced five descriptions reflecting the problematic 
behaviours identified by these studies. Both the initial and the final survey items are presented 
in Table 4-7 below.33 Cronbach alpha of 0.69 indicate the scale has acceptable internal 
consistency.
33 For screen shot o f survey items, see Appendix 3 page 286.
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Scale: 1— Never, 2 -  Rarely, 3 -  Sometimes. 4 = Often. 5 = Almost Always
Initial Questionnaire Items
Managers identified some common experiences they 
have in their jobs; how often do you experience each o f 
these?
1 Taking actions that enhance long-term 
performance when it negatively impacts short­
term performance
2 Having to do things on the job you feel are 
against your better judgement
3 Having to stay longer hours in the office 
indicating you are working hard
4 Having to over report actual performance
5 Having to under report actual performance
6 Making investments in training and development 
though it negatively impacts short-term 
performance
7 Having to shift income or expenses between
 accounts, or between periods___________________
Final Questionnaire Items
Listed below are pressures some people in other 
organisations claim to have experienced in their jobs. 
To what extent have you experienced these in your 
current job? (Even if the questions don’t particularly 
apply to your job, please give the nearest possible 
answer)
Taking actions that enhance short-term performance o f  
the firm even though it negatively impacts long-term 
performance
Having to do things you feel are against your better 
judgement in the course o f your work
Having to stay longer hours in the office to indicate you 
are working hard
Feeling it necessary to avoid or skip a required 
procedure
Feeling I cannot record all the time I spend on a specific 
work, project, or job assignment
4.4.9 Interactive Use of Control Systems
Based on Simons (1995, 2001) interactive control systems concept, interactive use of control 
systems (ICS) is usually measured in the literature from the perspective of top managers or 
supervisors, rather than that of subordinates.34 In addition, measures of ICS used in the 
literature is related to the use of specific formal control mechanisms like budgets, scorecards, 
and project management systems (Abemethy and Brownell, 1999; Bisbe and Otley, 2004), 
and to specific MCS information such as customer information, product design information, 
cost information, resources information, and profitability information (Davila, 2000).
However, this study differs from previous studies in the operationalization of ICS in several 
ways. First, ICS is measured in this study from subordinate managers’ perspective.
34 Some authors also allude to interactive controls as the intensity o f use o f  controls (Chenhall, 2003) and as the 
intensity o f  information exchanges (Van der Stede, 2001).
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Table 4-8 Interactive Use o f  Control Systems - Measurement Items
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Initial Questionnaire Items




Reports tracking performance against Preamble: Thinking o f the way in which performance 
information is used, please indicate the extent to which 
you agree with the following statements:
‘‘Information about my performance against agreed 
objectives/targets . . .”
Are the subject o f face-to-face discussions with 
my superior whether there are deviations or not 
from performance targets
Is used by my superior mainly to force us to 
continually question and revise the assumptions 
upon which we base our plans
Commands my superior’s regular and frequent 
attention.
Is the subject o f face-to-face discussions with my 
appraiser whether or not my performance diverges from 
the agreed objectives/targets
Is used by my appraiser mainly to encourage me to 
continually seek information and ways o f improving my 
work performance
Is the subject o f my appraiser’s regular and frequent 
attention
Is used by my appraiser to encourage and inspire me,
and to facilitate my development______________________
Second, ICS is assessed in relation to the overall formal performance measurement and 
evaluation information rather than to information from specific control mechanisms. Thirdly, 
the overall performance measurement and evaluation information relates to individuals rather 
than units or products. Role theory lends credence to the measurement of ICS from the 
perspective of subordinates rather than superiors. Role theory distinguishes the enacted from 
the received role (Deutsch and Krauss, 1965), and also indicates that the relevant role is the 
behaviour of the role occupant most directly influenced by the context under consideration. In 
the context o f this study, the focus is on the received role rather than the enacted role as the 
other variables of interest is also measured at this level. Therefore, ICS is measured from the 
perspective of the subordinates. Four items were used to measure ICS (see Table 4-8) 
above.35 These items were synthesized from the previous studies mentioned above and 
adapted for this study. The items show high internal consistency with a Cronbach alpha of
0.87.
35 For screen shot o f survey items, see Appendix 3 page 288.
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4.4.10 Intention to Turnover
Intention to turnover (IT) was assessed using a single item, adapted from London and Howart 
(1978), which asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement (on a scale of 1= strongly 
disagree to 7 = strongly agree) with the statement ‘barring any unforeseen circumstances I 
intend to stay with my current employer.’ This measure was also used by Hunton et al. (1996) 
in a study of hierarchical and gender differences in accounting departments of 3 
manufacturing industries and more recently by Parker et al. (2005) in their study of 
organisational justice and turnover in public accounting firms. Similar single item measure of 
IT was also used by Ketchand and Strawser (1998) in their study of turnover intentions in a 
public accounting setting.36
4.4.11 Job Satisfaction
Job satisfaction (JS) has been measured in management accounting literature using several 
different measures. Brownell (1982a, p. 18) notes that “the number of ad hoc measures (of job 
satisfaction) used in single studies defies estimation.” However, based on reliability and 
validity criteria he narrowed the measures down to 2 main measures, i.e. the Job Descriptive 
Index (JDI) (Smith et al., 1969) and the Minnesota Satisfaction Questionnaire (MSQ) (Weiss 
et al. 1967). In this study however, JS was measured by a single item which asked respondents 
to indicate their agreement (on a scale of 1= strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree) with the 
statement ‘all in all I am very satisfied with my job.’ Similar global measure of JS has been 
used in other studies (e.g. Sousa-Poza & Henneberger, 2004; Nagy, 2002; Scarpello & 
Campbell, 1983). The issue with single item measures is that they may be considered less 
reliable than multi-item measures.
However, Scarpello & Campbell (1983) note that there is no empirical evidence that the single 
item measure of JS is unreliable, and they advocate the use of a single global measure of JS in 
place of the sum of the facet satisfaction measures like the JDI and the MSQ. They concluded
36 For screen shot of survey items, see Appendix 3 page 287, item lk \
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from results of their empirical tests of single global JS measures and the MSQ that global 
single measures of JS appear to include consideration of other variables that influence JS not 
captured by the facet measures in the MSQ and other such instruments. Furthermore, they 
state that a ratings measure of global JS is more inclusive than summation of many facet 
responses. In addition, Petty et al. (1984) meta-analytic study concluded that the relationship 
between individual overall job satisfaction and individual job performance measure is stronger 
and more consistent than the relationship between JDI facet of JS measure and job 
performance. Several other studies also reach similar conclusions regarding the use of a global 
single item measure of JS (Wanous et al., 1997; Nagy, 2002). Wanous & Hudy (2001, p.368) 
re-emphasise the conditions for using single item measures stating that they are “ ...most 
appropriately used in situations in which the construct of interest is (a) unidimensional rather 
than multidimensional, (b) clear to respondents, and (c) sufficitently narrow.” The JS 
construct for the purposes of this study meets these conditions, and on the balance of evidence 
and for parsimony a global single measure of JS was employed.
4.4.12 Organisational Commitment
Organisational commitment (OC) was assessed using measured adapted from the 9 item scale 
of Mowday, et al. (1979, 1982) as recently used by Parker et al. (2005). The Mowday et al. 
scale is noted as one of the most widely used measures of affective commitment with 
acceptable levels of reliability and validity reported by previous studies employing the scale 
(Meyer, et al., 1989; Angle & Peny, 1981). The initial and final survey items are listed in 
Table 4-9 below  and only 8 of the 9 items were initially used.37 However, after further 
review of the items, given the need for parsimony, only 4 items were adapted in the final 
survey. Items were deleted first if it was considered to have a close substitute, and second if 
the item is among those reported by Parker and Kohlmeyer (2005, p.366) as not loading
37 The item not used is 7  talk up this organisation to my frien d s as a g rea t organisation to w ork fo rd  This item was 
not considered relevant to the context o f the present study. For screen shot o f  survey items, see Appendix 3 page 
287, items to 7 ’
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...appropriately in factor analysis.”38 In the current study, Cronbach alpha for the 4 item 
scale is 0.78, which is satisfactory and compares well with the 0.85 alpha level reported for 
the full scale by Parker and Kohlmeyer (2005).
Table 4-9 Organisational Commitment - Measurement Items
Scale: 1 — Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree 
Preamble:JPlease indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements
Initial Questionnaire Items Final Questionnaire Items
1. I would accept almost any type o f job assignment in 
order to keep working for this organisation.
Within my role, I would accept almost any type o f  
work, project, or job assignment in order to keep 
working for this organisation
2. I am extremely glad that I chose this organisation to 
work for over others that I was considering at the 
time I joined.
I am extremely glad that I chose this organisation to 
work for over others that I was considering at the time I 
joined.
3. I really care about the fate o f this organisation I really care about the future o f  this organisation
4. 1 am willing to put in a great deal o f effort beyond 
that normally expected in order to help this 
organisation be successful
I am willing to put in a great deal o f  effort beyond that 
normally expected in order to help this organisation be 
successful
5. I find that my values and the organisation’s values 
are similar
6. I am proud to tell others that I am part o f this firm
7. This organisation really inspires the very best in me 
in the way o f  job performance
8. For me this is the best o f all possible organisations 
for which to work
4.4.13 Supervisory Trust
Supervisory Trust (ST) was measured using an instrument adapted from McAllister (1995) 
used to measure interpersonal trust among a dyadic group of managers and professionals. This 
scale consists of 6 items measuring affect based trust, and 5 items measuring cognition based 
trust. McAllister reported Cronbach alphas of .89 and .91 for the affect and cognition based 
trust scales. Ambrose and Schminke (2003) combined all 11 items of this scale to assess 
supervisory trust, i.e. individuals’ relationship with their immediate supervisor, and reported a 
Cronbach alpha of 0.92. However, in the present study only 4 items were adapted from this
38 Though item 4 is included among the items with inappropriate loading, it was included in the present study as it 
was considered quite relevant in the context o f the study.
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scale as used in Ambrose and Schminke (2003) with another item added. The questionnaire 
items are presented in Table 4-10 below, and the last item is the added item. Reliability 
estimate (Cronbach alpha) for the 5 item scale is .89.39
Table 4-10 Supervisor Trust - Measurement Items
Scale: 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree 
Preamble: JMease indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements
1. I can talk freely to my appraiser about difficulties I am having at work and know s/he will listen
2. My appraiser approaches his/her job with professionalism and dedication
3. If I shared my personal problems with my appraiser s/he will respond constructively and understandingly
4. My appraiser is always well informed and adequately prepared for the job
5. I pass on information that might be useful to my appraiser______________________________________________
4.4.14 Relative Emphasis on Quantitative Goals & on Financial Goals
Emphasis placed on meeting quantitative vs. non-quantitative targets, i.e. relative emphasis on 
quantitative goals (REQG) was assessed by asking respondents to indicate how much 
emphasis their performance appraiser placed on meeting quantitative goals (e.g. financial 
goals, efficiency goals, time and deadline goals) compared to non- quantitative goals when 
evaluating their performance. Respondents were to input a value from 0 to 100 %. A value of 
100% for emphasis on qualitative goals meant a 0% emphasis on quantitative goals or no 
quantitative goals if they had none. Being a web based survey, once a value was inputted in 
one box for the quantitative or non-quantitative category, the corresponding value for the 
other category was automatically inputted in that box.
To assess the relative emphasis on financial goals (REFG) respondents were asked to think of 
their quantitative goals, and to indicate how much emphasis their appraiser placed on meeting 
the financial compared to the non-financial goals when evaluating their performance. And as 
described above, respondents were to input a value from 0 -  100%.4°
39 For screen shot o f survey items, see Appendix 3 page 287, items ‘a ’ to V
40 For screen shot o f  survey items, see Appendix 3 page 283.
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4.4.15 Demographic and Other Information
In addition to the concepts measured above, some demographic and other information was 
also gathered in the survey. These are listed in Table 4-11 below.41
T able 4-11 D em ographic Information
Item Scale/Measure
1. Line o f  service (LOS) 3 categories - Assurance, Business Advisory, and Tax
2. Age Respondents were presented with 6 age categories starting from 
‘under 21’ to ‘over 45’. The mid-point o f  the ranges were used 
as the point estimate o f  age
3. Gender Male, Female
4. Length o f  time with firm, i.e. 
employment tenure (ET)
Respondents were presented with 13 categories from ‘under 1 
year’ to ‘over 14 years’.
5. Length o f  time at current grade, i.e. 
grade tenure (GT)
Respondents were presented with 9 categories from ‘under 1 
year’ to ‘over 8 years’
6. Length o f  time since the last 
performance review (TLPR)
9 categories from ‘None yet’ to ‘more than 12 months’
7. Frequency o f  contact with supervisor 
(FSC)
5 categories ranging from 1 (anchored as ‘only in connection 
with the annual performance appraisal*) to 5 (anchored as 
‘almost daily on job assignments’)
41 For screen shot o f items 2 -  7 in the table, see Appendix 3 page 289. For item 1 see Appendix 3 page 278/279.
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Chapter 5 Conceptualisation and Operationalisation of PES
In this chapter, an attempt is made to formally conceptualise performance evaluative style by 
identifying its conceptual domain from review of previous studies in the first section. The 
second section evaluates the PES concepts synthesized from the review and a measurement 
instrument for PES is proposed in the third section. The fourth section discusses the empirical 
validation of the measurement instrument using structural equation modelling (SEM). A 
synopsis of this technique is also provided. Finally, the operationalisation of the validated 
measurement items into PES measures used in the study is presented in the last section.
5.1 Review o f PES Concepts and M easures
The review of the PES concept starts with Argyris (1952) study of the impact of budgets on 
people. In his study, Argyris identified 3 dimensions of supervisory style viz. needling, raising 
of standards once it is met, and an uncompromising budget attitude. Following on Argris’ 
study, Hofstede (1968) also described 3 different dimensions of supervisory style with regards 
to use of budgets viz.; frequency of contacts about budget results (i.e. how frequently the 
superior discussed budget variances and other performance figures with the subordinate); 
what performance evaluation criteria is used -  personality, ability, effort or results; and the 
extent budget results were used in performance evaluation. By extent of budget results use he 
referred to the attention given to negative variances from budget standards, whether financial 
or non-financial standards. Thus he explicitly recognized that budgetary targets are not just 
financial in nature but are also non-financial. Hofstede found that frequency of budget 
contacts had negative effects as it induced feelings of high pressure and low job satisfaction. 
He also found appraisal on the basis of variances from budget standards to be associated with 
feelings of high pressure, nervousness, and unfairness of the performance appraisal. He 
advocated what he called ‘the game spirit’ style of budgetary control use, which he reasoned 
maximised the benefits of the control system while minimising its negative effects. He
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described the ‘game spirit’ style as characterised by the use of budgetary control in a manner 
that subordinates were clear on what was expected of them, the budget was relevant, feedback 
information was understandable, and budget results were used in a corrective rather than 
punitive way -  i.e. in Hopwood’s (1972) terms a ‘flexible’ rather than ‘rigid’ use of budgets in 
performance evaluation.
Lowe and Shaw (1968) identified another dimension of supervisory style -  the use of budgets 
as a basis for determining and allocating rewards. In the retail chain they studied, they found 
that performance relative to budget targets, published in league tables, formed the basis for 
salary increments, bonuses and promotions. Lowe and Shaw (1968, p307) notes that “this 
procedure (i.e. use of league tables) emphasises the Company’s concern for the budget as a 
means of evaluation of managers and stresses the competitive element (i.e. the desire for 
promotion and for greater shares of resources) among A.M.s (area managers).” Though this 
seem to reflect as much the MCS design, they further note that “the company appears to have 
no clearly specified method of determining salary increments and promotions, though sales 
growth and performance relative to the budget are felt to be important” implying a supervisor)' 
style linking rewards to performance relative to the budget. This is an important aspect as a lot 
of the ills of budgeting seem related to the use of performance against to budget targets -  
whether financial or non-financial - as a basis of determining and allocating rewards 
(Hofstede, 1968; Jensen, 2001). For instance, Hofstede (1968, p76) thesis strongly 
emphasised that budgets should not be used in this way as he states that the general 
environment in which budget communications occur must “ ...foster the idea that budget 
performance is an end in itself, existing for its own sake, not primarily leading to some 
external reward.”
Following from these earlier studies and based on initial interviews in the organisation 
studies, Hopwood (1972) devised some questionnaire items from which he eventually
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categorized 3 supervisory styles viz.; budget constrained (BC), profit conscious (PC), and 
non-accounting (NA) styles. These styles were based on 2 main dimensions viz.
a) evaluative criteria - whether accounting or non-accounting based; i.e. the extent to 
which budgets were used in performance evaluation; and
b) attitude to negative variance from budget targets; i.e. the manner in which the 
accounting data contained in budgets were used.
In relation to the 3 evaluative styles, the BC and PC styles made extensive use of budgets in 
performance evaluation, but differed in the ‘manner’ in which the information was used, 
rigidly in the former and flexibly in the latter. The NA style, on the other hand differed from 
these two in the extent of budget use, with little or no use of budgets in performance 
evaluations. The BC style reflected reliance on meeting the budget in performance evaluation 
and the use of this criterion in a manner intolerant of deviations; the PC style reflected 
reliance on concern for cost i.e. effectiveness, in addition to other non-budgetary criteria in 
performance evaluation. According to Hopwood (1972, p. 175), the PC style involve 
“ ...supplementing them (accounting data) with other sources of information, both formal and 
informal, so that alternatives can be compared and inconsistencies investigated...” On the 
other hand, the third evaluative style, i.e. the ‘Non-Accounting (NA)’ style, he conceptualised 
as based on “ ...rather vague criteria: attitudes, the way the cost centre head handles his men, 
and effort...” which though important is surrounded by a lot of uncertainty as to what 
constitutes a good or bad performance, coupled with difficulty in determining performance 
improvements. Thus, Hopwood’s conceptualisation of styles of budgetary control systems use 
for performance evaluation, and presumably rewards, could be characterised as an exclusive 
or rigid focus on accounting data (the BC style), a flexible use of accounting data along with 
other non-accounting information (the PC style), and an exclusive focus on non-accounting 
information (the NA style).
Hopwood argued that accounting measures as contained in budgets were incomplete measures 
of performance and that a rigid style of budget use (i.e. the BC style) emphasised concern
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with short-term performance with more dysfunctional consequences, whereas the more 
flexible style of budget use (i.e. the PC style) emphasised concern with overall i.e. long-term 
performance with more positive consequences. As he states “ ...it is only when meeting the 
budget becomes important relative to other valued criteria of job performance that 
unfavourable consequences occur. Of itself, concern with meeting the budget can result in 
quite favourable consequences” Hopwood (1972, 173). Thus, where budgets were used in 
evaluating performance, the manner of use refers to the relative concern with short-term vs. 
long-term performance. Hopwood operationalised budgetary control systems use as a 
categorical variable based on the relative importance rankings of 2 out of the 8 performance 
criteria in his survey viz:; ‘my concern with costs’ and ‘meeting the budget’. These were the 
only ‘accounting’ performance criteria in his measure, and he used them to contrast the 
concern with long-term performance vs. short-term performance concern. Roughly, if the first 
criterion was in the top 3 but not the second this was classed as a PC style, and if the reverse it 
was classed as a BC style. On the other hand, if both criteria were not in the top 3 this was 
classed as an NA style. Like Hofstede, Hopwood advocated the PC style -  a bit more refined 
‘game spirit’ of using budgetary control systems.
Most of the subsequent studies following Hopwood’s (e.g. Otley, 1978; Brownell, 1982a; 
1985; Brownell and Hirst, 1986; Dunk, 1989; Imoisili, 1989) conceptualised performance 
evaluative style (PES) as a continuum along the dimensions of rigid vs. flexible use of 
accounting information. Most of these studies, referred to as the reliance on accounting 
performance measures (RAPM) studies, also used or adapted Hopwood’s measurement 
instrument.42 However, the method of scoring/operationalising PES differed among the 
studies giving rise to PES concepts different from Hopwood’s (see Otley and Fakiolas, 2000 
for a detailed discussion). Given the subtly different PES concepts of the RAPM studies, 
Otley and Fakiolas (2000, p505) criticised the RAPM researchers for “uncritically using 
Hopwood’s original rationale to motivate their work” echoing Briers and Hirst (1990) earlier
42 Refer to Table 2-2 on page 31 for summary o f  some o f the studies.
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criticism of theory underdevelopment. Otley and Fakiolas (2000) also noted that the Hopwood 
questionnaire was not intended to provide an additive scale, nevertheless some authors
have provided Cronbach alphas for the whole set of items ” leading them to pose the
question “if the items do represent a single underlying construct, what is it?”
The earliest exception to using Hopwood’s instrument was Hirst (1983), who also 
operationalised PES as a continuum between, presumably, rigid/flexible use of accounting 
data. However, in line with Lowe and Shaw’s (1968) observation, Hirst (1983) explicitly 
linked PES to rewards in their definition/measurement of it. Hirst (1983, p598) 
operationalised PES in terms of “the extent to which the receipt of rewards was contingent on 
a participant (i.e. respondents to his survey) performing satisfactorily in terms of quantitative 
performance criteria . . .” He gave examples of the quantitative performance criteria as costs, 
production targets, sales targets, etc. Hirst’s operationalization of PES was based on his 
argument for not using Hopwood’s instrument, which is that Hopwood’s instrument was 
tailored for manufacturing settings and was unsuitable for the non-manufacturing settings of 
his survey (see footnote 8, p598). Hirst and Yetton (1984) also used Hirst (1983) instrument.
Govindarajan (1984, p i27) also conceptualised PES as a continuum, but defined as “the 
degree of reliance superiors place on formula vs. subjective (non-formula) approaches towards 
the evaluation of the subordinate’s performance and in deciding the subordinate’s rewards 
(such as incentive bonus).” Like Hirst’s (1983), Govindarajan PES concept explicitly links 
rewards, in particular incentive bonuses, to performance evaluation. He operationalised PES 
as the percentage of respondents total performance incentive bonus determined based on 
subjective judgement. Presumably, a 0% score represented bonuses determined “solely on 
meeting various levels of financial performance” i.e. the formula-based approach (p. 130). At 
the other end of the scale, a 100% score represented ‘exclusive use of subjective judgement’. 
Govindarajan then related this operationalisation of PES to Hopwood’s PES categories, 
equating the strictly ‘formula-based’ and strictly ‘subjective’ approaches to Hopwood’s BC
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and NA styles, and the combination of subjective and formula-based approaches to 
Hopwood’s PC style. Govindarajan and Gupta (1985) also conceptualised and measured PES 
the same as Govindarajan (1984).
5.2 Evaluation of PES Concepts and M easures
On one hand, Hopwood (1972) educed the fundamental concern raised by earlier studies i.e. 
the focus on short-term performance, characterized by emphasis on short-term budget targets 
for performance evaluation, vs. focus on long-term performance characterized by the use of 
more broad performance evaluative criteria. An uncompromising attitude to meeting budget 
targets was seen to cause a short-term focus on performance to the detriment of longer-term 
performance resulting in subordinates’ feelings of increased tension, resentment, fear and 
mistrust, and deterioration in job satisfaction. On the other hand, the other studies reviewed 
above additionally identified the criteria used in determining extrinsic rewards, i.e. 
performance relative to budget targets vs. other criteria, as underpinning the effects of focus 
on short-term performance. Therefore the dimensions of PES apparent from the review of the 
literature are: the relative importance of accounting performance criteria; the relative attitude 
of supervisors’ towards meeting accounting performance targets; and the criteria used in 
determining extrinsic rewards, i.e. the extent to which rewards are based on subjective criteria 
vs. objective (i.e. performance relative to targets) criteria .
From these dimensions of PES, two general approaches of operationalising PES emerge. The 
first approach using Hopwood’s instrument measures PES as relative emphasis on meeting 
financial/accounting performance targets. Under this approach, PES as a categorical variable 
is measured as exclusive use of or rigid focus on accounting data (the BC style), combined use 
o f accounting and non-accounting information (the PC style), and an exclusive use of non­
accounting i.e. qualitative information (the NA style). As a continuous variable, PES is 
measured as high /low emphasis on budget targets, with high (low) budget emphasis related to
Chapter 5 Conceptualisation and Operationalisation o f  PES 134
the BC (NA) style.43 The second approach of operationalising PES hinge on the criteria and 
manner of determining extrinsic rewards. Under this approach, PES is measured as either the 
use of objective criteria (i.e. performance relative to budgets) vs. subjective criteria in 
determining rewards, or the extent to which rewards are formula vs. non-formula based. The 
use of objective criteria, and the formula based rewards, is generally seen as relating to high 
budget emphasis, i.e. the BC style. Conversely, the use of subjective criteria, and non-formula 
based rewards, is seen as relating to low budget emphasis, presumably the NA style 
(Govindarajan, 1984; Govindarajan and Gupta, 1985).
After Hopwood (1972) and Otley (1978), many of the cross-sectional studies using the RAPM 
approach do not provide enough evidence to indicate that this approach really tap into the 
short-term vs. long-term concerns experienced within the organisations studied. 
Consequently, it is unclear that the two separate approaches of operationalising evaluative 
style tightly correspond to the underlying issue educed by Hopwood (1972). First, PES 
operationalised solely as the relative emphasis on meeting budget/accounting performance 
targets, i.e. high vs. low emphasis on accounting performance measures, may not explicitly 
account for the underpinning effects of the way rewards are determined. Also, PES 
operationalised solely as the method of determining rewards, i.e. objective/formula based vs. 
subjective/non-formula based, does not really capture the manner in which performance is 
evaluated. Most formula based rewards tend to be bonuses while organisations use other 
forms of incentives even more like promotions, salary increases, and job assignments. 
Moreover in different organisational settings, it is not clear that either approach captures well 
the underlying issue educed by Hopwood, i.e. the tension between focus on short-term vs. 
long-term performance. For instance, objective performance criteria may be employed but 
subjectively weighted when determining rewards, while subjective performance criteria could 
also be combined with formula-based rewards.
43 In some studies using the high/low budget emphasis categorisation, it is unclear whether low budget emphasis 
relates to Hopwood’s NA style or his PC style.
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Moreover, most of the studies after Hopwood (1972), to a large extent, equated budgetary 
control with control based on financial/accounting information. No explicit conceptual 
definition of accounting information/performance measure is provided though generally 
operationalised as financial targets. Harrison (1993, p.319) provided the first formal definition 
of accounting performance measures (i.e. the accounting information used for performance 
evaluation) as “those performance criteria which are quantified in accounting and financial 
terms, and which are prespecified as budget targets.” Essentially this definition equated 
accounting information with quantitative financial information and delineated other 
quantitative non-financial information from the realm of accounting performance measures. 
The shortcoming of this definition, and thus of the studies that operationalise budgetary 
information as essentially financial accounting information, is that budgets do not contain 
only targets of a financial nature. This point was recognised by earlier studies; for instance, in 
defining the scope of his study, Hofstede (1968, pp. 15 & 26) states that:
budgets are based on standards, both financial and pre-financial, i.e. technical: 
quantities, hours, percentages, quality levels. Standards are the bricks the budget 
structure is built from. So these standards had to be included in the investigation. 
...some of this (detailed budgetary information) consists of either standard or 
historical data expressed in money, but much of it is technical, pre-financial 
information; efficiency standards expressed in weights, numbers, hours, reject 
percentages, efficiency ratios etc. ...I considered as a standard everything expressed in 
numbers which (quoting Stedry, 1960) “carries with it the connotation of a ‘goal’ or 
‘desired attainment’” (and)...although this has no basis in accounting theory, people in 
the plants often considered technical and budget standards to be quite different things. 
Therefore budgetary targets include both financial and quantitative non-financial information. 
Thus the uncritical use of Hopwood’s instrument may have confounded the effects on 
behaviour of the ‘target’ nature of information with the ‘accounting’ nature of information 
(Hartmann, 2001). And if budget targets do not equate to only financial targets, we do not
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know much about the difference in effects, if any, between financial and quantitative non- 
financial targets.
5.3 PES M easurem ent Instrum ent
The 3 dimensions of evaluative style identified above cover the conceptual domain of PES, at 
least from the perspective offered by previous studies. In addition, however, this study 
proposes the broadening of budgets/accounting performance targets to generally quantitative 
targets to make the PES concept more robust. Thus, this study defines the dimensions of the 
PES concept as:
A. The relative importance of quantitative vs. non-quantitative performance criteria in 
performance evaluation; i.e. the performance criteria dimension. It is proposed that this be 
measured by the following three items:
1. My appraiser mainly uses quantitative information (e.g. financial, time and deadline 
targets) in evaluating my performance (which is survey item number -  q3 a)
2. My appraiser uses qualitative and quantitative information in equal proportions in
evaluating my performance (i.e. survey item number -  q3c)
3. My appraiser mainly uses qualitative information (e.g. quality of work done) in
evaluating my performance (i.e. survey item number -  q3b)
B. Supervisors’ attitude towards (negative) deviations from meeting quantitative 
performance targets (i.e. high intolerance of variances from targets vs. concern for overall 
performance); i.e. the supervisor’s attitude dimension. It is proposed that this be measured 
by the following three items:
4. My appraiser expects me to meet my goals and is unwilling to accept explanations 
for any shortfalls in meeting them (i.e. survey item number -  q3f)
5. Normally my appraiser expects me to meet my goals but accepts good reasons for 
any shortfalls in performance (i.e. survey item number -  q3e)
6. My appraiser is more concerned with my overall performance than with not meeting 
specific goals in the short-term (i.e. survey item number -  q3d)
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C. The relative importance of performance against quantitative targets vs. non-quantitative 
performance criteria in the determination of extrinsic rewards (i.e. use of formula or 
objective target related performance criteria vs. the use of subjective judgement based on 
subjective performance criteria). It is proposed that this be measured by the following 
three items:
7. My rewards depend mainly on information other than how well I meet my specific 
goals (i.e. survey item number -  q3g)
8. My rewards depend mainly on how well I meet my goals (i.e. survey item number -  
q3h)
9. My rewards depend equally on how well I meet my goals and on non-goal related 
information (i.e. survey item number -  q3i)
All nine items are scored on a 1 - 7 point scale anchored as strongly disagree to strongly agree 
as shown in Appendix 3, page 279 under item number 3. However, the order of the survey 
items is different from that presented here as indicated by the survey item numbers in 
brackets. These measures construe PES as a continuous variable and attempts to capture the 
mid and end points of the scale for each dimension.
The appropriate means for assessing the validity of these measures depend on the assumed 
relationship between the PES construct(s), the measures, and the errors of measurement. The 
traditional means of assessing validity such Cronbach alpha and factor analysis is not 
appropriate in all situations. To assess the relationship between the PES construct and the 
measures, we need to determine whether these items are ‘effect indicators’ of PES, i.e. does 
PES cause these items, or if they are ‘causal indicators’ i.e. do these items determine PES 
(Bollen, 1989; Bollen and Lennox, 1991; Law et al., 1998; Law and Wong, 1999). If a change 
in PES requires a simultaneous change in all the items then the items are effect indicators 
meaning PES is a latent construct whose effects are captured by the variations in the items. On 
the other hand, if a change in one item causes a change in PES, with all other items remaining 
constant, then the items are causal indicators and PES a non-latent construct that is determined
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by the measures. A consequence of this consideration is that while internal consistency and 
reliability measures like Cronbach alpha is appropriate for assessing the validity of effects 
indicators, low internal consistency does not invalidate causal indicators (Bollen and Lennox, 
1991; Jarvis et al., 2003; Mackenzie et al., 2005). Assessing the validity of causal indicators 
require examining other indicators that are the effects of the non-latent construct (Bollen and 
Lennox, 1991). Another implication of this consideration is that a non-latent construct 
requires all the concepts that form it, as eliminating one indicator (i.e. dimension) may change 
the meaning of the construct (Jarvis et al., 2003).
Evaluation of the PES dimensions using the criteria above indicates that the ‘performance 
criteria’ and ‘supervisor’s attitude’ dimension measures are causal indicators rather than effect 
indicators of PES. In Law et al. (1998) terminology, these dimensions exist at the same level 
as the PES construct, i.e. PES is defined as a combination of these dimensions. Thus a change 
in one dimension would cause, i.e. implies, a change in PES. On the other hand, the rewards 
criteria dimension measures are effect indicators because, in Law et al. (1998) terms, the PES 
construct exist at a deeper level than this dimension, i.e. this dimension is a manifestation of 
the PES construct. PES is therefore conceptualised as a continuum of styles with a high target 
focused (TF) PES style at one end (similar to Hopwood’s BC style), a broad based PES (akin 
to Hopwood’s PC style) at the mid-point, and a low or non-target focused style (akin to 
Hopwood’s NA style) at the other end. A high TF PES, characterised as the combination of 
use of mainly quantitative performance criteria and high intolerance for variance from targets, 
would result in rewards based mainly on performance relative to targets rather than rewards 
based on other criteria (i.e. measurement items 1 and 4 mainly result in item 7). Equally the 
low TF PES, characterised as use of mainly qualitative performance criteria combined with 
concern for overall performance rather than performance against targets, would result in 
rewards based mainly on criteria other than performance relative to targets (i.e. items 3 and 6 
mainly result in item 8). The broad based PES, characterised by equivalent use of quantitative 
and qualitative performance criteria combined with low intolerance for variances from targets,
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would result in rewards that are based on both target and non-target related performance (i.e. 
items 2 and 5 mainly result in item 9).44
5.4 V alidation o f PES M easurem ent Instrum ent - Using SEM
Structural equation modelling (SEM) technique was employed to assess the validity of the 
PES measure given unsuitability of the traditional factor analysis and Cronbach alpha. SEM is 
a generalization of familiar techniques like multiple regression, path analysis, and 
confirmatory factor analysis. Though SEM may be viewed simply as a combination of path 
analysis and factor analysis, it may be used as a more powerful alternative to these techniques. 
It allows the modelling of correlated independents, measurement error, correlated error terms, 
and multiple latent independents each measured by multiple indicators as well as multiple 
latent dependents also measured by multiple indicators. It also allows for more flexible 
assumptions, particularly allowing interpretation even in the face of multicollinearity, and use 
of confirmatory factor analysis to reduce measurement error by having multiple indicators per 
latent variable. SEM is also more attractive because of the desirability of testing models 
overall rather than testing individual coefficients, i.e. examining the consistency of actual data 
with the hypothesized relationships between all o f the latent and non-latent factors, and the 
observed measured variables.
In specifying a SEM model, some of the factor loadings are typically constrained or fixed to
be zero, i.e. some items are constrained not to load on a factor, in a confirmatory factor
analysis fashion (Byrne, 2001). It is also necessary to fix one loading for each factor to the
value ‘1’ in order to give the latent factor an interpretable scale, or alternatively fix the
variance of all factors to one and then estimate all factor loadings. Normally, the former is
44 It is acknowledged here that the distinction between items 6 ( ‘my appraiser is more concerned with my overall 
performance than with not meeting specific goals ’) and 5 (‘normally my appraiser expects me to meet my goals but 
accepts good reasons fo r  any shortfalls in performance ’) is not so sharp. Both items are probably interchangeable 
in meaning. This is a conceptual issue reflecting the blurred line in differentiating supervisor attitude to target 
deviations between the broad based and the low TF styles. Same situation applies with Hopwood’s PC and NA  
styles.
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done rather than the latter, thus factor variances are usually estimated. To assess the 
consistency of data with the hypothesised model, the chi-square test is usually employed. 
However, this test is sensitive to sample size and may to lead to a Type II (Type I) error with 
small (large) sample sizes. Consequently, several fit indices with recommended cut-off points 
are often used by researchers in assessing model fit. The popular fit indices in use that is least 
affected by sample size include the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) and 
the Bentler comparative fit index (CFI) (Fan et al., 1999). The CFI compares the hypothesised 
model fit with a null (or independent) model, and the value ranges from 0 -  1. By convention 
CFI >.90 is generally considered to indicate a well-fitting model (Bentler, 1992), though Hu 
and Bentler (1999) advise a revised cut-off value close to .95. On the other hand, RMSEA 
does not require comparison with a null model but measures average lack of fit (i.e. 
discrepancy) per degree of freedom, and has a known distribution related to the non-central 
chi-square distribution. Browne and Cudeck (1993) advice that RMSEA values <.05 indicate a 
close fit of the model to the data while values < 0.08 indicate a mediocre fit, and values >0.1 
indicate a poor fit. Hu and Bentler (1999) also suggest a RMSEA <=.06 as a cut-off for a good 
model fit. In addition, other researchers call for the use of RMSEA confidence intervals to 
assess the precision of the RMSEA estimates (Steiger & Steiger, 1990).
In the SEM methodology literature, the recommendation for properly specifying causal- 
indicator models is to relate the construct to its effects - in addition to its causal indicators 
(Bollen and Lennox, 1991; Jarvis et al., 2003). Thus, PES is modelled as a non-latent 
construct with 6 causal indicators (i.e. items 1 -  6 of the measurement instrument above) and 
3 effect indicators (i.e. items 7 -  9). The result of this SEM model is depicted in Figure 5.1 
below. The SEM is estimated using Maximum Likelihood extraction method (the 
Asymptotically Distribution Free method gives slightly improved indices). As can be seen 
from the result, the chi-squared goodness of fit (x2 = 57.125,/? =.000), the root mean square
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error of approximation (RMSEA =.126, pclose = .000), and the comparative fit index (CFI 
=.905). These results all indicate that the model does not fit the data well.
Figure 5.1: PES-MODEL 1
Fit Indices 
X2 — 57.125,/? = 000 
RMSEA - 126 
P C L O SE -000 
GF1 = .952 
CFI -  .905
Hoelter’s N  (.05) =  87
Given the ill-fit of this initial PES measurement, it was modified by dropping some redundant
measures but still consistent with our theory. Since PES is conceptualised as a continuum, it is
more efficient to measure it by reference to the end-points of the scale rather than by reference
to both end-points as well as the mid-point. This is in line with most of the reviewed literature
which measure PES by reference to the end-points of the scale, i.e. high/low budget emphasis.
Thus, items 2 (i.e. q3c) and 5 (i.e. q3e) of the instrument were dropped from the causal
indicators. Nonetheless, the remaining causal indicators appropriately relate to the underlying
issue identified by Hopwood in his original study. And between the freely estimated effects
indicators, item 7 (i.e. q3h) was dropped leaving only items 9 (i.e. q3i) and 8 (q3g). Dropping
item 7 (q3h) is in line with Govindarajan (1984) who measured PES as the extent to which
45 The 90% confidence interval for RMSEA: LO 90 -.095; HI 90 -.160. The Pclose gives a test o f close fit i.e. it 
tests the null hypothesis that RMSEA is no greater than .05)
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rewards are based on subjective judgement i.e. item 8 (q3g). In any case, using item 7 rather 
than item 8 does not yeild a better model fit. The resulting model and the results of estimating 
it is presented in Figure 5.2. The fit statistics ( /  = 1.939 p  =.585; RMSEA =.000, pclose 
=.770; CFI =1.000) indicate a high consistency between data and the new hypothesised PES 
measurement model. The results of this 2nd PES measurement model show it has vastly 
superior model fit compared to the first model, and the regression weights (unstandardized) 
are also improved.46 Reverse coding items 3 (q3b) and 6 (q3d), or items 1 (q3a) and 4 (q3f) to 
reflect PES as continuum does not change the model’s fit statistics, what changes are the sign 
of their covariance with other items and the sign of their regression weights. The regression 
weights of all the causal indicators are significantly different from zero except for that of item 
3 (q3b). However, the regression weight of the freely estimated effect indicator is not 
significant. In conclusion, the chi-square overall model fit test and the other fit indices 
indicate that this PES measurement model fits the data well and thus these indicators can be 
considered as reliable measures of PES, consistent with our theory.
Figure 5.2: PES - MODEL 2
Fit Indices 
X2 =1.939 ,p = .5 8 5  
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46 90% confidence interval for RMSEA: LO 90 —.000, HI 90 .093.
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5.5 O perationalising PES
Having validated the measurement items in the formative PES measurement model in Figure 
5.2, the next concern is how to combine these item scores to represent the PES construct for 
use in further analysis. This sort of formative measurement model is what Law et al. (1998, p. 
745) classed as the aggregate (i.e. non-latent) model and they state that under such models 
“the multidimensional construct is formed as an algebraic composite of its dimensions.... 
(and) can be a linear or non-linear combinations of its dimensions, and the dimensions may 
also have unit weights or differential weights while forming the overall construct.” In line 
with Law et al. (1998), it is therefore proposed that PES be scored as the sum of all its 
indicators. Given that the importance of each item is taken into account by respondents in 
scoring the measures, it is not necessary to use a weighted sum. However, to make the PES 
score conceptually consistent as a continuous construct of extent of focus on targets (i.e. 
short-term orientation), items 3, 6, and 8 are reverse coded.47 And to maintain the scale range 
of 1 -  7, the aggregate score is divided by 6 (i.e. the number of items). This PES measure is 
referred to as Target-Focused style -1 (TF1) represented thus:
TFl = [qSa + (8 - qSb) + (8 - q3d) + q3 f + (8 - q3g) + q3i] -r- 6.
TF1 is a more comprehensive PES measure that simultaneously incorporates the 3 main PES 
dimensions identified in the literature, while also maintaining focus on the central issue 
highlighted by Hopwood’s original study. High scores for TFl represent focus on short-term 
performance while low scores represent focus on long-term performance. A histogram of the 
distribution of this measure with summary statistics is provided in the Figure 5.3 below, and it 
shows that TFl has values ranging from 1.17 to 5.87 (theoretical range is i -  7), with mean 
(median) of 3.34 (3.42). The skewness (.056), kurtosis (.073), and test of normality (z =.989,
47 Item 3 (i.e. q3b) is - ‘my appraiser mainly uses qualitative information (e.g. quality o f  work done) in evaluating 
my performance’; item 6 (q3d) -  ‘my appraiser is more concerned with my overall performance than with not 
meeting specific goals in the short-term’; and item 8 (q3g) -  ‘my rewards depend mainly on information other than 
how well I meet my specific goals’.
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p-value— .079) statistics indicate that TFl has a normal distribution, as can also be seen from 
the histogram.
Figure 5.3 Histogram & Summary Statistics o f Target Focused 1 (T F l) PES Measure
S u m m a r y  St a ti st i cs
N 236
Median 3 .42
Mean 3 .3 4
Std Deviation . 7 5 3
Minimum  1.17
M axim um  5 .6 7
S k e w n e s s  . 056
Kur tosi s  . 073
Norm al  Test S ta t  .989
Normal  Test  P—Value .079
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TARGET FOCUSED STYLE-1
In addition to the TFl PES measure, two other PES measures are proposed for comparability 
of this study’s analysis with previous studies, for parsimony, and for triangulation purposes. 
The first of these 2 additional PES measures is based on only items 6 and 4 of the PES 
instrument. 48 This measure may be considered a parsimonious version of TFl which still 
captures the important dimensions of evaluative style as educed by Hopwood -  at least within 
the case organisation, and. The use of just 2 measurement items also parallels Hopwood’s 
empirical measurement of PES using only 2 items. This 2nd PES measure is referred to as 
Target-Focused style -2 (TF2), and is derived as the average of the 2 items scores after reverse 
coding item 6 represented thus:
TF2 = [q3f+ (8 -  q3d)] +2
This scoring construes PES as a continuum, and also gives a consistent scale that represents 
focus on the short-term for high scores and focus on the longer-term for low scores. A 
histogram of the distribution of this measure with summary statistics is provided in the figure
48 Item 6 (i.e. q3d) is ‘my appraiser is more concerned with my overall performance than with not meeting specific 
goals in the short-term’; and item 4 (q3f) is ‘my appraiser expects me to meet my goals and is unwilling to accept 
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5.4 below. Unlike TFl, the actual and theoretical range of TF2 is the same, i.e. 1 -  7, but it 
is positively skewed with more observations scoring low values resulting in low mean 
(median) values of 2.86 (2.5).
Figure 5.4 Histogram & Summary Statistics o f Target Focused 2 (TF2) PES Measure
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The 2nd additional PES measure is based on adaptation of Hopwood’s original instrument. The 
adapted instrument asked respondents to indicate the importance of each of the criteria listed 
below in their superiors’ evaluation of their performance as shown in Appendix 3 page 281, 
under item 5. The criteria scored on a 1 — 7 scale (anchored by 1 = not at all important, to 7 = 
very important) are:
a. How well I communicate and build relationships with colleagues and clients
b. How well I get along with my appraiser
c. How well I met my goals and deadline targets
d. The quality of my work
e. My actions that produce long-run effectiveness rather than short-run results
f. How much effort my appraiser perceives I put into the job
g. How long I have been in my current position
Previous studies that employed similar measures as these used different scoring methods in 
terms of what items were used and how these were combined (see Otley and Fakiolas, 2000
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for a detailed discussion). Using the rating scores from only items a (i.e. q5a), c (q5c), and d  
(q5d) from this measure, a 3rd PES measure is proposed which, consistent with the first 2 
measures, construes PES as a continuum. This 3rd PES measure is referred to as Target- 
Focused style - Hopwood (TFH) and is derived as:
TFH = (q5c x 2) = (q5a + q5d)
TFH is an attempt to mirror Hopwood’s 2 item based PES measure, but using the absolute 
importance rating scores rather than the rank scores. Again, TFH is consistent with the 
dimension of PES he depicted, i.e. the importance of budget target achievement relative to 
other performance criteria reflecting a short vs. long-term focus and essentially measured by 
two items. The equivalents of these two Hopwood’s items used by subsequent studies to his 
study are: 'how well I  met my goals and deadline targets' i.e. q5c, and 'my actions that 
produce long-run effectiveness rather than short-run results' i.e. q5e. However, in this study 
items q5a 'how well I  communicate and build relationships with colleagues and clients', and 
q5d 'the quality o f my work' is used in constructing the TFH measure because both items 
represented more concrete long-term dimensions of performance in the case organisation than 
did the general question measuring this (i.e. item q5e). This is also reflected in the survey by 
the frequency of importance rankings accorded each item as presented in Table 5-1 below. 
Respondents were asked in the survey to rank the importance of each criteria in their
49performance evaluation from 1 — most important to 7 — least important.
Table 5-1 show that more respondents ranked item q5d ‘1’, i.e. as the most important criteria 
in their supervisors evaluation of their performance (frequency = 41.53%, mean importance 
rank = 2.35). This is followed by q5a (frequency = 24.15%, mean importance rank = 2.91), 
then q5c (frequency = 17.37%, mean importance rank = 3.01), before q5e (frequency 5.08%, 
mean importance rank = 4.52). Even the respondents themselves believed these 3 criteria 
should be the most important as reflected in the mean ranks by respondents -  1.79 for q5d, 
followed by 2.74 for q5c and 2.81 for q5a.
49 See Appendix 3, page 258 for a screen shot of the survey items.
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Table 5-1 Frequency & Mean o f Importance Rankings o f Evaluative Criteria
Frequency of Importance Rankings: 
(Rankings: 1 = 'most important’ to 7 = ‘least important’)
Mean of Criteria Importance 
Rankings
Criteria 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 AMean S.D BMean S.D
q5d 41.53 25 12.71 9.74 5.51 2.12 2.12 2.35 1.66 1.79 1.25
q5a 24.15 22.88 19.5 17.37 8.47 4.66 1.7 2.91 1.66 2.81 1.46
q5c 17.37 25.43 25.42 13.56 10.59 5.09 1.69 3.01 1.57 2.74 1.32
q5f 4.66 11.87 16.1 20.76 25 18.22 1.7 4.2 1.57 4.86 1.27
q5e 5.08 8.06 11.44 21.61 24.57 19.92 7.2 4.52 1.64 3.76 1.35
q5b 3.81 5.51 7.21 11.86 16.1 31.36 19.91 5.28 1.75 6.17 1.4
q5g 1.69 2.12 5.51 2.54 8.48 15.68 58.47 6.25 1.53 6.19 1.23
lVlVUll W1 liv VY lllipui IU111 1 vjpuuuviltu L/V11V v vv* U1V11 uwyvi i iuviu »
B Mean of how important respondents believe the criteria should be ranked
Thus in the context of the case organisation the TFH PES measure, as constituted here, is 
conceptually equivalent to the broad dimensions of short-term vs. long-term concerns by 
which Hopwood (1972) categorised evaluative style. A histogram of the distribution of TFH 
with the summary statistics is presented in Figure 5.5 below. The statistics show values for 
this construct range from .288 to 4 (theoretical range is 1 — 5) and mean (median) of .925 
(.909). The histogram shows 3 extreme scores relating to 3 different observations in the data 
viz.; 2, 3 and 4. Deleting these observations or replacing them with median values only 
reduces the mean and substantially the skew of distribution but it still remains non-normal, as 
such leaving the observations may not impact on results of data analysis using this construct 
than otherwise.
Figure 5.5 Histogram & Summary Statistics: Target Focused Style - Hopwood
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In summary, 3 measures of TF PES is used in this study -  TFl, TF2, and TFH.50 TFl is the 
prime PES measure proposed in this study comprising the average score from 6 items. This 
measure of PES is based on the 3 main dimensions of PES constituting its conceptual domain 
as synthesized from the review of previous studies, mostly empirical management accounting 
research studies. On the other hand, TF2 is based on only 2 of the items used in TFl, and as 
such could be regarded as a more parsimonious version of TFl. However, it still captures the 
tension between focus on short-term vs. long-term performance as educed by Hopwood 
(1972). Also, TFH is based on 2 measurement items, but different from those used for TFl 
and TF2. The items come from measures adapted from Hopwood’s evaluative style 
measurement instrument. Therefore both TF2 and TFH measures, particularly TFH, provide 
PES measures that are comparable to those used by previous studies, and also provide a 
means o f triangulating the results from the data analysis using the prime PES measure, i.e. 
TFl.
50 In the rest o f  the study, ‘TF’ and ‘TF PES’ would be used generally to denote Target Focused Performance 
Evaluative Style encompassing the three specific measures i.e. T Fl, TF2, and TFH
Chapter 6 Data Analysis & Hypothesis Testing
Chapter 6 Data Analysis/Hypothesis Testing
149
This chapter presents results of the data analysis and hypothesis testing. The first section 
provides a description of the survey data in terms of the chronology of events, demographic 
information, and analysis of the data for response bias. The second section provides 
description of how the variables were constructed, as well as the validation of the measures to 
assure that the instruments consistently measured the constructs intended to be measured. In 
the third section, a brief overview of the statistical procedures used to test the hypothesis 
proposed in Chapter 3 is provided, then followed by the presentation of the hypothesis test 
results in the fourth section.
6.1 Response Rate & Demographic information
As earlier mentioned in Section 4.1, data were collected via a web survey of a large 
professional accounting services firm referred to in this study as ABC LLP. The survey was 
conducted over a 3 week period from the 25th of August to the 16* of September 2005. The 
timing of the survey in August when most people traditionally took their vacation was not 
ideal and was likely to affect participation in the survey. However, this was the best 
opportunity for the survey to be implemented in ABC LLP for several reasons. First, the firm 
was planning to conduct its own survey later in the year and did not want this study’s survey 
to affect responses to their own survey. They expressed great concern that this survey be 
conducted in time to give some gap between it and the implementation of their own survey. 
Secondly, a later date would have involved the last and first quarters of the year which were 
traditionally the busiest part of the year for ABC LLP, and thus not an ideal time to conduct 
the survey. Finally, given time and other resource constraints for this study the survey could 
not be postponed for a more ideal time in the following year. A chronology of events and 
response rates to the survey is shown in Panel A of Table 6-1.
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A link to the web survey was sent out in email invitations to ABC LLP’s staff in the Midlands 
region, excluding support staff and Partners. The first set of email invitations were sent out on 
the 25 of August 2005 to staff in one office, while the second set of email invitations were 
sent out roughly a week later on the 31st of August to staff in the rest o f the Midlands offices. 
The email invitations were sent out to an estimated 1,261 ABC staff, and the total response 
rate was 25% (i.e. 320 responses). After the first invitation to about 75 people, 16% (i.e. 12 
people) responded before the second invitation, out of which only 9% were usable. After the 
second invitation was sent out to the rest of the potential participants, an additional 210 people 
responded representing 17% of all potential participants, but only 13% were usable. Four days 
before the survey was closed, a reminder email was sent to all participants and an additional 
98 responses were received bringing the total response rate to 25%. However, only 236 
responses in total, i.e. 19%, were usable.
Table 6-1 Survey Time Line & Response Rates
P a n e l A :  R espon se  ra tes












1st email invitation to staff in 
Milton Keynes (about 75) 25th August 12 7 7 16%
1st email invitation to rest o f  
staff in the Midlands region 31st August 210 158 165 17%
Reminder email sent to all 
locations 12th September 98 71 236 25%
P a n e l B :
M ea n s T-test o f  D ifferen ces  
Variable Respondents N Mean Difference t Value
Effort Early 165 5.41
Late 71 5.69 -.284 -2.06*
* p < . 0 5  (2-tailed).
Unusable responses resulted from incomplete survey responses. This further provides 
justification for the reduced length of the questionnaire. As described in Section 4.2.7, ABC 
LLP wanted the original questionnaire length reduced and even then a quarter of the people 
who started to respond to the survey did not complete it. This may be an indication of their 
busy work schedule. It may also be an indication that the survey was a bit tedious for them
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and had it been longer as originally intended the response rate might have been even smaller. 
The initial judgement on the questionnaire length was probably wrong, and the firm was 
probably right in getting the survey length reduced. The overall response rate of 25% (19% 
usable) is reasonable considering the run of response rates in management accounting 
research, and the time of year the survey was conducted, i.e. late August/early September 
when people were on holidays etc. In addition, response rates to internal surveys conducted by 
the organisation were generally between 20 -  30%, and the firm considered the 25% response 
rate as reasonable and within their expectations.
Given the significant number of responses received after the reminder, a t-test was conducted 
to identify any significant differences between the late and early respondents mean scores for 
each of the 31 variables covered in the survey. The only significant difference in mean scores 
is shown in Table 6-1 Panel B. This shows that late respondents indicated putting more effort 
into their jobs compared to early respondents (significant at the 5% level), and this perhaps is 
reflected by their late response to the survey. Otherwise no other significant differences 
between early and late respondents were found.51 Thus the significant difference noted in the 
effort variable may well be due to chance given the number of variables examined.
Demographic Information
Demographic information of the respondents is shown in Table 6-2 below. The table shows 
that a greater percentage of respondents are male, i.e. 56.8% compared to 43.2% female 
respondents. From ABC LLP 2005 and 2006 annual reports, women made up 51% and 50% 
of ABC LLP global client service and practice support staff. The ratio in this survey looks 
reasonably representative of gender composition in the firm considering that the survey only 
covered one UK region. Otherwise, it is difficult to interpret the gender statistic without 
additional information as to the gender composition in the entire population of ABC staff
^ Mcfln scores for another variable — relative emphasis on financial goals (REFG) - was marginally different {t- 
value  = 1.82, p  = .071) between late and early respondents
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invited to the survey. Nonetheless, the number of responses from both genders appears 
proportionate enough to allow comparisons between the groups if needed. Table 6-2 also 
show the average age of all respondents to be 34 years with 19.9% of respondents less than 25 
years, 64.9% between 26 -  40 years, and 15.2% over 40 years old. The age distribution looks 
as would be expected in this type of organisation.
Table 6-2 Summary of Key Demographic Information
(N  = 236) Variable Mean M edian Sid. D ev
Age 34.25 35.00 7.378
Employment Tenure 6.01 5.00 4.059
Grade Tenure 3.07 2.00 2.038
Time o f  Last 
Performance Review 3.61 3.00 2.003
Line o f  Service Frequency Percent
Assurance (Audit) 96 40.7
Advisory (Consulting) 46 19.5
Tax 94 39.8
A ge C ategory Frequency Percent
under 21 yrs 3 1.3
2 1 -2 5  yrs 44 18.6
26 - 30 yrs 61 25.9
3 1 -3 5  yrs 57 24.2
36 - 40 yrs 35 14.8
41 - 45 yrs 22 9.3
46 - 50 yrs 8 3.4
over 50 yrs 6 2.5
G rade Tenure Frequency Percent
under 2 yrs 123 52.1
2 - 3 yrs 35 14.8
3 - 4 yrs 28 11.9
4 - 5 yrs 20 8.5
5 - 6 yrs 11 4.7
6 - 7 yrs 9 3.8
7 - 8 yrs 2 0.8
over 8 yrs 8 3.4




Em ploym ent Tenure Frequency P ercen t
under 2 yrs 60 25.4
2 - 4 yrs 46 19.5
4 - 6 yrs 42 17.8
6 - 8 yrs 29 12.3
8 - 10 yrs 21 8.9
1 0 -1 2  yrs 13 5.5
1 2 -1 4  yrs 8 3.4
over 14 yrs 17 7.2
Time O f  Last 
Perform ance R eview
Frequency P ercen t
None yet 8 3.4
0 - 2  months 56 23.7
2 - 3  months 93 39.4
3 - 5  months 60 25.4
5 - 7  months 13 5.5
7 - 9  months 2 0.8
9 - 1 2  months 1 0.4
over 12 months 3 1.3
Perform ance R eview  was used as the point estimates in coding scores for each variable, for e.g. the 21 25 years
age bracket, was coded as 25 years.
Table 6-2 also shows that respondents have on average been with the organisation
(employment tenure) for 6 years with 25.4% under 2 years with the firm, 19.5% 2 - 4 years, 
17.8% 4 - 6  years, and 37.3% over 6 years. The distribution of the employment tenure is as 
would be expected in an accounting firm where majority of the people are on training
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contracts of not more than 3 years, and where the culture tends to be either move up or move 
out. Similarly, the respondents have on average been in their current position in the 
organisational hierarchy (grade tenure) for 3 years, with 52.1% being in their current grade for 
less than 2 years, 26.7% 2 - 4  years, and 21.2% over 4 years. Again, the distribution of grade 
tenure seem as would be expected in this sort of organisation and concurs with the observation 
made about the employment culture in accounting firms. Thus the demographics of the 
respondents suggests that they are a fair representation of the organisation surveyed and 
typical of what might be expected in accounting firms in general.
The data was further analysed based on the demographic information to identify any potential 
demographic factor that should be controlled when testing the hypothesis. The data was split 
into three groups based on the median value of each demographic variable; i.e. age, 
employment tenure, grade tenure, and time of last review. Scores above the median formed 
one group, scores below the median formed another group, and scores at the median formed 
the third group. A t-test was then conducted to identify any significant differences in the 
criterion variables mean scores between the 3 groups for each demographic variable.52 Also, 
differences in means for these criterion variables were compared between male and female 
respondents.
The result of the means t-test show significant differences in the MP mean scores (/ = -2.165, 
p-value = .035) of respondents below the median grade tenure of 2 years (N  =25, mean = 
4.84; std dev =1.068) and those at the median grade tenure (N  = 26, mean = 5.38; std dev = 
.697). This implies that respondents with grade tenure (GT) between 2 - 3 years performed 
better than those who had been at their grade level for less than 2 years. However, there were 
no significant differences in performance between managers above the median GT, i.e. over 3 
years (N  = 75, mean = 5.27, std dev = 1.223), and those below the median GT i.e. under 2
52 The criterion variables are actual performance rating (AP); managerial performance -(M P); Effort (EFF); 
intention to turnover (IT); and quality threatening behaviour (QTB).
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years. Also there were no differences between respondents above and those at the median GT. 
Furthermore GT show no significant correlation with MP {rho — .06, p-value = .54). Given 
these results, there is no strong reason to control for GT in subsequent analysis though the 
results hint that managers’ performance improved with time at current grade but may then 
begin to decline if they stayed longer than 3 years at the same grade. The hint at a curvilinear 
relationship between performance and grade tenure is plausible and not unexpected. People 
generally get better at their jobs with time, i.e. performance improves with grade tenure; 
however, better performers get promoted and moved on while under-performers stay longer at 
the grade. It might also be that those who stay longer at a grade, for whatever reason, become 
disenchanted and de-motivated to put in a better performance. This is a potentially interesting 
question to explore in a longitudinal study, i.e. what are the reasons behind longer stay at a 
grade and what impact does this have on performance.
Comparison of means scores on the criterion variables between the genders showed a 
significant difference in effort (EFF) between the male and female groups (t = -2.99, p-value 
= .003). The results show that female respondents exert more effort in their work (N = 102, 
mean = 5.71, std dev = .929) compared to the male respondents (N = 134, mean = 5.33; std 
dev = .987). Correlation between the EFF and the gender variable (male =1, female =0) was 
also negative and significant {rho = -.167, p-value = .005). This difference might be 
attributable to the tendency of males to generally understate the effort they put into an activity. 
Nonetheless, this implies that gender should be controlled for in all analysis involving the EFF 
variable. There were no other significant differences in the cohort of responses to each 
criterion variable, and thus no need to control for other demographic variables when testing 
the hypotheses.
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6.2 Validation of Variable Constructs
In Section 4.4 the survey instruments used to measure the constructs of interest were 
described in detail, and Chapter 5 was devoted to a detailed review of the concept, 
measurement and validation of the focal construct, i.e. target-focused (TF) PES, measures. 
This section provides a description of how the other variables used in the study were 
constructed as well as the validation of the measures to assure that the instrument consistently 
measure the constructs intended to be measured.
Measurement of the constructs is validated using structural equation modelling (SEM) based 
on confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). As earlier discussed in Section 5.4, the advantages of 
using SEM over traditional factor analysis technique for CFA are that firstly all the 
parameters, i.e. the factor loadings, variances and covariances, and the residual error variances 
and covariances of the observed variables can be modeled and estimated. Secondly, the fit of 
the measurement model can be assessed to test how well the hypothesized latent construct 
agrees with the data using the chi-square test and other fit indices. If the chi-square statistic is 
highly significant, the hypothesized model is rejected and the model could be modified to 
achieve a better fit. Model modification is usually guided by both the modification indices and 
theory, thus giving a better understanding of the construct. Moreover, the standardized 
regression weights (i.e. factor loadings) from a SEM analysis are comparable to the factor 
loadings derived using the traditional factor analysis techniques. The SEM statistical program 
AMOS 6 was used to estimate the CFA for all the constructs. In the subsequent sub-sections 
the results of the CFA using SEM is presented for the variables measured using more than one 
item.
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6.2.1 Equity and Fairness Perception - EFP
EFP was measured using 5 items (see Table 4-3 for item details) scored on a 7 point scale 
with high scores indicating more EFP — i.e. perception of greater equity and fairness. The 
results of estimating the CFA model for EFP using SEM is given in Table 6-3. The model is 
depicted in Figures 6.1 and 6.2 below showing the unstandardized regression weights from the 
analysis. As previously explained in Section 5.4 it is necessary to fix one loading to the value 
one (1) in order to give the latent factor an interpretable scale. Thus the loading for item q8e 
was fixed to one as shown in Figure 6.1.53 All the fit indices for the initial model (Figure 6.1) 
indicate that this model did not fit the data well (%2 = 65, df = 5, p  < .001; GFI = .89; TLI = 
.76; RMSEA = .226, pclose <.001).54 Although Table 6-3 show the regression weights (i.e. 
factor loadings) to be significant and reasonably high, all above .61, the percentage of 
variance in the measurement items explained by the EFP factor is below 40% for 2 out of the 
5 items. Altogether, the results suggest modifying the model to improve the model fit.
The modifications suggested by the modification indices produced by AMOS were not 
theoretically very meaningful and did not improve the model fit. Post hoc analysis of the 
model then involved re-examining the individual measurement items resulting in a decision to 
drop one item (q8a) from the scale on the grounds of possible redundancy. This item asked 
how equitable respondents perceived their rewards in general to be whereas items q8b, q8c, 
and q8d asked the same question but referred to specific forms of rewards operated in ABC 
LLP. Deletion of item q8a resulted in the second EFP model (Model 2) depicted in Figure
6.2 below.
53 Choice o f  which item loading is fixed to 1 is largely arbitrary, and the standardized regression weights as well as 
the variances is unaffected regardless o f the item loading that is fixed. However, in this study the choice o f  the item 
loading fixed to 1 is based on the item that seem a prior to have the most face validity in measuring the construct.
54 RMSEA measures the discrepancy per degree o f freedom (recommended cut o ff <= .06 but combined with the 
p c lo se)\ p c lo se  examines the null hypothesis that RMSEA <= .05, i.e. it gives the probability o f a close model fit. 
Hoelter’s N (.05) gives the critical size the sample size must reach for the model to be accepted by chi square at the 
.05 significance level. The rule o f thumb is a Hoelter’s N > 200. GFI represents the percent o f observed 
covariances explained by the covariances implied by the model -  analogous to R 2 in multiple regression, but deals 
with error in reproducing the variance-covariance matrix rather than error variances. Recommended cut o ff GFI >= 
.90. TLI in brief measures the percentage o f covariation in the data that can be reproduced by the specified model 
penalised for model complexity. TLI cut off by convention is > -  .90
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Chi square = 65.009, df =5, p = .000, Chi s q / d f  = 13.002.
GF1 = .891. TLI = .757. NFI = .871 RMSEA = .226, pciose = .000 
Hoelter's N .05 =41.000






Chi square = 5.484, d f = 2, p  = .064, Chi sq  / d f = 2.742.
GF1 = .989. TLI = .961. NFI = .980 RMSEA = .086, pclose = .177  
Hoelter's N .05 =257.000
Results of estimating this second model show improved fit statistics and a better fit of the 
model to the data = 5.48, df =  2, p  =.064; GFI =  .99; TLI =  .96; RMSEA = .086 p c lo se  =
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.177). Table 6-3 also show the regression weights in the model to be significant and higher, all 
above .93 (and .65 standardized). Also, the percentage of variance in each item (SMC) 
explained by the factor is above 50% except for one item with 44% variance explained. In 
addition, re-examination of Cronbach alpha for this scale shows only a slight decrease from 
.84 for the five items to .80 for the four items. Thus the four items reliably measure the EFP 
construct, and the average of the aggregate item scores is used to form the EFP construct.
Table 6-3 Maximum Likelihood Estimates: EFP Models in Figures 6.1 & 6.2
M odel P aram eter  
E stim ates
(N  = 236)
M odel 1 (5 items)
U nstandardized Standardized  
(Standard error)
P
M odel 2  (4 items)
U nstandardized S tan dard ized  p  
(S tandard error)
q8a <— EFP 1.01 (.067) .84 <.001 - - -
q 8 b « -  EFP .68 (.068) .67 <.001 .94 (.109) .71 < 001
q 8 c E F P .61 (.072) .57 <.001 1.00 (.121) .73 < 001
q 8 d <- EFP .66 (.074) .59 <.001 1.03 (.122) .72 < 001
q 8 e « -  EFP 1.00 .85 na 1.00 .66 na
Variance
EFP 1.85 (.243) <001 1.11 (.219) < 001
errl (error in q8a) .78 (.116) <001 - -
err2 (error in q8b) 1.08 (.118) <001 .96 (.123) < 001
err3 (error in q8c) 1.40 (.144) < 001 .97 (.128) < 001
err4 (error in q8d) 1.50 (.154) <001 1.11 (.143) < 001
err5 (error in q8e) .69 (.110) < 001 1.44 (.167) < 001
Squared Multiple Correlations q8a q8b q8c q8d q8e
Model 1 .71 .44 .33 .35 .73
Model 2 - .51 .54 .52 .44
N ote: Model 1 - ^ (5 ) = 65, p  <.001; GFI = .89; TLI = .78; RMSEA = 2 2 6 , p c lo se  =.000
Model 2  -  x2(2 )  = 5.48, p  = 064; GFI = .99; TLI = .96; RMSEA = M b ,  p c lo se  =.177
6.2.2 Goal Commitment - GC
GC was measured using 3 items (see Table 4-4 for item details) scored on a 7 point scale with 
high scores indicating greater goal commitment. Results of estimating the CFA model for GC 
using SEM is presented in Table 6-4, and the model is depicted in Figure 6.3. The model is 
just-identified, i.e. there are as many unknown as there are known parameters, consequently
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the chi square and other fit indices cannot be used to assess the fit of the model. However, 
Table 6-4 show the regression weights are all significant with standardized weights of .53 for 
qlOa, .83 for qlOb, and .59 for qlOd. The GC factor explains 28% of variance (SMC) in item 
qlOa, 34% variance in qlOd, and 69% variance in qlOb. On the whole, it is difficult to assess 
acceptability of the model based on the normal fit statistics, however it is accepted on the 
basis of face validity and significant parameter estimates given also a Cronbach alpha of .67. 
The average of the aggregate item scores is therefore used to form the GC construct.








Chi square = , df = , p = , Chi s q / d f  =
GF1 = 1.000, TLI = , NFI = , RMSEA = , pclose =, 
Hoelter's N .05  =
Table 6-4 Maximum Likelihood Estimates: GC Model in Figure 6.3
M odel P aram eter E stim ates 
(N  =236)
U nstandardized  
(Standard Error) S tandardized P
qlOa<— GC .63 (.112) .53 <.001
qlOb < - GC 1.00 .83 na
qlOd <— GC .81 (.154) .59 < 001
Variance
in GC .78 (.170) <001
errl - error in q8a .81 (.093) < 001
err2 - error in q8b .35 (.141) .013
err3 - error in q8c 1.0 (.129) < 001
Squared Multiple Correlations qlOd qlOa qlOb
Model 1
,  - . . . . . .  /  4  t t  r  r n / c c *
.34 .28 .69
Note: Fit statistics (%;2, TLI, RMSEA etc) could not be computed because the model is just-identified
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6.2.3 Interactive Use of Control Systems -  ICS
ICS was measured using 4 items (see Table 4-8 for item details) scored on a 7 point scale with 
high scores indicating greater ICS. Results of estimating the CFA model for ICS using SEM is 
given in Table 6-5, and the model is depicted in Figure 6.4 below. The chi square test and the 
RMSEA index indicate that this model did not fit the data well (x2 = 8.2, df = 2, p  =.017; 
RMSEA = .115, pclose = .068), although other fit indices were ok (e.g. GFI = .98; TLI = .96). 
Table 6-5 also show significant and reasonably high (standardized) regression weights 
ranging from .63 to .92. The proportion of variance in each measurement item (SMC) 
explained by the ICS factor is above 60% except for one item with 40% variance explained.











Chi square = 8.198, df = 2, p = .017, Chi s q / d f  = 4.099.
GF1 = .982. TLI = .961. NFI = .983 RMSEA = .115, pclose = .068 
Hoelter's N .05 = 172.000
Output of the AMOS modification indices indicated that modelling the error terms for items 
ql3a  and q!3b (i.e. errl and err2) to co-vary would improve model fit with an estimated 
reduction in chi square of at least 6.898.55 Allowing for such a correlation makes sense as 
responses to item q!3a  may likely be related to responses to q!3b  and both items were close
55 Item q l3a  reads: ‘information about my performance against agreed goals is the subject o f face-to-face 
discussions with my appraiser whether or not my performance diverges from the agreed objectives/targets 
Item q 13b reads: ‘information about my performance against agreed goals is used by my appraiser mainly to 
encourage me to continually seek information and ways o f improving my work performance
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to each other in the survey. Figures 6.5 depicts the ICS model after making this change and 
the fit statistics indicate a considerable fit of the model to the data (%2 = .04, df = p  — .848; 
GFI = 1.0; TLI = 1.0; RMSEA = .00, pclose = .886). Nonetheless, there were little or no 
changes in the parameter estimates and percentage of variances explained as shown in Table 
6-5. Cronbach alpha for this scale is .86. Altogether these four items reliably measure the ICS 
construct and the average of the aggregate item scores is used to form the construct.
T able 6-5 M axim um  L ikelihood Estimates: ICS M odels in Figures 6 .4  & 6.5
M odel P aram eter  
E stim ates 
(N  = 236)
M odel 1
U nstandardized
(Standard error) S tandardized P
M odel 2 (with co rre la ted  error terms) 
U nstandardized
(Standard error) S tan dard ized  P
q l3a  <— ICS 1.00 .63 na 1.00 .60 na
q l3b  <— ICS 1.21 (.121) .80 <.001 1.24 (.12) .77 <.001
q l3 c «— ICS 1.24 (.126) .80 <.001 1.29 (.138) .79 <.001
q 13d <— ICS 1.54 (.148) .92 <.001 1.65 (.17) .94 <.001
C ovariances
errl *-*■ err2 .225 (.083) .007
Variance
ICS .84 (.65) <.001 .76 (.159) <.001
errl (error in ql3a) 1.29 (.130) <.001 1.37 (.136) <.001
err2 (error in q 13b) .72 (.087) <.001 .79 (.092) <.001
err3 (error in q 13 c) .75 (.086) <.001 .76 (.092) <.001
err4 (error in ql 3d) .38 (.087) <.001 .29 (.10) .004
Squared Multiple Correlations (SMC) q l3a ql3b  q l3c ql3d
Model 1 .40 .63 .63 .84
Model 2 .34 .60 .63 .88
N ote: Model 1 - y?(2) =  8.19, p  =  017; GFI = .98; TLI = .96; RMSEA = .115, p c lo se  = .086; HN(.05) =172 
Model 2 - ^ (1 ) =  0.37, p  = 848; GFI = 1.0; TLI = 1.0; RMSEA = .000, pc lo se  =  .886; HN(.05) =  24542 
AStandard Errors in Parentheses
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Chi square = .037, d f - 1 ,  p = . 848, Chi s q / d f - . 037.
GF1 = 1.000. TLI = 1.012. NFI = 1.000 RMSEA = .000, pclose = .886 
Hoelter's N .05 =24542.000
6.2.4 Job Related Tension -  JRT
JRT was measured using 4 items (see Table 4-6 for item details) scored on a 7 point scale 
with high scores indicating greater JRT. Results of estimating the CFA model for JRT using 
SEM is given in Table 6-6, and the model is depicted in Figure 6.6 below. The chi square test, 
the RMSEA and TLI indices all indicate a poor fit of the model (%2 = 18.2, df = 2, p  =.000; 
RMSEA = .186, pclose = .002; TLI =.74), although other fit indices (e.g. GFI = .97; NFI = 
.90) indicate a good fit. Results, in Table 6-6, also show significant (standardized) regression 
weights ranging from .47 to .85. The percentages of item variances (SMC) explained by the 
JRT factor is all above 40% except for item q9a with 26% and q9c with 22% variance 
explained.
The AMOS modification indices showed that allowing the error terms for items q9a and q9c 
to co-vary would improve model fit considerably, with an estimated reduction in chi square of 
at least 14.01 (other changes suggested were to predict item q9a by item q9c, and vice versa
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but with lower improvement to fit).56 Again, it is reasonable to expect such a covariance 
between the items. Not being able to influence a superior’s decisions and actions that affect 
one (item q9c) would be related to feelings of having too much workload (item q9a).










Chi square = 18.232, df=2,  p = .000, Chi s q / d f =  9.116.
GF1 = .966. TLI = .744. NFI = .907 RMSEA = .186, pclose = .002 
Hoelter's N .05 =78.000
Figure 6.7 CFA Model -  Job Relate Tension - Model 2
J  q9a \+ -
&
Chi square = .127, df=1,  p = . 722, Chi s q / d f  = . 127.
GF1 = 1.000. TLI = 1.028. NFI = .999 RMSEA = .000, pclose = .790 
Hoelter's N .05 = 7124.000
56 Question item asked respondents to indicate how often they were concerned with: “F eeling that yo u  have too  
heavy a workload, one that you  f in d  very difficult to finish during an ordinary w orking d a y ’fiWem q 9 a ); and 
“F eeling unable to influence you r immediate superior's decisions an d  actions that affect you"  (item q9c).
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After making this change depicted in Figure 6.7 above, the covariance of both items is -.22 
(p<.001) and the fit statistics indicated a much closer fit of the model with the data (%2 = .127, 
P ~ -7^2, GFI — 1.0; TLI = 1.0; RMSEA = .00, pclose = .790).57 Table 6-6 also show 
the JRT factor now explains more than 50% variance in each item. Cronbach alpha for this 
scale is .69 thus the items reliably measure the JRT construct and the average of the aggregate 
item scores is used to form the construct.
Table 6 -6  M axim um  L ikelihood Estimates: JRT M odels in Figures 6 .6  & 6.7
M odel Param eter  
Estim ates  
(N  = 236)
M odel 1 
Unstandardized
(Standard error) S tandardized P
M odel 2  (with co rre la ted  e rro r terms) 
U nstandardized
(Standard error) S tan dard ized  P
q 9 a « -  JRT 1.00 .51 na 1.00 .53 na.
q9b — JRT 1.17 (.189) .65 <.001 1.08 (.162) .79 <.001
q9c « -  JRT 1.24 (.126) .47 <001 .93 (.18) .56 <.001
q9d < - JRT 1.62 (.256) .85 <.001 1.35 (.197) .67 <.001
C ovariances
errl <-► err3 -.216 (.051) <.001
Variance
JRT .24(.065) <.001 .30 (.075) <.001
errl (error in q9a) .69 (.071) <.001 .6.3 (.071) < 001
err2 (error in q9b) .46 (.065) <..001 .43 (.052) < 001
err3 (error in q9c) .69 (.070) <.001 .64 (.070) < 001
err4 (error in q9d) .25 (.084) .003 .33 (MO) < 001
S qu ared  M ultiple C orrelations (SMC) q9a q9b q|9c q9d
Model 1 .26 .42 .22 .71
Model 2 .56 .67 .53 .79
N ote: Model I - f ( 2 )  = 8.19, p  =  017; GFI =  .98: TLI =  .95: RMSEA = 1 1 5 ,  p c lo se  =  .086: HNY.05) =  172 
Model 2 -3^(1) =  0.37, p  =.,848; GFI =  1.0; 'TLI =  1.0; RMSEA =  pclose =  .116; HN(.05) =  24542
57 The suggested changes, from the modification indices and the negative covariance might imply that people took 
on more worlc thjiti they c^ tti hestr perfasips t©1 impress their superior 'Slid Ifius mciresise- or iStieir infliiiciice
over decisions concerning them-
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6.2.5 Organisational Commitment -  OC
OC was measured using 4 items (see Table 4-9 for item details) scored on a 7 point scale with 
high marks indicating greater commitment to the organisation. Results of estimating the CFA 
model for OC using SEM is given in Table 6-7, and the model is depicted in Figure 6.8. The 
results show that all the fit indices indicate the model closely fits the data (^2 = 1.89, df = 2,p  
= .388; RMSEA = .00, pclose = .573; GFI = .99; TLI = 1.0). Results in Table 6-7 also show 
significant (standardized) regression weights ranging from .42 to .91. The percentage of 
variance in each measurement item (SMC) explained by the OC factor were all above 40% 
except for items q l2 f  with only 17% variance explained. Cronbach alpha for this scale is 
reasonably high at .78 thus the items reliably measure the OC construct. Therefore, the 
average of the aggregate item scores is used to form the construct.
Table 6-7 Maximum Likelihood Estimates: OC Model in Figure 6.8
M odel P aram eter Estimates 
(N = 236)
Unstandardized  
(Standard error) Standard ized P
q l2 f «— OC 1.00 .42 na
ql2g <— OC 1.16 (.198) .66 <.001
q l2 i«— OC 1.86 (.299) .91 <.001
ql2j «— OC 1.61 (.256) .83
Variance
GC .56 (.177) <.001
errl - error in q l2 f 2.65 (.252) <001
err2 - error in ql2g .98 (.101) .013
err3 - error in ql2i .39 (.112) <001
err4 - error in ql2j .66 (.100)
Squared Multiple Correlations q l2 f ql2g ql2i ql2j
Model 1 .17 .44 .83 .69
N ote: ^(2) = 1.89,p  =  .388; GFI = .99; TLI = 1.0; RMSEA = .00,p c lo se  =  .573; HN(.05) = 744
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Chi square = 1.893, df = 2, p = .388, Chi s q / d f = .  947.
GF1 = .996. TLI = 1.001. NFI = .995 RMSEA = .000, pclose = .573 
Hoelter's N .05 =744.000
6.2.6 Quality Threatening Behaviour -  QTB
QTB was measured using 5 items (see Table 4-7 for item details) scored on a 7 point scale 
with high scores indicating greater QTB. Results of estimating the CFA model for QTB using 
SEM is given in Table 6-8. The model is also depicted in Figure 6.9. All the fit indices 
indicate the model closely fits the data (% = 8.72, p  = .121; GFI = .99; TLI = .96; RMSEA = 
.056, pclose = .365), with significant (standardized) regression weights ranging from .46 to 
.71. The percentage of variance in each item (SMC) explained by the QTB factor ranged from 
21% to 50%, however Cronbach alpha for the scale is .69. The 5 items reliably measure the 
QTB construct, and the average of the aggregate score is used to form the construct.
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Figure 6.9 CFA Model -  Quality Threatening Behaviour
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Table 6-8 Maximum Likelihood Estimates: QTB Model in Figure 6.9
Model Parameter Estimates 
(N = 236)
Unstandardized 
(Standard error) Standardized P
q lla< — QTB 1.00 .46 na
q llb < —QTB 1.38 (.272) .55 <001
ql l c «— QTB 1.35 (.245) .71 <001
ql Id •<— QTB 1.25 (.260) .50 <001
q lle< -Q T B 1.24 (.237) .61 <001
Variance
QTB
errl - error in ql 1 a 
err2 - error in ql lb 
err3 - error in q llc  
err4 - error in ql Id 













Squared Multiple Correlations q lla  q llb q llc q lld q lle
Model 1 .21 .30 .50 .25 .37
Note: ^(5) = 8.72, p = .121; GFI = .99; TLI = .96; RMSEA = .056, pclose = .365; HN(.05) = 299
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6.2.7 Supervisory Trust -  ST
ST was measured using 5 items (see Table 4-10 for items details) scored on a 7 point scale 
with high scores indicating greater ST. The results of estimating the CFA model for ST using 
SEM is given in Table 6-9 and the model depicted in Figure 6.10. The chi square test and the 
RMSEA indicate a poor fit of the model (x2 = 29, df = 5, p  =.000; RMSEA = .143, pclose = 
.001), however other fit indices indicate a good fit (GFI = .95; TLI =.93; NFI = .96). Results 
in Table 6-9 also show high and significant (standardized) regression weights ranging from 
.64 to .86. The percentage of variance (SMC) explained by the ST factor is above 63% except 
for items ql2e  with 26% variance explained. Given the ill fit of the model going by the x2test, 
the model was modified. The modification indices from estimating the 1st model indicated that 
allowing the error terms for items q l 2 a and q l 2 e (i.e. errl and err3) to co-vary would 
improve model fit considerably with an estimated reduction in x2 of at least 14.75.38 The two 
items relate to the affect-based dimension of ST and thus the suggested covariance of the error 
terms might be an indication of this relationship. After making this change depicted in Figure 
6.11, the covariance between the two items is .40 (p <.001), and the fit indices indicate a 
much closer fit of the model to the data (x2 = 5.75, p  =.219; GFI = .99; TLI = .99; RMSEA = 
.043, pclose = .475). Nonetheless, there were little or no changes in the parameter estimates 
and percentage of variances explained as shown in Table 6-9. Cronbach alpha for this scale is 
.89, thus these items reliably measure the ST construct, and the average of the aggregate item 
scores is used to form the construct.
58 Question item asked respondents to indicate how much they agreed with the statements: “I  can talk fre e ly  to  my  
appra iser about difficulties I  am having a t w ork and  know s/he w ill listen  fltcm q !2 a ) ,  and I f  I  sh ared  my  
p erso n a l prob lem s with my appraiser s/he w ill respond constructively a n d  u n d ers ta n d in g ^  (item q I2 c )
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1.07Trust err3 I 65q12c
err4 ] 5 8q12d ■
.94q12e err5
Chi square = 29.039, df =5, p = .000, Chi s q / d f =  5.808.
GF1 = .952. TLI = .930. NFI = .958 RMSEA =. 143, pclose = .001 
Hoelter's N .05 =90.000












Chi square = 5.747, df = 4, p  = .219, Chi s q / d f =  1.437.
GF1 = .991. TLI = .994. NFI = .992 RMSEA = .043, pclose = .475 
Hoelter's N .05 = 388.000
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Table 6-9 Maximum Likelihood Estimates: ST Models in Figures 6.6 & 6.7
170
Model 1 M odel 2 (with correlated error terms)
Model Parameter
Estimates Unstandardized Unstandardized
(N  = 236) (Standard error) S tandardized P  (S tandard error) S tandard ized  P
ql2a <— ST 1.00 .80 na 1.00 .73 na
ql2b <— ST .82 (.063) .81 <.001 .92 (.076) .83 <.001
ql2c <— ST 1.07 (.071) .86 <.001 1.1 (.072) .81 <.001
ql2d <— ST .95 (.070) .85 <.001 1.09 (.088) .88 <.001
ql2e <— ST .627 (.062) .64 .69 (.073) .64 <.001
C ovariances
errl «-► err3 -.403 (.096) <.001
Variance
ST 1.64 (.231) <.001 1.37 (.223) <001
errl (error in ql2a) .94 (.110) <.001 1.20 (.134) <001
err2 (error in ql2b) .57 (.069) <.001 .51 (.066) <001
err3 (error in ql2c) .65 (.091) <.001 .87 (.106) <001
err4 (error in ql2d) .59 (.078) <.001 .45 (.075) <001
err5 (error in q!2d) .94 (.093) <.001 .94 (.094)
Squared Multiple Correlations (SMC) ql2a ql2b ql2c ql2d ql2e
Model 1 .64 .66 .74 .72 .41
Model 2 .53 .69 .65 .78 .41
Note: Model 1 - ^ (5 )  =  29, p  =  00; GFI = .95; TLI =  .93; RM SEA =  M 3 ,pclose -  .001; HM(.05) -  90  
Model 2 - x2(4) = 5.75, p  = 219; GFI =  .99; TLI =  .99; RM SEA =  M 3 ,pclose = .475; H N (.05) =  388
6.3 Analytical M odels for Hypothesis Testing
The hypotheses put forward in the study were tested using means t-tests, correlation and 
regression analysis. The direct effect hypotheses were tested using regression analysis in 
addition to both parametric and non-parametric correlation analysis. The moderation and 
mediation hypothesis were also tested using regression analysis. The combination of 
moderation and mediation relationships in the mediated moderation models were tested using 
regression analysis based on the analytical strategy' articulated by Muller et al. (2005). Based 
on a series of linear regression models, they articulated and illustrated an analytical strategy 
for testing the combination of moderation and mediation processes which they referred to as 
moderated mediation and mediated moderation. The chronology of the hypotheses to be
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tested is almost in tandem with their analytical strategy as discussed later below. Thus, we test 
for direct effects of TF PES followed by tests for any moderated effects, then for any 
mediated effects and finally for a combination of the moderated and mediated effects. The 
core regression models employed in testing the hypotheses are:
Y, = #  10 + P\ \X t + £] Equation 1
Y, ~ cc20 + /?2iX t + P22M° + fi2-X  Mo, + s 2 Equation 2
Met = a 30 + Pn X j + s3 Equation 3
Y, = + fi4lX ' + p A2 M et + s A Equation 4
Where Yt = criterion variables (QTB, IT, EFF, MP and AP);
X, = focal independent variable TF PES (measured by TF1, TF2, TFH);
Mo, = moderator variables (GD, ICS, OHL, OC, ST);
XjMo, = interaction between TF PES and the moderator variable; and 
Me, = mediator variables (EFP, GC, JRT, JS).
6.3.1 Analytical Strategy for Testing Direct and Moderated Effect Hypothesis
To test the hypothesis of a direct effect of X, on Y„ the regression model in Equation 1 is 
employed. The direct effect hypothesis is supported if fin estimates are significant and in the 
hypothesized direction -  if stipulated. To test the moderation effects hypothesis, the 
regression model in Equation 2 is employed. The moderating effect hypothesis is established 
if /?23 estimates are significant. To facilitate interpretation of the moderation effect and help 
assess any directional hypothesis, simple regression of Y: on X, for high, low and medium 
levels of the moderator Mo, is also plotted. Typically, high (low) values of the moderator are 
defined as the mean plus (minus) one standard deviation, while the middle values are defined 
as all other values between the high and low values of the moderator.
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6.3.2 Analytical Strategy for Testing Mediated Effect Hypothesis
The most popular strategy for testing mediating/intervening effect is the procedure proposed 
by Baron and Kenny (1986) (MacKinnon et al., 2000, 2002, 2007; Muller et al., 2005). Baron 
and Kenny (1986) stipulated four conditions for a mediating effect to be established viz.:
1) there must be an overall effect of the independent variable on the outcome 
variable, i.e. estimates of/?n in Equation 1 must be significant
2) there must be an effect of the independent variable on the mediating variable, i.e. 
estimates of /?3i in Equation 3 must be significant
3) there must be an effect of the mediator on the outcome variable, i.e. estimates of 
/?42 in Equation 4 must be significant; and finally
4) allowing for the effect of the mediator on the outcome variable, the residual effect 
o f the independent variable on the outcome variable must be smaller than the 
overall effect, i.e. absolute value estimates of /?4i must be smaller than that of /?n 
(note this condition assumes only a partial mediation)
An implied equality in these series of relationship is that:
P\ 1 - A 1 = A  1 x Pm Equation 5
This means that the indirect effect computed as the difference between the overall or total 
effect (i.e. p u) less the direct effect (i.e. /?4]) should be equal to the indirect effect computed as 
the product o f the effect of the independent variable on the mediating variable (i.e. /?3]) and 
the effect o f the mediator on the dependent variable (i.e. Therefore statistical
significance of meeting condition (4) is established by testing for the significance of the 
quantity on either side of the equation (MacKinnon et al., 2002; Muller et al., 2005).
However, some authors question the necessity of condition (1) in establishing a mediated 
effect. On one hand, Holmbeck (1997) distinguishes between a mediated and an indirect 
effect. According to Holmbeck (1997), whereas a mediated effect first requires a significant
59 Total and overall effect would be used interchangeably to describe the direct (i.e. residual) plus indirect (i.e. 
mediated) effects o f  the independent variable on the dependent variable.
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relationship between the independent and criterion variable consistent with condition (1), an 
indirect pathway or indirect effect exists where there is no significant relationship between the 
independent and criterion variable but the intermediate variable has significant relationship 
with the independent as well as the criterion variable.
On the other hand, Mackinnon et al. (2000) and Shrout and Bolger (2002) in their discussions 
use mediated and indirect effects interchangeably indicating no difference between the two 
terms. Mackinnon et al. (2000) note that the causal step procedure of Baron and Kenny (1986) 
assume only a partial mediation effect and does not take account of other inconsistent 
mediation models where condition (1) is not necessary' to establish a mediated effect. Such 
inconsistent mediation models exist when the mediator suppresses the direct effects of the 
independent variable on the criterion variable. Mackinnon et al. (2002) identified such 
suppressor effects as occurring when the direct effect (i.e. /?4i) and the mediated/indirect effect 
(i.e. /?3i* /?42) have opposite signs and thus may cancel out resulting in an overall effect (i.e. 
fiu) that is zero or non-significant (see Mackinnon et al., 2002, p. 178; Shrout and Bolger, 
2002, p.430 for illustrations). In addition to the suppressor effect described above, Shrout and 
Bolger (2002) identify suppressor effects that could also occur when the causal process 
between the independent and criterion variable become more distal such that the direct effect 
size becomes smaller and more likely to be transmitted through additional links in the causal 
chain, and/or affected by competing causes, and/or affected by random factors. They 
demonstrate in such cases that the mediated effect may be detected confidently but not the 
total effects of the independent variable on the criterion variable. Thus in distal causal 
processes there is more power to detect a mediated effect but limited power to detect a direct 
effect as such effect diminishes through time affected by competing causes and/or random 
factors. Consequently, condition (1) of the Baron and Kenny (1986) procedure is not a 
necessary condition to establish a mediation effect when the mediating variable is expected to 
suppress the direct effects of the independent variable.
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An alternative strategy for testing mediation effects, particularly where suppression is 
expected, is simply to test for the significance of the indirect effect i.e. /?3i x /?42 (MacKinnon 
et al., 2000; MacKinnon et al. 2007; Preacher et al., 2007). When a mediated effect is 
established then a (non-)significant estimate of /?41 provides evidence of a (complete) partial 
mediation (MacKinnon et al., 2007, p.602). To test the significance of the indirect effect, the 
standard error of the indirect effect (i.e. SEah where a = b3] and b = b42) is first computed 
according to Sobel’s (1982) first order solution (MacKinnon et al., 2002). Then dividing the 
indirect effect, i.e. a*b, by its standard error {SEab) yields a z-statistic that can be used in az- 
test to determine the statistical significance of the indirect effect {a^b). The z-statistics using 
Sobel’s (1982) first order solution for the SEab, is given as:
Given that some of the indirect effects hypothesized in the study involve a suppression effect, 
this alternative strategy would be employed in this study. Thus a significant Sobel’s z 
evidences a mediation effect. In most cases, however, Sobel’s z should be consistent with the 
Baron and Kenny strategy except models where the mediator completely suppresses the 
overall effect being investigated.
6.3.3 Analytical strategy - Mediated Moderation Effects
To test a mediated moderation (and equivalently moderated mediation) hypothesis, Muller et 
al. (2005) advocate a statistical procedure based on the Baron and Kenny causal step 
procedure for testing a mediation effect. The strategy involves the use of three regression 
equations (variable subscripts have been omitted for ease of reading) viz.:
a x b a x b
z =
Y = a 20 + P n X  + P 22Mo + fSn XMo + s 2 
Me = a 50+j35tX  + Pn Mo + P53XMo + e5 
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It can be seen that Equations 6 and 7 are adaptations of Equations 3 and 4 above. Muller et al. 
(2005, p.855) assert that the parameters in these equations can be interpreted as given in Table 
6-10 if Me (i.e. the mediator) and Mo (i.e. moderator) variables are centred, and X  is contrast 
coded and assumed to be uncorrelated to Mo. They assert that mediated moderation, and 
equivalently moderated mediation, can happen in several ways as depicted in Figure 6.12 
below, which is a mediation model allowing for the moderation of the different paths.
Figure 6.12 Illustration of Moderated mediation & Mediated moderation
Me
Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt (2005, p855)
Thus from Equations 6 and 7; {$ 5 3  tests for the moderation of the X  —♦ Me path, f56 5  tests the 
moderation o f  the Me —*■ Y path, and f$ 63 tests for the moderation of the (residual/direct) X - + Y  
path. While P2 3 from Equation 2 tests the moderation of the X —► Y path, i.e. the moderation 
o f  the overall/total effects. Analogous to Equation 5 (i.e. f}u - yff4i = #si x fia), they show the 
follow ing equality holds between the beta estimates of these equations:60
fin  -  #>3 = yW s3 + fiesPsi Equation 8
Given this equality, they assert that a mediated moderation requires that there is first a 
moderation of the total effects and the issue then is whether the moderation is accounted for 
by the mediating process. If this is the case, then it means that there must be mediation with 
one or both of the indirect paths moderated. Consequently, the moderation of the direct effect 
should be smaller in absolute value compared to the moderation of the total effect (Muller et 
al., 2005, p.856).
60 Muller et al. (2005, p. 863) indicate that the equality o f the beta estimates will only hold exactly in a sample data 
if  the moderator is a contrast coded variable, but if  not then the equality will only be approximate.
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Table 6-10 Interpretation of Regression Slope Parameters
Slope parameters Interpretation o f slope parameters
Al Total effects o f  A'on Y at the average level o f  Mo
fin Moderator effect on Y on average across the two levels o f X
fin Change in the total effects o f  X  on Y as M o increases
fisi The effect o f  X  on Me at the average level o f Mo
A 2 Moderator effect on Me on average across the two levels o f X
Change in effects o f X  on Me as Mo increases
Ai Residual direct effects o f  X  on Y at the average level o f M o
f i a Moderator effect on Y on average within the two levels o f  X  and at the average level o f  M e
Ai Change in the residual direct effects o f  X  on Y as M o increases
f i (A Mediator effect on Y on average within the two levels o f  A  and at the average level o f  M o
As Change in the mediator effect on Y as Mo increases
In summary, the conditions for mediated moderation to be established are as follows:
1) there must be a moderation of the total effect of the independent variable on the 
outcome variable, i.e. estimates of f a  in Equation 2 must be significant
2)
a. the effect of the independent variable on the mediating variable depends 
on the moderating variable and at the same time the partial effects of the 
mediator on the criterion variable is non-zero, i.e. estimates of both As in 
Equation 6 and f a  in Equation 7 must be significant; and/or
b. the partial effect of the mediator on the criterion variable depends on the 
moderating variable and the average effect of the independent variable on 
the mediator is non-zero, i .e. estimates of both f a  in Equation 7 and f a  in 
Equation 6 must be significant
3) the moderated direct effect of the independent variable on the criterion variable 
should be smaller in absolute value compared to the moderated total effects; i.e. 
absolute value estimates of f a  in Equation 7 should be smaller than those o f f a  in
Equation 2.
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In the case of moderated mediation; Muller et al. (2005) assert that condition (1) should not 
hold i.e. /?23 must be zero (i.e. non-significant), but condition (2) holds the same. In other 
words there must be a mediation of the overall effects, and this indirect effect depends on the 
level of the moderator, thus the moderator must not moderate the overall effects. Furthermore, 
given the relationship expressed in Equation 8 (i.e. /?2s -  /?63 = / t a f e  + PssPsi) the 
condition that ^ 23 -  0, it then follows that /?63 must also be significant (i.e. non-zero).
Having established the primary analytical strategies for testing the hypothesis, the subsequent 
sections presents the results of the data analysis starting with descriptive statistics o f the data 
and on to the tests o f the hypotheses .
Chaptei 6 Data Analysis & Hypothesis Testing 178
6.4 Results
In Section 5.5, TF1 was proposed as the prime TF PES measure augmented with two 
additional measures viz.; TF2 and TFH. While TFl and TF2 are general measures of 
evaluative style based on the same measurement items, TF2 is considered a parsimonious 
version of TFl based on only 2 items equating to short vs. long —term dimensions of 
evaluative criteria. On the other hand TFH is considered an equivalent PES measure but based 
on instrument adapted from Hopwood (1972). Though TFH like TF2 is based on 2 items, it is 
more specific to the case organisation in that it is based on the most important criteria actually 
observed in the organisation going by the importance rankings accorded the items constituting 
it. Data analysis is conducted using all three measures but for parsimony, discussions would 
focus on the prime measure (i.e. TFl) except where there are significant differences between 
results obtained using TFl and the additional measures.
6.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics of the key variables employed in the hypotheses tests are presented in 
Table 6-11 which shows the actual and theoretical minimum and maximum values, the 
median, mean, and standard deviations. The statistics show that the variables have ranges 
close to their theoretic range, and means close to their theoretic means. There is also a 
reasonable dispersion around the mean for most variables. As might be expected for this sort 
of study, some of the variables show evidence of skewness and kurtosis. Parametric and non- 
parametric correlations of these variables are presented in the 2nd panel of the table in 
Appendix 4. Pearson parametric correlation coefficients are displayed in the lower diagonal 
while the Kendall tau non-parametric coefficients are displayed in the upper diagonal. Both 
correlation techniques show largely the same results both in direction and significance except 
in 4 cases where the Pearson but not the Kendall tau coefficients were significant viz. 
correlation between: EFP & TFH; JS & TFH, OC & TFH, ST & TFH; and another 2 cases 
where the reverse was the case viz. correlation between AP & TF2, and between QTB & ST.
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Table 6-11 Descriptive statistics of Key Variables
(N = 236) 
Variable Label





range Actual range Median Mean
Std
D ev Skewness Kurtosis
Actual Performance 
Rating® AP 1 - 1-5 2 -5 3.00 3.49 .72 .08 -.25
Effort EFF 1 - 1 -7 2 -7 6.00 5.49 .99 -.35 -.09
Equity & Fairness 
Perception EFP 4 .80 1 -7 1 -7 4.40 4.34 1.18 -.38 -.15
Goal Commitment GC 3 .67 1 -7 2.33 - 7 5.33 5.31 .88 - A l .16
Goal Difficulty GD 1 - 1 -7 1 - 7 4.00 3.97 1.32 .01 -.46
Interactive Use Of 
Control Systems ICS 4 .86 1 -7 1 - 7 4.50 4.44 1.23 -.44 -.21
Intention To 
Turnover IT 1 - 1 -7 1 - 7 3.00 2.96 1.65 .93 .23
Job Related Tension JRT 4 .69 1 -5 1.5-5 3.25 3.21 .672 .19 -.12
Job Satisfaction JS 1 - 1 -7 1 -7 5.00 4.84 1.44 -.73 .12
Managerial
Performance6 MP 1 - 1 -7 1 -7 5.00 5.21 1.11 -1.02 1.59
Organisational
Commitment OC 4 .78 1 -7 1.25-7 4.75 4.76 1.19 -.54 .15
Organisational 
Hierarchical Level OHL 5 - 1 -5 1 -5 3.00 2.78 1.07 .29 -.73
Quality Threatening 
Behaviour QTB 5 .69 1 -5 1 -4.6 2.60 2.56 .67 .24 -.01
Relative Emphasis 





1 0-100 0-100 42.50 45.20 25.03 .04 -.77
Supervisory Trust ST 5 .89 1 -7 1 -7 5.20 5.17 1.19 -.59 .28
Target Focused 
Style-Full TFl 6 - 1 -7 1.17-5.67 3.42 3.34 .75 .06 .07
Target Focused 
Style-Short TF2 2 - 1 -7 1 -7 2.50 2.86 1.24 1.09 1.00
Target Focused Style 
Hopwood TFH
Ratio
2:1 - .1 4 -7 .29-4 .91 0.93 .32 5.08 43.65
Note’. Standard error (SE) of skewness = .158; SE of kurtosis -  .316.
•N  = 22&, and SE skewness = .161; SE kurtosis = .321. bN=  126, and SE skewness = .216; SE kurtosis = .428
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6.4.2 Tests of Hypothesis 1 & 2 -  Directs Effects of TF PES
Recall that Hypothesis 1(a) and 1(b) posit a positive association between TF PES and quality 
threatening behaviour (QTB), and TF PES and intention to turnover (IT). QTB and IT were 
regressed on TFl to test these hypotheses, and results from the regression analysis are 
presented in Table 6-12 below. The results show that TFl is a significant predictor of QTB 
(bu =.16, p-value <.01) though with a small variance explained (.R2 = .03). The results using 
TF2 and TFH measures are also consistent with that using TFl but with higher R 2, .10 and .05 
respectively. Thus Hypothesis 1(a) is supported.
In the second panel of Table 6-12, the results show that TF PES is positively associated with
IT as expected though the association is not significant using the TFl measure (bu = .06, p
>.10). However, parameter estimates for the TF2 measure (bn = .21) and the TFH measures 
(&n = .80) are positive and significant. Thus although Hypothesis 1(b) is not supported using 
TFl PES measure, there is indication of a positive association as supported using the TF2 and 
TFH PES measures.
Table 6-12 Summary o f  regression analysis: TF PES Predicting QTB & IT
<NII TFl TF2 TFH
Equation P aram eters & 
E xpected  sign
P SE B p  SE B P SE B
Y = QTB Constant 2.01** .196 2.06** .105 2.13** .131
TF (/>„) + .16** .057 .18 .18** .034 .32 .47** .134 .22
R2 .034 .104 .05
F 8.14** 27.21** 12.35**
Y = IT Constant 2.77** .490 2.35** .269 2.22** .327
TF (b u ) + .06 .143 .03 .21** .086 .16 .80** .334 .16
R 2 .001 .025 .024
F .151 5.99** 5.77**
Note /? is unstandardized beta & B is standardized beta;
A p < . 10; * p < .05; **p < .01. Note: For hypothesis testing purposes a 10% significance level is o f  course a 
test at the 5% level if  the hypotheses are directional. However, in this table and subsequent tables o f  results the 2- 
tailed p-values are reported and used in testing the hypotheses. This allows for discussion o f  significant results 
opposite in direction to the hypothesis.
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Given that higher TF PES is associated with higher QTB and possibly higher IT, further 
analysis was conducted to check if there were differences in QTB and IT between high TF 
PES based mainly on financial measures and high TF PES based mainly on non-financial 
measures. In order words we investigate to see if the observed positive association is driven 
by the nature of the performance measure used in a target focused manner in performance 
evaluation. First, data was grouped into high (low) TF PES if the TF PES score was above 
(below) the TF PES median. Then the high TF PES groups were subdivided into high TF PES 
based mainly on financial or non-financial measures based on if scores on the relative 
emphasis on financial goals (REFG) measure were above or below the REFG median. Scores 
above the REFG represented TF PES based mainly on financial measures, and scores below 
represented TF PES based mainly on non-financial measures. This grouping was represented 
by the variable TFl Fin, TF2_Fin, and TFH Fin respectively for the 3 PES measures with a 
value o f ‘1’ representing high TF PES based mainly on financial measures and ‘O’ otherwise. 
Finally, the QTB and IT mean scores for the two sub-groups were compared. The results, 
presented in the first panel of Table 6-13 below, show no significant differences in QTB (for 
T F l, t = .69, p  = .49) and in IT (for TFl, t = .49, p  = .622) between the two sub-groups. The 
same results apply using the TF2 and TFH measures. This implies that when quantitative 
financial and quantitative non-financial measures are used in the same target focused manner, 
they result in similar unintended consequences. Thus Hypothesis 2(a) and 2(b) are supported.
To evaluate this point further data was grouped into two based on whether performance
measures were mainly quantitative or mainly qualitative. Scores above (below) the median on
the relative emphasis on quantitative goals (REQG) measure were identified as use of more
quantitative (qualitative) performance measures.61 This was represented by a dummy variable
Quant which equalled 1 (0) if performance measures were more quantitative (qualitative).
61 REQG measure asked respondents to indicate the emphasis their superior currently placed on meeting 
quantitative vs. non-quantitative goals when evaluating their performance. And the REFG measure asked 
respondents to indicate the amount o f emphasis superiors placed on meeting the financial vs. non-financial 
measures o f  their quantitative measures. See Appendix 3, page 259
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Result o f the analysis, presented in the 2nd panel of Table 6-13, show that those whose 
performance measures were mainly quantitative did not report significantly different levels of 
QTB (t — .66, p  =.51) and IT (/ = -.95, p  =.34) compared to those with mainly qualitative 
performance measures.
Table 6-13 T-test o f  Differences in QTB & IT Means
Groups based on Nature o f  Performance Measures - Financial vs. Quantitative Non-financial Measures; 
Quantitative vs. Non-quantitative_________ _______ _________________
Group
















QTB 1 50 2.70 .69 46 2.85 1.21 43 2.74 1.30
(0.59) (.490) (0.60) (0.23) (0.68) (0.20)
0 44 2.61 40 2.68 55 2.55
(0.75) (0.73) (0.75)
IT 1 50 3.00 .49 46 3.13 -0.43 43 2.88 -0.65
(1.93) (.622) (1-96) (0.67) (1.62) (0.52)
0 44 2.82 40 3.30 55 3,11
(1.59) (1.62) (1.75)
QuanT Fin1
Mean t Mean /
Group N (Std. Dev) (2-tailed Sig..) N (Std. Dev) (2-tailed Sig.)
QTB 1 2.59 0.66 2.67 1.73
118 (0.67) (0.51) 80 (0.67) (0.08)
0 2.53 2.49
118 (0.68) 114 (0.68)
IT 1 2.86 -0.95 2.93 -0.09
118 (1.67) (0.34) 80 (1.78) (0.93)
0 3.06 2.95
118 (1.63) 114 ( 1 .6 6 )
‘ T F l Fin  =  1 for high TFl PES based mainly on financial measures and O' for high TFl PES based mainly on 
non-financial measures; same for TF2_Fin, and TFH_Fin.
b Q uant =  1 (0) when mainly quantitative (non-quantitative) performance measures are emphasized; Fin =  1 (0) 
when mainly financial (non-financial) performance measures are used.
In addition, comparisons were also made between those whose performance measures were 
mainly quantitative financial and those with more quantitative non-financial measures. This 
was measured byf the dummy'- variable Fin which equalled 1 (0) for scores above (below) the 
REFG median. Again no significant differences were found between the two groups, although
Chapter 6 Data Analysis & Hypothesis Testing 183
those with more financial measures reported marginally more QTB (t = 1.73, p  =.08). This 
marginal difference provide some support to the findings of Hopwood (1972) and others, i.e. 
that emphasis on the short-term meeting of budget targets, which are quantitative and 
financial, are associated with dysfunctional behaviours. However, it is also shown here to be 
of less importance with the more general quantitative vs. qualitative measures thus extending 
the findings o f earlier studies. Furthermore, combining this and the finding of similar QTB 
levels between the high TF PES financial and non-financial groups indicate that using 
quantitative non-financial measures in the same target focused manner as quantitative 
financial measures produces similar unintended consequences. Thus this study further extends 
earlier studies in showing that emphasis on achieving targets in general, budget or non budget 
related, has similar unintended consequences.
6.4.3 Tests of Hypothesis 3 -Direct (Curvilinear) Effects of TF PES 
Recall that Hypothesis 3 posits a convex, i.e. inverted U-shaped, curvilinear relationship 
between TF PES and effort (EFF), and TF PES and performance. Recall also that performance 
is measured in terms of the actual performance ratings respondents received in their last 
performance review (AP) and by managers self rated measure of performance, i.e. managerial 
performance (MP). A hierarchical regression analysis was employed to evaluate the 
hypothesized curvilinear relationship. EFF was regressed on the gender control variable in the 
first step, then the linear TF PES term w as added in the second step, and the cun ilinear term 
(i.e. squared TF PES) was entered in the last step. Similarly, the criterion variables (AP and 
MP) were regressed on the linear TF PES term in the first step, and the curvilinear TF PES 
term was added in the second step. If the relationship between TF PES and the criterion 
variables are best represented by linearity, then a significant amount of the variation in these 
variables should be explained by the TF PES term alone. If on the other hand the inclusion of 
the squared TF PES term explains a significant amount of variation beyond that explained by 
the linear term and the squared term is also significantly different from zero, then a curvilinear
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form best represents the relationship between TF PES and the criterion variable. Results are 
presented in Table 6-14 below.
Table 6-14 Summary o f  hierarchical regressions: Linear & curvilinear TF PES predicting Effort
N  = 23 6  
E xpected  Sign
TFl TF2 TFH
Step  1 P SE B P SE B P SE B
Constant 5.71** .095
Gender ? -.38** .126 -.19
F 8.912**
R2 .037
Step 2 P SE B P SE B P SE B
Constant 5.81** .298 5.54** .176 5.65** .211
Gender ? - .38** .127 -.19 -.37** .126 -.19 -.37* .127 -.19
TF -.03 .084 -.02 .06 .051 .07 .06 .198 .02
F 4.50* 5.08** 4.49*
R2 .037 .042 .037
A R 2 .001 .005 .000
Step 3 P SE B P SE B P SE B
Constant 4.11** .880 6.11** .366 5.73** .377
Gender ? -.38** .126 -.19 -.37** .126 -.19 -.37** .128 -.19
TF + 1.03* .526 .796 -.33 .222 -.42 -.07 .527 -.02
TF2 - -.16* .077 -.83 .06 .031 .50 .04 .142 .05
F 4.44** 4.475** 3.00*
R 2 .054 .055 .037
AR2 .017* .013'' .000
2nd Panel TFl (Male Subgroup)21 TFl (Female Subgroup)1’
S tep  1 P SE B P SE B
Constant 5.33** .086 5.71** .093
TF -.06 .115 -.05 .01 .122 .01
F .27 .003
R2 .002 .000
S tep  2 P SE B B C ET B
Constant 8.41** 1.347 6.49** 1.221
TF + 1.70* .777 1.29 .46 .711 .38
j p 2 -.26 .115 -1.35 -.07 .104 -.38
F 2.77A .211
R 2 .041 .004
AR2 ,039A
t .  t i r  11 •> a . b n r
.004
Note is unstandardized beta, & B is standardized beta. ® ¥ - 134; 'N -  102 
Ap  < .10, *p <  .05. **p <  .01.
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The result of the hierarchical regression of EFF on gender and the linear and squared TF PES 
terms is shown in the first panel of Table 6-14 above. In the 1st step gender was negatively 
and significantly related to effort (EFF), justifying its inclusion as a control variable. In the 2nd 
step the linear TFl term was not significantly related to EFF and did not add much to the 
variance attributed to gender. Similar results were obtained using TF2 and TFH. In the final 
step, the squared TF PES term was entered. In this step, the squared TFl term was found to be 
negatively and significantly related to EFF, and the linear term was also positive and 
significantly related to EFF. Adding the squared TFl term explained a significant 1.7% 
variance in EFF beyond that explained by gender and the linear term in the 2nd step (F-change 
= 4.2, p  < .05). Results using TF2 and TFH are not significant however. The TFl result 
provides support for Hypothesis 3(a). The positive linear term and negative squared term 
imply an inverted 'U ’ relationship meaning that TF PES engenders greater effort up to a point 
after which effort begins to decline. A scatter graph of EFF and TFl with the curvilinear 
regression trend line imposed on it is shown in the first panel of Figure 6.13. An examination 
of this graph shows however that the curvilinear relationship is not so apparent; rather it 
seems more like there is no discernible pattern of association between TFl and EFF.
Given the significant differences in EFF between men and women, further analysis was 
conducted separately for the 2 groups. As before, EFF was first regressed on the linear TFl 
term and then on both the linear and curvilinear TFl term. The results presented in the second 
panel of Table 6-14 suggests that the curvilinear effect observed in the first analysis relate 
only to the male group and not the female group. For the male group, the addition of the 
curvilinear term explain a marginally significant 3.9% additional variation, just as the 
regression model on the whole is only marginally significant (F — 2.77,p  < .10). However, the 
curvilinear term is not significant even though the linear term is. A scatter graph of EFF and 
7 F 1 for the male group with the curvilinear regression trend line imposed is also presented in 
the second panel of Figure 6.13 below .
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Again, visual inspection of the graph above does not indicate any apparent pattern of 
relationship between the variables. So although there is a statistically significant convex 
relationship between TF1 and EFF, which seems to relate to men more than to women, this 
relationship is not substantively significant. In summary therefore, the results statistically 
provide support for Hypothesis 3(a) using the TF1 measure of PES, and further analysis 
indicates that the result is not substantive. Given the visual evidence from the graphs coupled 
with the marginal significance of the model for the male sub-group for whom only the
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hypothesized relation seemed to hold, a decision was made to drop the curvilinear term from 
further analysis.
Hypothesis 3(b)
Results from the 2 step hierarchical regression of actual performance ratings (AP) and the self 
rated measure of managerial performance (MP) on the linear and curvilinear TF PES terms is 
shown in Table 6-15 below. In the first panel of the table, the results with AP as the dependent 
variable do not support Hypothesis 3(b). Addition of the squared TF1 term does not add 
significantly to explaining the variance in AP and the squared term is also not significant, The 
result rather show a negative and significant linear association between TF1 and AP (b = -.18, 
p  < .05). Results using the TFH measure also show a negative but non-significant linear 
relationship, and also show no significant curvilinear relationship. Results using the TF2 
measure indicate a non-significant negative linear relationship; however, it also shows a 
significant curvilinear relationship with AP that is concave in shape. The scatter graph of AP 
on TF2 with the curvilinear regression line superimposed is presented in Figure 6.14 and it 
does rather suggest no apparent relationship between the variables. Thus the statistically 
significant curvilinear effect appears not be substantively significant. Results in the second 
panel of Table 6-15 with MP as the dependent variable do not also provide support for a 
curvilinear relationship. On the other hand, the results show a positive and significant linear 
association between TF PES and MP across all 3 TF PES measures (for TF1, b = .37, p  < .01)
Further analysis was conducted to explore the nature of the negative association between TF 
PES and AP given the strong positive association between TF PES and MP. In the survey the 
questionnaire item for MP was only presented to managers and above, so AP was now 
regressed on both the linear and squared TF PES terms separately for those with and those 
without a score on the MP variable. The results were consistent with the results of the initial 
regression of AP on linear and curvilinear TF PES terms for both groups of respondents. In
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the U‘ step AP is negatively associated with TF PES for the two groups and across all 3 TF 
PES measures, but only significant using the TF1 measure. Using the TF1 PES measure; = - 
. 164, = .029 for those with MP scores; and: -  -.222, p  = .049 for those without MP scores. 
In the 2nd step, the squared TF PES term is not significant for both groups across all 3 PES 
measures. Thus as more emphasis is placed on achieving set targets, performance is seems 
deteriorated given the actual performance ratings, but improved according to self rated 
managerial performance. This may be an indication of performance target ratcheting, i.e. 
where superiors raise the expected performance levels a notch higher in subsequent periods 
based on employees past superior performance. Thus as more emphasis is placed on 
achieving targets managers respond by improving their performance which nonetheless still 
falls short of their superiors expectations because the expectations have been set to a higher 
level than in previous periods. If so, employees would feel more pressure and may seek to 
alleviate some of the pressure by resorting to more dysfunctional behaviour and social 
withdrawal. This may partly explain the positive association between TF PES and 
dysfunctional behaviour in the form of QTB, and social withdrawal represented by IT.
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Table 6-15 Summary of tiierarcliical regressions: Linear & curvilinear TF PES predicting AP *  MP'
I" = AP0' IF! TF2 TFH
(Expected sigm#
Step I fi SE B fi CT ,©.1. M' j. JP' M fi SE M
Constant 4.1** .216' 3.64** .120 3.63** .146









Step 2 fi C T B fi CMC' B'3JL 3 B fi "OP B
Constant 3.5®** 4. If** .27® 3.99** 3 U
'TF + .2® .421 ...2® -.42* .161; -.72 -.71* 399 -.314
TF2 - -.06 .063 -.40' .05* .023 ..65 .16 .107 ,267
IT 4.59* .3,56* 1.63'
i f .099 .031 .014
J* 2' .004 .022* JD10
¥  = MP*'























Step 2 e SE j0 fi C T  © I f B fi SE
pn
Constant 3.2*** 1.227 4.13** .526 4.25** 311
IF' + OTS .755 59 .06 325 JO# 130 .729 ,44'









j j F .003
3>. a,, r — "Th'TS"© ,,
.002
»/ — ii *iuc 1 ft.
.005
AilTUntnfi k  iii 'giaiiadlaniiTeirl ill S  is standardized beta. AM — 228; b N — 126. Ap  < ,10; *p < -05; **p < JM*
6 A 4  Tests of Hypothesis 4 -  GD Moderation of TF PES Direct Effects.
Recall that Hypothesis. 4 posits that goal difficult (GD) moderates 'the effect o f  TF PES on
quality threatening behaviour (QTB) — Hypothesis 4(a); intention to' tainiO'Ver (IT) — 
hypothesis 4(h); effort (EFF) -  hypothesis 4(c); and performance (AP and MP) -  hypothesis 
4(dt,&2)* Furthermore, it is hypothesized that this moderation occurs, such that TF PES is 
positively related to QTB, IT and EFF when GD is high than when GD is low or at medium 
levels; and that TF PES is more positively related to MP1 and AP at moderate and low levels of 
GD than at high levels o f GD. Recall also that the moderation relationship is evaluated via
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Equation 2, i.e. } = a 20 + fl2lX  + f322Mo + /323XMo + £2t and that the hypothesis is
supported if /?23, the interaction between TF PES and GD, is significant. In all the moderation 
models, the independent variables were centred for ease of interpreting the parameter 
estimates. Results from the regression analysis of TF PES, GD and their interaction predicting 
QTB, IT, EFF, AP and MP is presented in Table 6-16 beknv.
Table 6-16 Summary of regression analysis: TF PES, GD and their interaction predicting QTB, IT,
EFF, AP & MP
A = 2 3 6  TF1 TF2 TFH
Equation 2 Parameters & fi SE B fi SE B fi SE  B
E xpected  sign
Y = QTB Constant 2.56** .043 2.56** .042 2.56** .043
TF -  b 2 l + .16** .058 .18 .17** .034 .31 .47* .195 .22
GD — b 2z (+) .07* .033 .14 ,06A .032 .11 .06A .032 .12
TFxGD — b n + .01 .043 .02 .01 .023 .04 -.02 .091 -.02
F 4.32** 10.29** 5.34**
R 2 .053 .117 .065
Y = IT Constant 2.95** .105 2.94** .104 2.98** .104
TF -  b 2] + -.02 .143 -.01 .16A .086 .12 1.47** .476 .28
GD — b u (+) .24** .090 .19 .23** .079 .18 .24** .079 .19
TFxGD + .20A .105 .12 .12* .057 .14 -.50* .221 -.21
F 4.49** 6.48** 6.51 **
R 2 .055 .077 .078
Y = EFF Constant 5.66** .095 5.66** .095 5.65** .095
Gender -.29* .127 -.15 -.29* .127 -.15 -.29* .127 -.15
T F - b 2 i ? + .01 .084 .01 .08 .051 .10 .04 .283 .01
GD — 6 2 2 (+) -.15** .048 -.2 -.16** .048 -.22 -.16** .048 -.21
TFXG D -A 23 ? -.09 .061 -.09 -.02 .034 -.03 .07 .131 .04
F 5.34** 5.50** 5.04**
R 2 .085 .087 .080
Y = MP* Constant 5.19** .093 5.18** .097 5.18** .101
T F -  b 2 i + .51** .120 .36 .24** .073 .28 .87* .406 .32
GD — b 22 (+) .15* .068 .17 .14A .071 .17 .11 ...073 .13
TFxGD-*23 + ? -.35** .086 -.35 -.11* .046 -.20 -.16 .179 -.13
F 10.33** 5.75** 3.3.5*
R2 .203 .124 .076
Y = AP11 Constant 3.48** .047 3.48** .048 3.48** .048
T F -  *21? + _  i9** .064 -.19 -.05 .039 -.09 -.35 .218 -.16
GD — b22 (+) -.05 .036 -.08 -.04 .037 -.08 -.05 .037 -.09
TFxGD -  *23 + ? .03 .048 .04 .02 .026 .04 ...14 .101 .13
F 3.40* 1.25 1.44
R2 .044 .016 .019
aAr= 126' bjV =228' ' p <  .10: *p <  .05; **p <  .01. N ote expected  coefficient sign in bracket is not
fo rm a lly  s ta te d  in a  hypothesis but is apparent in the hypothesis developm ent
Chaptei 6 Data Analysis & Hypothesis Testing 191
Results in the 1 , 3 ,  and 5th panels of Table 6-16 above show that the interaction of TF PES 
and GD did not have any significant effect on QTB, EFF, and AP respectively, i.e. #23 = 0. 
Thus Hypotheses 4(a), 4(c), and 4(d2) are not supported. However, the results also indicate 
that at moderate levels of GD, high TF1 still leads to significantly high QTB and low AP. 
Also at moderate levels of TF1, GD leads to significantly more QTB and less EFF. The 
conclusion therefore is that high TF1 leads to high QTB regardless o f the level o f GD, and 
conversely GD leads to high QTB regardless of the level of TF1. Thus high TF PES and high 
GD may have substitutionary effects. Results are similar using TF2 and TFH measures.
Results in the 2nd panel of the table show that TF1 does not have any significant effect on IT 
given moderate levels of GD (b2\ -  -.02, p  > .10), but at moderate levels of TF1 GD 
significantly increases IT (bji = -24, p < .01). The results further show that the TF1 and GD 
interaction term is positive and marginally significant (b2 3 = .20, p-value = .061) thus 
providing some support for Hypothesis 4(b). This result implies that TFl impact on IT 
depends on the level of GD; in this case TFl seems to increase IT when GD is high. The 
results using TF2 and TFH measures are similar with significant interaction term, but the sign 
o f the interaction term is reversed in the case of TFH. In order w ords, given easier rather than 
difficult targets higher levels of TFH lead to increased IT. It is not immediately clear why this 
is the case as it is expected that results using all 3 PES measures should be similar in direction 
if not in significance. Perhaps this reflects the relative rather than absolute nature of the 
adapted Hopwood measure such that increasing emphasis on the more quantitative and target 
focused performance criteria relative to the more qualitative less target focused ones while 
required performance levels are low may be considered unchallenging than increasing relative 
emphasis on the qualitative less target focused criteria.
Similarly, results in the 4th panel of the table show that at moderate i.e. average GD, TFl is 
positively and significantly associated with MP (b2: = . 5 1 <  .01), and GD is also positively' 
and significantly associated with MP at average levels of TFl (b2i = A 5 , p  < .05). The results
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further show that the TFl and GD interaction term is negative and significant (Z>2j = -.35, p  < 
.01). This implies, as expected, that high TFl (i.e. focus on achieving targets) leads to lower 
MP when GD is high, and conversely higher MP at low to moderate GD. Therefore 
Hypothesis 4(di) is supported. Thus having specific targets to aim for does provide managers 
motivation to improve their performance, as does also emphasis on achieving targets. 
However, high focus on achieving targets affects performance more positively when GD is at 
low to moderate levels than when GD is high. Results using TF2 and TFH are also similar 
except that the interaction term is not significant for the TFH measure.
To evaluate Hypothesis 4(b) and 4(dj) further, and also facilitate interpretation o f the 
moderation effects, simple regressions of IT on TF PES, and MP on TF PES was plotted for 3 
subgroups o f GD viz.: high GD (1 std dev above the GD mean); low GD (1 std dev below GD 
mean); and medium GD (all values in between ±SD). The graphs are presented in Figures 
6.15 and 6.16 below. As can be seen from the 1st panel of Figure 6.15 TFl increases IT more 
when GD is high than when GD is moderate or low confirming support of Hypothesis 4(b). 
Also, in the 1st panel of Figure 6.16, it can be seen that TFl increases MP when GD is at a low 
or moderate level compared to when GD is high. The significant interactions imply that the 
slopes are significantly different from each other, but it does not provide information as to 
whether the simple slopes are significantly different from zero.
Post hoc analysis examining the significance of the slopes of the simple regression lines of IT 
and o f MP on TFl respectively at high and low GD is conducted via two additional 
regressions similar to Equation 2. However, in these regressions the moderator, i.e. GD, is 
recoded so that high GD is assigned a value of zero in the 1st analysis, and then low GD 
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Recall that GD is centred round its mean, so for high GD representing scores 1 standard 
deviation (SD) above the mean to be assigned a value of zero, the centred GD variable is 
recoded by subtracting the SD of GD which is 1.32. In the case of low GD, i.e. scores 1 SD 
below the mean, the centred GD variable is recoded by adding the SD (Aiken et al., 1991; 
Cohen and Cohen, 2003). The significance of the TFl term in the regression of IT and MP 
respectively on TFl, the recoded GD and their interaction term provides a test of the 
significance of TFl simple effects on IT and MP when GD is zero, i.e. at low or at high GD as 
specified.
Running the analysis with the MP dependent variable yields the following results:
for low GD: MP = 4.995** + .983 777** + A45GD* - .354(777 * GD)** 
for high GD: MP = 5.379** + .045777 + .145G7>* - .354(777 x GD)**
The simple slope of TFl when GD is low is positive and significant (i.e. b2\ = -983,p  < •0 1 ),
while it is much smaller and not significant when GD is high (i.e. b2\ = .045, p  > .10). Recall
from Table 6-16 that (b2\ = .51,/? < .01) when GD is moderate. It can be seen then that as GD
increases, TFl effects on MP reduces though still positive. Thus the trend of TFl effect on
MP is negative as GD increases, and conversely positive as GD reduces. However, it was
expected that TF 1 impact on MP would be greatest when GD is moderate whereas the result
show it is greatest when GD is low.
Similarly, post hoc analysis using the IT dependent variable yields the results:
for low GD: IT = 2.633** - .279777 + 239GD** + . 198(777 *GD)A 
for high GD: IT = 3.267** + .244777 + .239G79** + .198(777 *GD)A
Though these simple effects of TFl on IT are not significant, the results show it is negative
when GD is low (Z?2i = -.279,/? > .10), but positive when GD is high (i.e. b21 = .244,/? > .10)
as also indicated by the graphs. Recall from Table 6-16 that when GD is moderate b2\ = -. 0 2 ,
p  > .10. Thus the trend of TFl impact on IT as GD increases is positive, and TFl increases IT
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only when performance targets are set at a high level of difficulty , i.e. when GD is high. This 
provides strong support for Hypothesis 4 (b).
In summary the result provide support for Hypotheses 4(b) and 4(dj), i.e. the effect of TF PES 
on intention to turnover and managerial performance depends on the level of goal difficulty' 
(GD). When the goal difficulty' (GD) is low or moderate, TF PES increases performance but 
does not affect performance when GD is high. On the other hand when GD is high, TF PES 
tends to increase intention to turnover (IT) but tends to decrease it when GD is low.
6.4.5 Tests of Hypothesis 5 -  OHL & Performance Measure Characteristics 
Recall that Hypothesis 5(a) states that there is no difference in the level of quantitative 
information used at low vs. high organisational hierarchical level (OHL); H5(b) states that 
quantitative (non-)financial information is used more extensively at (lowr) high OHL; and 
H5(c) states that the PES dominant at lowr and high OHL would be different. To reduce the 
error rates from comparing means between the 5 levels of the OHL, and to also take account 
of the correlations between the variables of interest the one-way MAMOVA technique was 
employed. First, relative emphasis on quantitative goals (REQG) and relative emphasis on 
financial goals (REFG) was grouped together as dependent variables (DVs) in one analysis, 
while the 3 TF PES measures (i.e. TFl, TF2, and TFH) were grouped together as DVs in 
another analysis - making 2 one-way MANOVAs conducted. Using the MANOVA technique 
enables one to determine first whether differences in means between the 5 OHLs are large 
enough to indicate that at least two of the corresponding population means must also differ. If 
so, then post hoc tests are conducted to further determine which variable means are 
significantly different between the 5 OHLs, and then to identify the OHLs involved. Results 
of the 2 one-way MANOVA is presented in Table 6-17 below.
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T able 6 -17  Sum m ary o f  O ne-w ay M A N O V A s. IV: OHL; D V s: REQ G, REFG; & T F l, TF2, TFH
Panel 1: D e s c r ip tiv e  S ta tis tic s REQG REFG TFl TF2 TFH
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
Hierarchical Levels N (Std Dev) (Std Dev) (Std Dev) (Std Dev) (Std Dev)
Support = 1 21 39.90 26.38 3.50 3.10 .92
(33.22) (30.98) (.83) ( 1.10) (.21)
Executive Assistant = 2 89 44.87 32.58 3.37 2.88 .93
(23.06) (28.34) (.68) (1.15) (-17)
Manager = 3 60 49.95 53.38 3.39 2.87 .99
(25.57) (27.20) (.82) (1.31) (.52)








Director = 5 14 43.93 66.07 3.01 2.36 .86
(20.21) (17.00) (.82) ( 1.12) (.16)
Panel 2: M ultivariate Tests M ANO VA-2a M ANO VA-1a
Wilks’ Lambda- W .834 .957
F 5.46** .85
Panel 3: Tests o f  Between  
Subject Effects
REQG REFG TFl TF2 TFH
F .91 9.17** 1.16 1.19
1 .  J  T-I-'TT 61
.12
‘The criterion variables in MANOVA-2 are REQG and REFG; and in M ANOVA-1 T Fl, TF2 and TFH.62 
Ap  < .10; *p <  .05; **p < .01.
Data in the 1st panel of the table show the means and standard deviations of the 5 categories of
the OHL (i.e. support, executive assistant, manager, senior manager, and director) for each
DV of interest. The 2nd panel of the table presents the results of the 2 MANOVA analysis
conducted. Results of analysis with REQG and REFG as the DVs is presented under the
heading ‘MANOVA-2’ while results using the 3 TF PES measures as the DVs is presented
under the heading ‘MANOVA-1’. In the 1st analysis, i.e. ‘MANOVA-1’, the multivariate test
of differences using Wilks’ Lambda is not significant (W =  .957, F[12, 606.17] = .85,p  > .10).
This implies there are no significant differences in the mean levels of TF PES used at different
OHL, thus Hypothesis 5(c) is not supported. In the 2nd analysis, i.e. ‘MANOVA-2’, Wilks’
Lambda is significant (W = .834, F[8 , 462] = 5.46, p  < .01) indicating that at least 2 OHLs had
significantly different means on either the REQG and/or the REFG variable. Results of the
post hoc tests of between subject effects shown in the 3rd panel of the table reveal that
62 When all variables are used in one MANOVA; Wilks’ Lambda is still significant and test o f between subject 
effects are significant for only REFG, and the multiple comparison results are unchanged.
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significant differences in mean exist only in relation to the REFG variable. Thus Hypotheses 
4(a) and 4(b) are supported meaning there are no significant differences in the level of REQG 
at different OHLs, but the level of REFG differed among at least 2 OHLs.
Further post hoc analysis involving multiple comparisons of REFG means was conducted to 
identity which of the 5 OHLs means significantly' differed. First, Levene’s test of equality of 
error variances [^(4,231) = 2.93, p  < .05] indicated unequal error variances of the REFG 
scores, thus the post hoc analysis w as conducted using the Games-Howell test.63 Result of the 
multiple mean comparisons is shown in Table 6-18 below, and it suggests that there is more 
REFG at successively higher OHL, considering just the differences in mean scores. The 
exception being that there is more REFG at Manager (OHL = 3) compared to Senior Manager 
(OHL = 4) levels. In terms of statistical significance, the results show that at Managers level 
there is significantly more REFG compared to Support (OHL = 1) and Executive Assistants 
(OHL = 2) levels. Similarly, at Directors level (OHL = 5) there is significantly more REFG 
compared to Support (OHL = 1), Executive Assistants (OHL = 2), and Senior Managers 
levels.
Table 6-18 Multiple Comparison of Differences in REFG Mean scores between OHLs
D ifferences in REFG M ean scores  
betw een  OHLs Mean D iff 
(Std Error)
Mean D iff 
(Std Error)
Mean D iff 
(Std Error)




2 3 4 5
(Director)
Support -1 -6.20 -27.00** -18.52 -39.69**
(7.40) (7.62) (7.97) (8.15)
Executive Assistant - 2 -20.80** -12.32 -33.49**
(4.62) (5.19) (5.45)




Senior Manager - 4 -21.17*
(6 .21)
aThe criterion variables in MANOVA-2 are REQG and REFG; and in MANOVA-1 T Fl, TF2 and TFH.64
Ap  < .10; *p <  .05; **p <  .01.
63 The Games-Howell test does not assume equality' o f  variance or equal sample sizes for the groups that are 
compared unlike the more popular Tukey’s honestly significant difference (HSD) test.
64 When all variables are used in one MANOVA; Wilks’ Lambda is still significant and test o f between subject 
effects are significant for only REFG, and the multiple comparison results are unchanged.
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To evaluate this assertion further, a graph of the 5 OHLs means on the REQG, REFG, as well 
as the TF PES measures is presented in Figure 6.17. As anticipated, the 1st panel of Figure 
6.17 indicate little or no difference in the level of REQG across the 5 OHLs. As also 
anticipated, it depicts progressively higher REFG at higher OHL excepting as already noted 
that REFG is more at Manager level compared to Senior Manager level. The 2nd and 3rd 
panels of Figure 6.17 depict the graphs of the 5 OHLs mean scores on the TF PES measures. 
Though the tests of differences in the MANOVA indicated no significant differences, the 
figures show, as anticipated, that progressively lesser TFl and TF2 PES is employed higher 
up the hierarchy. However, the graph in the 3rd panel show more TFH higher up the hierarchy 
up to Manager level, and then lower TFH after this level. Thus with the exception of the 
Manager levels, the graph conforms to expectations w ith lesser TFH used higher up the OHL.
These conclusions are further supported by the results of regressing REQG, REFG, and the 
TF PES measures on OHL. The results of these regressions presented in Table 6-19 show that 
the OHL beta estimate for REQG is not significant confirming the hypothesis that there is no 
difference in REQG at different OHL. But for REFG, the OHL beta estimate is positive and 
significant implying more REFG at higher OHL, thus confirming the hypothesis. On the hand, 
the OHL beta estimates for all 3 TF PES measures are negative in the first instance and also 
significant when observations with abnormal residuals above 3 standard deviations are 
successively deleted. The results thus imply progressively less TF PES at higher OHL. In 
summary therefore, the graphs and regression results provide support for Hypotheses 5(a) and 
5(b), as well as Hypothesis 5(c), i.e. there is more REFG and less TF PES higher up the 
hierarchy.
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Table 6-19 Summary o f  Regression Analysis: OHL predicting REQG, REFG, & TF PES
IV+ = OHL
1stRegression (N = 236) 2nd Regression1 3 rd Regression1*
R2 F P R2 F fi R2 F  fi
DV+ = REQG .000 .049 .338
DV = REFG .093 24.02** 8.59**
DV = TFl .014 3.41A 0 00 > .016 3.70A -,09A
DV = TF2 .007 1.59 -.09 .012 2.74A -.12 .017 3.85A -,13A
DV = TFH
vi * . «mkJ .  j ->rd
.004 .832 -.02 .022 5.23* -.03* .032 7.525** -.03**
Note: 2 and 3r regressions are after deleting, from the immediate previous regression, observations with 
standardized residual more than 3 standard deviations from the residuals mean.
= 235 for T F l; 233 for TF2 and TFH. hN  =  230 for TF2 and TFH 
+I V =  independent variable; D V =  dependent variable.
Ap <  .10; *p  < .05; **p < .01.
6.4.6 Tests of Hypothesis 6 -  OHL Moderation of TF PES Direct Effects 
Recall that it is postulated in Hypothesis 6  that OHL moderates the relationship between TF 
PES and the criterion variables such that quality threatening behaviour (QTB), and intention 
to turnover (IT) is more positively associated with TF PES at higher organisational 
hierarchical level (OHL), while effort (EFF), managerial performance (MP) and actual 
performance rating (AP) is more positively associated with TF PES at lower OHL.
The result of the moderated regression analysis is shown in Table 6-20. It shows that OHL 
only moderates the effect of TFl on EFF given the marginally significant interaction term in 
the 3rd panel of the table (b23 = -14, p  < .10). The positive interaction term implies that the 
effect of TFl on EFF increases higher up the OHL. Results are similar using the other 2 PES 
measures except that the interaction term is significant using the TFH measure but not 
significant using the TF2 measure. The moderation effect is depicted in Figure 6.18a for 3 
OHL groupings viz.: above managers comprising senior managers and directors; managers; 
and below managers comprising support and executive assistants. The figures show that EFF 
is more positively associated with TF PES at high OHL than at low OHL, the reverse of the 
hypothesis.65
65 If just the executive assistant, manager and senior manager levels is considered, the graph looks very much the 
same as that depicted in Figure 6.18 see Appendix 5.
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Table 6-20 Summary o f  Regression Analysis: TF PES, OHL and their interaction predicting QTB, IT, 
EFF, MP, & AP
N = 236 
E quation P aram eters
E xpected  sign
TFl TF2 TFH
fi SE B fi SE B fi SE B
Y = QTB Constant 2.56** .043 2.56** .041 2.56** .043
TF -  b 2 I + .18** .058 .20 .19** .034 .34 .53** .141 .25
OHL -  b 2 2 (?) .06 .041 .09 .06 .039 .09 .05 .040 .07
T F*O H L -A z, + -.03 .052 -.04 -.04 .032 -.08 -.21 .194 -.07
F 3.51* 10.57** 5.10**
R2 .043 .12 .062
Y = IT Constant 2.96** .109 2.97** .107 2.94** .106
TF -  b2l + .04 .145 .02 .20* .087 .15 .98** .350 .19
OHL - b 22 (?) -.08 .102 -.05 -.06 .100 -.04 -.10 .100 -.06
TFxO H L-A „ + .02 .130 .01 .07 .083 .05 ■ oo > .482 -.12
F .28 2.36A 3.12*
R2 .004 .030 .039
Y = EFF Constant 5.72** .097 5.71** .096 5.734** .097
Gender (?) -.37** .129 -.19 -.36** .130 -.18 -.41** .129 -.21
TF - b 2l +
o1* .084 -.03 .05 .051 .06 -.09 .207 -.03
OHL - b 22 (?) .01 .060 .02 .02 .060 .02 .03 .060 .04
TFxOHL-A* - - .14A .076 .12 .08 .049 .11 .69* .284 .17
F 3.14* 3.24* 3.78**
R2 .052 .053 .061
Y = MP* Constant 5.03** .155 5.06** .155 5.02** .155
T F -6 ; ;? + .46* .190 .33 .35** .120 .42 .31 .333 .11
OHL - b 2 2 (?) .22 .146 .14 .17 .145 .10 .26A .145 .16
TFxOHL - b 23- - -.08 .177 -.06 -.16 .115 -.20 .86 .527 .20
F 4.00** 4.12** 4.08**
R2 .090 .092 .091
Y = APb Constant 3.49** .047 3.49** .048 3.49** .048
TF - b 2i1 + _ 19** .064 -.20 -.05 .039 -.09 -.22 .157 -.10
OHL -  b 2 2 (?) .01 .045 .01 .01 .045 .01 .02 .046 .03
TFxOHL - b 23- - .09 .060 .10 -.02 .038 -.03 .33 .220 .11
F 3.60* .74 1.09
R2 .046 .010 .014
l \ T  —  O . in- * n  <  .05: **o < .01. N ote expected  coefficient sign  in bracket is/V  —  1 ^ 0 ,  i V  “  ^ O ,  ^  -  . m v ,  r   * r
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Figure 6.18 OHL Moderation o f the TF PES / Effort Relationship - 1
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Below M anagers
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As in the previous section, post hoc analysis examining the significance of TFl simple effects 
on EFF at high and low OHL yields:
for low OHL: EFF = 5.703** - 314Gender** - .1877T7 + .013OHL + A4\(TF  x OHL)A 
for high OHL: EFF = 5.732** - 314Gender** + M6TF1 + .013OF[L + A4\(TF1 x OHL)A 
Though these simple effects are not statistically significant it is positive at high OHL (Z>2 i = 
.116,/? > .10) and negative at low OHL {blx = -.187,/? > .10). Recall from Table 6-20 that at 
average, i.e. middle, OHL b 2l = -.04, p  > .10. Thus the trend of TFl impact on EFF as OHL 
rises is positive. Moreover, TFl impacts positively on EFF only at high OHL. Similar results 
are obtained using the TFH measure.
In summary, OHL only moderates TF PES impact on EFF in line with Hypothesis 6(c). 
However, the hypothesis is not fully supported because the interaction effect is in the opposite 
direction hypothesized. Contrary to expectations, when high TF PES is employed senior 
managers and above report responding with increased effort, while lower level staff report no 
change or decreasing effort. This may be because at senior manager levels and above there is 
more at stake, in terms of organisational rewards, from not responding to increased focus on 
achieving targets. It may also be that in some circumstances increased emphasis on target 
achievement gives these higher level managers more focus in their roles which are most likely 
loosely defined. All other sub-hypothesis under Hypotheses 6 is not supported, i.e. the effects 
of TF PES on QTB, IT, MP and AP do not depend on the OHL.
6.4.7 Tests of Hypothesis 7 -  ICS Moderation of TF PES Direct Effects
In Hypothesis 7, it was also postulated that ICS moderates the effect of TF PES on the 
criterion variables such that quality threatening behaviour (QTB), and intention to turnover 
(IT) is more positively associated with TF PES when ICS is low than when ICS is high. On 
the other hand, effort (EFF), managerial performance (MP) and actual performance rating 
(AP) is more positively associated with TF PES when ICS is high than when it is low. Results
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of the moderated regressions of the criterion variables on TF PES are presented in Table 6-21. 
Results relating to the criterion variables QTB, EFF, MP and AP in the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th 
panels of Table 6-21 show no significant interaction effect (i.e. Z>23 = 0) therefore Hypothesis 
7(a), 7(c), 7(d1&2) are not supported. Nonetheless, results in the 1 st, 2 nd and 3 rd panels of the 
table also show that at average levels of TFl, ICS has a negative and significant effect on 
QTB and IT, and a positive and significant effect on EFF. This implies that at moderate levels 
of TFl, high ICS leads to increased EFF but reduced QTB and IT. The results are also 
consistent using the TF2 and TFH PES measures.
On the other hand, results in the 2nd panel of Table 6-21 show that ICS moderates the effect of 
TFl on IT given the significant interaction term (b2 3 = -.35,p  < .01). The moderation effect is 
depicted in Figure 6.19 representing simple regressions of IT on TFl at high, low and medium 
values of ICS. It shows, as expected, that IT is more positively associated with TFl when ICS 
is low compared to when ICS is medium or high providing support for Hypothesis 7(b). Post 
hoc analysis of the significance of the TFl effects at low and high ICS also confirms this. The 
post hoc analysis results yields:
for low ICS: IT = 3.65 + .537*7** - .51/CS** - .35(7*7 *ICS)** 
for high ICS: IT = 2.39 -.327*7 - .51/CS** - .35(7*7 *ICS)**
This shows that TFl significantly increases IT when ICS is low (b2i = .53,/? < .01) but IT is 
reduced, though not significantly, when ICS is high ( £ 2 7  = -.32, p  > .10). Recall from Table 
6-21 that when ICS is moderate that TFl has a positive but non-significant effect on IT (b2j = 
.10, p  > .10). Thus the trend of TFl effects on IT as ICS increases is negative, thus the 
negative interaction term indicating TFl overall positive impact on IT decreases as ICS 
increases. Moreover, TFl significantly increases IT only when ICS is low. Therefore high ICS 
mitigates TFl effects on IT. These results are also consistent using the TF2 and TFH 
measures except that the interaction term for the TFH measure is not significant. In summary, 
the results provide support for Hypothesis 7(c) but not the other sub-hypotheses. Thus the
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impact of TF PES on IT depends on the level of ICS such that TF PES significantly increases 
IT only when ICS low and not when ICS is high.
Table 6-21 Summary of regression analysis: TF PES, ICS and their interaction predicting QTB, IT, 
EFF, AP & MP
N  = 2 36  
Equation P aram eters &
E xpected  sign
TFl TF2 TFH
fi SE B fi SE B fi SE B
Y = QTB Constant 2.57** .042 2.56** .041 2.56** .041
TF - b 2t + .21** .057 .23 .15** .034 .28 .47** .218 .23
ICS ~ b 22 (-) -.18** .035 -.32 - .12** .033 -.22 -.15** .034 -.27
T FxIC S-**, - -.04 .047 -.05 -.01 .027 -.03 -.00 .14 -.00
F 11.64** 13.89** 10.72**
R2 .131 .152 .122
Y = IT Constant 3.02** .102 2.92** .101 2.96** .101
TF - b 2t + .10 .139 .05 .10 .084 .08 .65 .532 .13
ICS ~ b 22 (-) -.51** .084 -.38 -.41** .082 -.31 -.44** .083 -.33
TF*ICS -  b2J - -.35** .114 -.20 -.18** .066 -.17 -.13 .334 -.04
F 13.51** 13.04** 11.72**
FT .149 .144 .132
Y =  EFF Constant 5.72** .096 5.69** .094 5.71** .095
Gender (?) -.40** .126 -.20 -.38** .124 -.19 _ 39** .126 -.20
TF - b 2, + -.08 .087 -.06 .07 .052 .08 -.14 .328 -.05
ICS - b 22 + .14** .052 .18 .15** .051 .18 .13* .051 .16
T F xIC S -*« + -.01 .071 -.01 -.06 .041 -.09 -.16 .206 -.08
F 4.20** 5.13** 4.15**
R2 .068 .082 .067
Y = MP* Constant 5.23** .099 5.22** .099 5.21** .098
TF -  b 2i + .33* .137 .24 .20** .077 .24 .19 .491 .07
ICS -  b22 (+) -.01 .084 -.01 .09 .080 .10 .04 .080 .05
T F *IC S -6* + -.07 .113 -.07 -.07 .058 -.11 -.32 .300 -.19
F 3.14* 3.71* 2.85*
R2 .072 .084 .065
Y =  APb Constant 3.49** .048 3 49** .049
3 49** .048
TF - b 2, + -.20** .067 -.21 -.05 .040 -.09 -.44A .252 -.20
ICS -  b 22 (+) .04 .040 .06 .01 .039 .01 .01 .039 .01
T F xIC S -*2i + -.01 .053 -.02 .01 .031 .01 -.22 .157 -.16
F 3.12* .70 1.06
R2 .040 .009 .014
*\r — 1 T/C- _  TOO. A  n < 10- *n < .05: **io <  .01 N ote expected coefficient sign in bracket is
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6.4.8 Tests of Hypothesis 8  -  OC Moderation of TF PES Direct Effects
In Hypothesis 8 , it was postulated that organisational commitment (OC) moderates the effects 
of TF PES on the criterion variables such that QTB, and IT is more positively associated with 
TF PES at low OC; while EFF, MP, and AP is more positively associated with TF PES at high 
OC. The result of the moderated regression analysis is presented in Table 6-22. Results 
relating to the criterion variables QTB, IT, EFF and AP in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th panels of the 
table respectively do not show any moderation effect (i.e. b23 = 0). Therefore Hypothesis 8 (a), 
8 (b), 8 (c) and 8 (d2) are not supported. Nonetheless, results in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th panels of 
the table also show that OC has a negative and significant effect on QTB and IT, and a 
positive and significant effect on EFF. Thus at average levels of TFl, increasing OC lowers 
QTB and IT, and enhances EFF. Result are also similar using the other 2 TF PES measures 
except that the impact of OC on MP is also significant.
On the other hand, results in the 4th panel of the table show that OC marginally moderates TFl 
positive effects on MP (b23 = -.19,/? < .10), thus providing some support for Hypothesis 8 (dQ. 
This negative interaction term implies that TFl impact on MP decreases, rather than increases, 
as OC increases. Thus Hypothesis 8 (di) is not fully supported. The moderation effect is 
depicted in Figure 6.20 representing simple regressions of MP on TF PES at low, high and 
moderate OC. It shows that MP is more positively associated with TFl at low rather than at 
high OC, although there is still a positive association at high OC. Results using the other 2 
PES are similar except that the interaction term using TFH is not significant. In addition, 
results using TF2 and TFH also show a marginally significant interaction term affecting EFF 
in the 3rd panel of the table. Post hoc examination of the significance of the TFl effects at low
and high OC yields:
for low OC: MP = 5.176** + .553TF1** + .059OC - .194(OC x TF1)A 
for high OC: MP = 5.317** + .091TF1 + .059OC - .194(OC x TF1)A
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Thus TFl significantly increases MP when OC is low ( bZ] = .553,p  < .01) and moderate ( b 21 =  
.32, p  < .05 from Table 6-22), but has no significant effect on MP when OC is high ( 6 2 1  = 
.091,/? > .10). Therefore the trend of TFl effects as OC increases is negative.
Table 6-22 Summary o f  regression analysis: TF PES, OC and their interaction predicting QTB, IT, 
EFF, AP & MP
N  = 2 3 6  
Equation P aram eters
& E xpected  sign
TFl TF2 ‘TFH
f i SE B fi SE B fi o r B
Y =  QTB Constant 2.56** .041 2.56** .040 2.56** .041
TF -  b2i + .18** .055 .20 .16** .033 .30 .28A .169 .14
OC -  b 22 (-) -.19** .035 -.33 -.16** .034 -.29 -.16** .035 -.28
TFxOC -  b 2 J - -.01 .047 -.02 .01 .024 .02 -.09 .096 -.07
F 12.71** 17.43** 11.88**
R 2 .141 .184 .133
Y = IT Constant 2.96** .086 2.96** .086 2.98** .086
TF - b 2J + .13 .116 .06 .13A .070 .09 .67A .351 .13
OC -  b 22 (A -.85** .072 -.61 -.83** .073 -.60 -.83** .073 -.60
TFxOC - b n - -.09 .098 -.05 -.01 .052 -.01 .30 .199 .10
F 46.33** 46.77** 46.94**
R 2 .375 .377 .378
Y = EFF Constant 5.72** .096 5.71** .094 5.69** .095
Gender (?) _ 40** .127 -.20 __41** .125 -.21 -.37** .126 -.19
TF -  b2J + -.05 .085 -.04 .06 .051 .07 -.16' .255 -.05
OC -  b22 + . 1 2 * .053 .15 14** .053 .17 .13* .053 .15
TFxOC -  b j j + - . 0 1 .072 - . 0 1 -.07A .038 -.12 -,26A .145 -.15
F 3.58** 4.85** 4.48**
R 2 .058 .061 .072
Y = MP* Constant 5.25** .096 5.20** .095 5.2** .097
TF - b 2, + .32* .124 .23 .20** .074 .24 ..67* .330 .25
OC — b22 + .06 .094 .06 j9 * .092 .18 .19* .004 .18
TFxOC -  b j j + .  19A .112 -.15 -.09A .054 -.16 -.05 .176 -.03
F 4.41** 5.03** 3.78*
R2 .098 .11 .085
Y =  APb Constant 3.49** .047 3.48** .048 3.48** .048
TF -  b2 j + _ 1 9 ## .065 -.20 -.06 ...039 -.11 -.32 .196 -.14
A
’1
uO + -.03 .040 -.05 -.04 .041 -.01? -.04 .041 -.07
TFxOC -  b 23 + -.05 .054 -.06 -.02 .029 -.04 -.13 .111 - . 1 0
F 3.23* 1.25 1.22
R 2 .042 ,016 .016
-  1 b.ft/ ='»')«• A n < 10- *n < .05: **n < .0 1 . N ote expected coefficient sign in b ra c k e t ,is
no t fo rm a lly  s ta te d  in a hypothesis but is apparent in the hypothesis developm ent
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To conclude, these results do not provide support for any of the sub-hypothesis in Hypothesis 
8 . Although TF PES effect on MP depends on the level of OC supporting Hypothesis 8 (d2), 
however the moderation effect is not in the exact direction hypothesized. Therefore 
Hypothesis 8 (d2) is not fully supported. Thus high TF PES stimulates more motivation to 
improve performance when OC is low than when OC is high. Consequently, given that OC is 
usually boosted by offering higher rewards, these results suggest that doing so while also 
employing high TF PES is more effective when OC is low than when OC is high.
6.4.9 Tests of Hypothesis 9 -  ST Moderation of TF PES Direct Effects 
In Hypothesis 9, supervisory trust (ST) is hypothesized to moderate the effects of TF PES on 
QTB and IT such that they are less positively associated with TF PES when ST is high. Result 
of the moderated regression analysis is shown in Table 6-23. The results show that at 
moderate levels of TF1, ST has a negative and significant effect on both QTB and IT. The 
results also show that ST only significantly moderates TF1 effect on IT (b23 = -.25, p  < .05). 
The negative moderation term implies that TF1 positive though non-significant impact on IT 
decreases as ST increases thus providing support for Hypothesis 9(b). Results using the TF2 
and TFH PES measures are similar except the interaction term is not statistically significant.
The moderation effect is depicted in Figure 6.21, and it shows that TF1 increases IT when ST
is low and the effect is reversed when ST is high. Post hoc analysis of the significance of TF1
effects on IT at low and high ST yields:
for low ST: IT = 3.58** + .233TF1 - .544ST** - .245(ST x TF1)** 
for high ST: IT = 2.269** - .358TF1A - .544ST** - .245(ST x TF1)**
Thus TF1 increases IT when ST is low, though not significant (b2\ = .233, p > .10) but IT is 
significantly reduced when ST is high (b2\ = - ~ >58 , < .10). And from Table 6-23 TF1 has a 
negative but not significant effect on IT (b2] = -.06, p  > .10). Thus the trend of TF1 effect on 
j'p ST increases is negative, i.e. the positive impact on IT reduces as ST increases and is 
significantly reversed when ST is high. In conclusion therefore, Hypothesis 9(b) is supported 
as the results show there is a negative and marginally significant association between TF PES
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and IT when ST is high, but a positive though non-significant association when ST is low. On 
the other hand, Hypothesis 9(a) is not supported meaning that TF PES effect on QTB does not 
depend on the level of ST.
Table 6-23 Summary o f  regression analysis: TF PES, ST and their interaction predicting QTB & IT
N  = 2 3 6 TF1 TF2 TFH
Equation P aram eters
& E xpected  sign
P SE B P SE B P SE B
Y = QTB* Constant 2.55** .040 2.54** .041 2.55** .040
TF - b 2, + .13* .054 .14 .10** .036 .18 .29 .194 .13
ST -  b 22 (?) -.21** .033 -.37 -.17** .036 -.30 -.20** .034 -.36
TF*ST - b 2s - -.06 .041 -.09 -.03 .021 -.09 -.02 .068 -.03
F 18.08** 18.99** 16.72**
R 2 .189 .197 .178
Y = IT*: Constant 2.93** .097 2.91** .101 2.95** .098
TF - b 2l + -.06 .132 -.03 -.03 .089 -.02 .77 .473 .15
ST - b 22 (?) -.54** .082 -.40 -.56** .089 -.41 -.57** .083 -.41
TFxS T - * tj - -.25* .100 -.15 -.06 .051 -.07 .17 .165 .10
F 19.31** 17.39** 17.97**
.200 .184 .189
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6.4.10 Tests of Hypothesis 10 -  EFP Mediation of TF PES Direct Effects
Recall that Hypothesis 10 posits that EFP mediates the effect of TF PES on the criterion 
variables (QTB, IT, EFF, MP and AP). Recall also from Section 6.3 that mediation is 
evidenced by a significant indirect effect represented by /?3 i x/?42 from the following equations 
(where Me is the mediator):66
Recall also that significance of the indirect effect is tested using Sobel’s z, so a significant 
SobePs z evidences a mediation effect. Where mediation is established then a (non-) 
significant estimate of /?4J evidences (complete) partial mediation. The alternative Baron and 
Kenny test procedure establishes a mediation effect if first /?n ^ 0 (from Equation 1 i.e. 
Yt = a l0 + P \\X t + £,); then fin i- 0; /?42 4- 0; and [/?4i| < \J3n\. But as earlier mentioned this
procedure is limited in that it assumes only partial mediation and does not hold for 
inconsistent mediation models. Results from running Equations 3 and 4, as well as estimates 
of Pw from Equation 1 and Sobel’s z is presented in Table 6-24 below. The results do not 
show any significant SobePs z using the TF1 measure, implying TF1 does not have any 
significant indirect effect via EFP on QTB (SobePs z = .148) or on IT (SobePs z  = .148). Thus 
hypothesis 10 is not supported. The result shows TF1 does not seem to have any significant 
effect on EFP; though the association is generally negative i.e. TF1 tends to reduce EFP.
However, results using the TF2 and TFH measures show significant SobePs z  in relation to 
the criterion variables QTB (in the 1st panel) and IT (in the 2nd panel) of the table. Equations 3 
results, presented in the 1st panel of the table, show that TF2 and TFH both have a negative 
and significant effect on EFP (6 3 / = -.293, p  < .01; and bn — -J lA ,p  < .01, respectively). And 
results from Equation 4, in both the 1st and 2nd panels of the table, also show that EFP in turn 
has a negative and significant impact on QTB and on IT allowing for the effect of TF2 (i.e. 6 42
66 Note that the equations are estimated independently, i.e. equation 3 values are not fitted into equation 4
Met &2Q + p^ j X  i 
Yt = a 40 + fiAlX , + P A2Me, + s A
Equation 3
Equation 4
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= -.178, p  < .01 for QTB; and b42 = -.586, p  < .01 for IT), and allowing for the effect of TFH 
(i.e. b42 = -.20, p  < .01 for QTB; and b42 = -.579, p <  .01 for IT). This effect of EFP on QTB 
and on IT is also the same using the TF1 PES measure. Thus allowing for the effect of TF 
PES, regardless of how it is measured, higher EFP leads to lower QTB and lower IT, and vice 
versa. When the impact of EFP is controlled, TF2 residual/direct effect on QTB (i.e. b4X = 
.123) and on IT (b4\ = .039 in the 2nd panel) is smaller than the observed total/overall effects 
(b\\ = .1757 for QTB, and bu = .211 for IT). Similarly, TFH residual/direct effect on QTB 
(i.e. b4\ = .317 in the 1st panel), and on IT (b4\ = .354 in the 2nd panel) is smaller than the 
observed overall effects (&n = .4716 for QTB, and bn = .802 for IT). These results suggest 
that TF PES reduces EFP, and then the reduced EFP induces more QTB and IT beyond the 
levels directly attributable to the impact of TF PES. In other words, high TF PES diminishes 
the impact of EFP such that QTB and IT increases even more. Given that b4\ estimate in 
relation to QTB is significant, it implies that TF PES increase of QTB is partially transmitted 
directly and via EFP. On the other hand, the non-significant b4\ estimate in relation to IT 
means the TF PES increase of IT is entirely transmitted via EFP. A breakdown of the 
total/overall effects of TF2 and TFH on QTB and IT is given below and it shows that this
model adequately accounts for the overall effects of TF2 and TFH on QTB and IT.
TF2 effect on QTB TFH effect on QTB 
Indirect effect (&3ix 642): (-.2931*-. 1785) = .0523 (-.7737x-.2003) = .155
Direct effect (641): 123 -317
Total: .1753 .472
Overall effects (6n )■' 4757  ^472
Spurious effect: .0-004 J)0D
TF2 effect on IT TFH effect on IT
Indirect effect (&3ix b42): (-.2931x-.5866) = .1719 (-.7737x-.579) =  .448
Direct effect (b4\): _1039 _ 3 5 4
Total: -2109 .802
Overall effects (6n): ■ 2-109 JSQ2
Spurious effect: .0000 0^00
In summary, the results do not provide support for any of the sub-hypotheses under 
Hypothesis 10 using the TF1 PES measure, i.e. TF1 does not have an indirect effect via EFP
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Results in the 2nd panel of Table 6-26 relate to examination of the potential moderated 
mediation of TF1 effects on QTB given that ICS does not moderate TF1 overall effect on 
QTB, i.e. 623 = 0. Recall that a moderated mediation then exists if b5l65 4- 0 or/and b53M 4 0,
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on any of the criterion variables. However, using TF2 and TFH PES measures Hypothesis 
10(a) and 10(b) are supported, i.e. there is an indirect effect on QTB and on IT via EFP. It is 
also worth noting that the conclusions reached using Sobel’s z is consistent with the Baron 
and Kenny criteria given that the overall effect is not suppressed and mediation is only partial.
Table 6-24 Summary of Regression Analysis results: EFP Mediation of TF PES direct effects.
(N  = 236) TF1 TF2 TFH
Equation P aram eters E xpected sign fi SE fi SE ft SE
E quation I: Y = QTB TF: (b u ) + .1636** .0574 .1757** .0337 .4716** .1342
E quation 3: ^  Y = EFP TF: (b3l) -.0151 .102 -.2931** .0592 -.7737** .2353
Equation 4: Y = QTB TF: (b4l) + .16** .053 .123** .034 .317* .129
EFP: (bA1) - -.2174** .034 -.1785** .0354 -.2003** .035
Sobel’s z .148 3.533** 2.851**
Equation  /: ii TF: (bn) + .0556 .1431 .2 1 1 * .0862 .8020* .3339
Equation 4: ii H TF: (64i) + .047 .130 .039 .083 .354 .312
EFP: (642) - -.5989** .0832 -.5866** .0874 -.5790** .0849
Sobel’s z .148 3.985** 2.962**
E quation  /:* Y = EFF TF: (bn ) + -.0299 .0836 .0566 .0508 .0634 .1977
Equation 4:a Y = EFF TF: (641) + -.031 .084 .044 .053 .020 .202
EFP: (642) + -.0577 .0536 -.0434 .0562 -.0564 .0548
Sobel’s z .147 .763 .982
E quation l : b Y = M P TF: (* ,,) + .3690** .1223 .2123** .0735 .6352** .2406
E quation  3:b Y = EFP TF: (b3l) 9 -.0188 .1298 -.2215** .0752 -.7109** .2452
Equation 4:h Y =  MP TF: (641) + .371** .122 .2 0 1 * .076 .593* .249
EFP: (642) + -.1154 .0842 -.0529 .0879 -.0591 .0882
Sobel’s z -.144 .589 .653
E quation J:c ii TF: (bn) + -.1830** .0633 -.0551 .0385 -.1495 .1489
E quation 3:c Y =  EFP TF: (b3l) 9 -.0213 .1062 -.2979** .0604 -.7902** .2402
E quation  4  ° ii > TF: (b4l) + -.181** .063 -.035 .040 -.091 .152
EFP: (b42) + .0782* .0394 .0685 .0421 ,0745A .0410
Sobel’s z -.200 -1.543 -1.59
“Gender is a covariate, i.e. partialled out, in this equation. N  126; N  228 
^  Results o f  EFP regression on TF PES (i.e. b3J estimate) is same for panels Y = QTB; IT; & EFF. 
A p  <  .10; * p  <  .05; * * p  <  .01.
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6.4.11 Tests of Hypothesis 11 -  EFP Mediates OHL Moderation of TF PES Effects
Hypothesis 11 posits that EFP is a mechanism by which the hypothesized OHL moderation of 
the direct effects of TF PES is produced. In particular it was hypothesized that the effect of 
TF PES on EFP varies as a function of OHL such that at lower (higher) OHL TF PES is 
positively (negatively or non-significantly) related to EFP, and EFP in turn is negatively 
related to QTB and IT, and positively related to EFF, MP and AP. Recall from Section 6.3 
that such a mediated moderation (as well as a moderated mediation) effect is assessed using 3 
regression equations viz.:
Y = a 2Q + P lx X  + y322Mo + J323XM o + s 2 Equation 2
Me = a50 + P5XX  + P52Mo + P53XMo + s5 Equation 6
Y = + p hXX  + Pb2Mo + fi^XMo + P6AMe + P6SMeMo + s6 Equation 7
Recall also that for a mediated moderation to be established there must be moderation of the 
overall effect in the first place, i.e. p2i i1 0; then either p 5\, fies £  0 and/or fi53, i- 0, and 
finally \fi22\ > |/?63|. On the other hand, for a moderated mediation to be established there must 
not be moderation of the overall effects, i.e. /? 23 = 0 and there would be a mediation of the 
overall effects thus either also /?si, /?65 i= 0 or A53, /?64 ^ 0, and additionally fi6i ^  0 given that ^ 23 
=  0 .
Recall also from Section 6.4.6 that OHL does not moderate TF1 effects on QTB, IT, MP and 
AP, i.e. #3  = 0. Consequently, Hypothesis 11 is not supported in relation to these variables. 
Results are the same using TF2 and TFH PES measures. However, OHL does moderates TF1 
effects on EFF such that TF1 induces more effort higher up the OHL. Recall also from the 
preceding section that, using the TF2 and TFH PES measures, EFP mediates the effects of TF 
PES on only QTB and IT. Therefore Hypothesis 11 is considered only in relation to EFF, 
while a possible moderated mediation relationship is explored in relation to QTB and IT. The 
results from estimating Equations 6 and 7 are presented in Table 6-25 below.
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Table 6 -25  Sum m ary o f  R egression A nalysis results: EFP M ediation o f  OHL M oderation o f  TF PES  
direct effects.
(N  = 236) TF1 TF2 TFH
Equation P aram eters E xpected sign fi SE SE fi SE
Equation 6:a Y = EFP  TF: (b5l) ? .028 .077 -.298** .075 -,133A .078
OHL: (b52) 9 -.061 .074 -.086 .072 -.081 .075
TFxOHL: (6„ ) 7 .004 .072 .030 .071 -.033 .074
Equation 7:a Y = EFF TF: (b6l) + -.016 .063 .026 .066 -.025 .065
OHL: (b62) 7 .009 .060 .019 .061 .017 .063
TFXOHL: (b63) - .123* .059 .068 .062 .042 .061
EFP: (bM) + -.062 .054 -.056 .056 -.062 .054
EFPxOHL: (b65) 7 -.049 .050 -.029 .052 -.041 .051
Equation 6 : ~  Y = EFP  TF: (65I) 7 .025 .077 -.299** .075 -.134A .078
OHL: (b 52) 7 -.048 .072 -.075 .071 -.068 .073
TFxOHL: (b53) - .001 .072 .026 .071 -.028 .073
Equation  7: Y = QTB TF: ( i 61) + .11** .040 .123** .042 .088* .042
OHL: (b62) 7 .03 .038 .043 .038 .035 .039
TFxOHL: (b63) + -.42 .038 -.014 .039 -.027 .039
EFP: (bM) - -.22** .034 _189** .035 -.208** .035
EFPxOHL: (b65) 7 .02 .033 .013 .033 .019 .033
Equation 7: Y = IT TF: (b6l) + .029 .098 .087 .102 .043 .100
OHL: (b62) - -.124 .092 -.101 .093 -.129 .095
TFxOHL: (b63) + .039 .092 .141 .095 -.041 .094
EFP: (bM) - -.599** .084 -.581** .086 -.595** .084
EFPxOHL: (b65) 7 .066 .079 .026 .081 .068 .079
^Equation 6 result with Y = EFP (i.e. b5, - b53 estimates) is the same for panels Y = QTB; and Y -  IT. 
‘Gender was partialled out in both Equations 6 and 7.
Ap < .10; *p <  .05; **p <  .01.
As can be seen from the 1st panel of the table, TF1 does not have a significant effect on EFP, 
i.e. b5] = 0, and neither is the impact of EFP on EFF dependent on the OHL, i.e. b65 = 0. Also, 
TF1 impact on EFF is not dependent on OHL, i.e. 6 5 3  — 0. Also, EFP does not have a 
significant impact on EFF, i.e. bee = 0. Thus hypothesis 11 is not supported given the 
conditions for a mediated moderation highlighted above was not met. In addition, results in 
the 2 nd and 3 rd panels of the table do not provide evidence of a moderated mediation 
relationship in relation to QTB nor IT as neither the 3rd nor 2nd condition highlighted above 
was met; i.e. b63 = 0; though b5, + 0 * 65 = 0; and though bM * 0 b5, = 0. These results are the 
same using the TF2 and TFH PES measures.
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6.4.12 T ests o f H ypothesis 12 -  EFP M ediation o f ICS M oderation o f TF PES Effects
It was posited in Hypothesis 12 that EFP is the mechanism by which ICS moderates the 
effects of TF PES on the criterion variables. In particular it was hypothesized that the effect of 
TF PES on EFP varies as a function of ICS such that at high ICS TF PES is positively related 
to EFP, but negatively or non-significantly relate to EFP when ICS is low. Then EFP, in turn, 
is negatively related QTB and IT, and positively related to EFF, MP and AP. Recall that the 
result of the tests of the moderating effects of ICS is significant only with respect to IT as 
reported in Section 6.4.7, i.e. b23  ^0. Also as previously indicated, the mediating role of EFP 
is significant with respect to QTB and IT, using the TF2 and TFH PES measures. Therefore 
Hypothesis 12 will be examined in relation to IT, and a potential moderated mediation 
relationship is explored in relation to QTB. Given that ICS moderates TF1 overall effects on 
IT, then a mediated moderation relationship exists if also 6 5 1 , 65 4- 0 or/and b53> 64 ^ 0, and if 
f c l  > |^ 6 3 |- The result of estimating Equations 6  and 7 is presented in Table 6-26 below.
Results from analyzing Equations 6 , presented in the 1st panel of Table 6-26, shows that TF1
has a negative but non-significant effect on EFP (i.e. £>51 = -.075, p  > .10). However, the
significant TF* ICS interaction (i.e. b53 = .163, p  < .01) indicates that TF1 effect on EFP
depends on the level of ICS. Results using TF2 and TFH PES are similar except that TF2 and
TFH also have significant negative effects on EFP as earlier noted, i.e. b5X ^ 0. ICS
moderation of TF1 effect on EFP is illustrated in Figure 6.22 below, which represents simple
regressions o f  EFP on TF1 at low, medium and high ICS. As expected, it shows that TF1
reduces EFP when ICS is low and increases it when ICS is high. Post hoc analysis of the
significance of these effects at high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) ICS yields:
for low ICS: EFP = 3.755** - .276TF1** + .444ICS** + .163(TF1 xICS)** 
for high ICS: EFP = 4.846** + .126TF1 + .444ICS** + .163(TF1 xICS)**
Thus TF1 significantly reduces EFP when ICS is low (b5l = -.276, p  < .01), whereas EFP is
not significantly affected when ICS is high (bS\ = -126, p  > .10) or moderate (b5{ = -.075, p  >
.10 from Table 6-26). Hence the trend of TF1 effect on EFP as ICS increases is positive, i.e.
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TF1 increases EFP as ICS increases and conversely TFl reduces EFP as ICS decreases, 
However, TF1 reduction of EFP is only significant when ICS is low.
Table 6-26 Summary of Regression Analysis results: EFP Mediation of ICS Moderation of'TF' PES 
direct effects.
( S  = 236) TF! TF2 TFH
Equation P aram eters Expected sign fi SE fi SE fi SE
E quation 2 ' :  Y = I T TF*ICS: (bZ3, + -.298** .084 -.204* .083 -,158A .086
E quation (T* Y = EFP TF : ( b 5l) *> -.075 .070 -.223** .069 -.167* .069
ICS; (b52) + _444*# .058 .379** .056 .439** .058
TFxICS: (b53) + .163** .058 „1CHA .056 .119* .058
E quation 7: Y = IT T F:(66i) + .095 .097 .086 .099 .097 .099'
ICS: (ba ) - -.319** .089 -.255** ..087 -.279** .091
TFxICS: (ba ) - -.235** .082 -25#A ,0i82 -.103 .082
EFP: (bM) - -.431** .091 -.453** .093 -.457** ...092
EFP xICS: (b a ) ? .068 .058 .022 .060 ..#52 .058
E quation 7: Y = QTB TF : (b 6l) + .126** .041 .112** .041 .095* ...041
ICS : (b a ) - -.089* .038 -.058 .036 -.082* .038
TFxICS: (b a ) - .008 .035 .045 .,§34 -.006 .034
EFP : (b a ) - -.181** .038 -.169** .009 -.172** .039
EFPxICS: (b a ) ? .008 .024 .019 ..§25 .011 .024
* TF PES variables are contrast coded and thus beta estimates are different from those in Table 6-21. ++Resiilts o f 
estimating Equation 6 is same for panels Y = IT; and Y - QTB.
* p <  .10: *p <  .05; **p < .01.
Furthermore, Equation 7 results in the Ist panel of the table confirm earlier results, in Section
6.4.7. It also shows that TFl effect on IT is dependent on the level of ICS even allowing for 
the effects of EFP (i.e. b63 = -.235,p  < .01). As already illustrated in Figure 6.19 Section 6.4.7, 
this implies that TFl significantly increases IT only when ICS is low. In .addition, Equation 7 
results also show that EFP has a negative and significant effect on IT |Le... b§ 4  .431,/? < .01)
and that this effect is not dependent on the level of ICS (Le. b^ s — .068*/? > .10). Altogether 
these results (i.e. b231  0, b531  0, and bM # 0) indicate that a mediated moderation relationship' 
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Results in the 2nd panel of Table 6-26 relate to examination of the potential moderated 
mediation of TFl effects on QTB given that ICS does not moderate TFl overall effect on 
QTB, i.e. 6 2 3  = 0. Recall that a moderated mediation then exists if b5^ 65 4  0 or/and b53M 4  0,
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and i f  a lso  b 6 3  ±  0 . T hus the sign ificant T FxIC S interaction (i.e . b 5 3  =  .1 6 3 , p  <  .0 1 )  and 
s ig n ifica n t EFP e ffe c t  on Q T B  (i.e . 6 64 =  - .181 , p  <  .01) is in dicative o f  p o ss ib le  m oderated  
m ed iation . H ow ever , g iven  that T F l residual e ffec t on Q T B  is n ot m oderated  b y  IC S (i.e . b ^  
=  .0 0 8 , p  >  .1 0 ) th is m oderated m ediation  relationship is not statistica lly  estab lish ed . T h ou gh  
the fin d in g s d o  not provide ev id en ce  o f  a m oderated m ediation  m od el, the resu lts n everth e less  
su g g ests  that T F l has an indirect e ffec t on Q T B via  EFP w h ich  d epends on  the le v e l o f  IC S. 
In other w ord s, T F l reduces EFP and (low er) EFP in turn results in h igher Q T B . H ow ever , 
th is o ccu rs o n ly  w hen  ICS is low .
T o  fa c ilita te  further interpretation o f  the sign ifican t m ediated  m oderation  relation sh ip  
esta b lish ed  in the previous paragraphs, T F l total indirect e ffec t on  IT at h igh  and lo w  v a lu es  
o f  IC S can  be com p uted . T his is com puted  as the product o f  the sim p le  e ffec ts  o f  T F l on  EFP  
and EFP on  IT at th ese  va lu es o f  ICS. T F l sim ple e ffec ts  on  EFP at h igh  and lo w  ICS has  
alread y b een  com p uted  in the paragraphs above. S im ilarly, the sim p le  e ffec ts  o f  EFP on  IT at 
h igh  and lo w  IC S, a llo w in g  for T F l effec ts, y ields:
for lo w  ICS: IT =  3.363** +  .385T F 1** - .319IC S ** - .2 3 5 (T F lx IC S )* *
- .514E F P ** +  .068(E F P xIC S )
for h igh  ICS: IT =  2 .9 7 1 * *  + .095T F 1 - .319IC S ** - .2 3 5 (T F lx IC S )* *
- .431 EFP** +  .068(E F P xIC S )
T h e a b o v e  eq u ation s confirm  that, a llow in g  for the e ffec ts  o f  T F l,  EFP s ign ifican tly  redu ces  
IT regard less o f  the lev e l o f  ICS (i.e . from  ab ove equations b 6 4  =  - .5 1 4 ,/?  <  .01 w h en  IC S is  
lo w , and b 6 4  =  - .4 3 1 , p  <  .01 w hen  ICS is h igh). So, ICS d oes not m oderate the im pact o f  E FP  
on  IT. It a lso  con firm s earlier results that T F l sign ifican tly  increases IT o n ly  w h en  IC S is lo w  
(T F l resid ual e ffe c t  b 6, = .3 8 5 ,/?  <  .01 from  above equations) w h ereas it d o es  n ot a ffec t IT  
w h en  IC S is  h igh  (Z?6i =  .0 9 5 ,/?  >  .10 from  above eq uations) or w h en  ICS is  m oderate ( b 6X =  
.0 9 5 , p  >  .10  from  T able 6 -2 6 ). T F l indirect e ffec t on IT w h en  ICS is h igh  and w h en  IC S is 
lo w , as the product o f  the sim p le e ffec ts  o f  T F l on EFP and EFP on IT ( i.e . b ^ b M \  y ie ld s:
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at low ICS (-1 SD): -.276 x -.514 = .142 
at high ICS (+1 SD): .126 x -.431 = -.054
These computations show that TFl has considerably more effect on IT via EFP when ICS is 
low than when ICS is high. When ICS is high TFl has little or no indirect effect on IT via 
EFP, but when ICS is low the indirect effect is much more substantial. This significant 
positive effect of TFl on IT, when ICS is low, is also transmitted both indirectly via EFP and 
directly given that the residual/direct effect of TFl on IT is significant (i.e. b6i = .385,/? < .01 
from above equations). Moreover, from Table 6-26 the moderated residual/direct effect of 
TFl on IT (i.e. |Z?6 3! = -235) is smaller than the moderated total/overall effects (i.e. \b?$\ = .298). 
Thus TFl reduces EFP and the lower EFP, in turn, results in higher IT.
In summary, the results only provide support for the mediated moderation model of 
Hypothesis 12(b). The overall effect of TF PES on intention to turnover (IT) is moderated by 
the interactive use of control systems (ICS) such that TF PES induces greater IT only when 
ICS is low and this results entirely indirectly from TF PES reduction of equity and fairness 
perceptions (EFP). On the other hand, when ICS is high TF PES does not impact significantly 
on IT and on EFP.
6.4.13 Tests of Hypothesis 13 -  EFP Mediation of ST Moderation o f TF PES Effects 
Recall that in Hypothesis 13, EFP was also postulated to be the mechanism by which 
supervisory trust (ST) moderates the effects of TF PES on the criterion variables. In Section
6.4.7, ST was observ ed to moderate only the effect of TF PES on IT. And as noted before EFP 
mediated the effects of TF PES on only IT and QTB. Consistent with previous sections, 
Hypothesis 13 will therefore be examined only in relation to IT while a possible moderated 
mediation relationship is explored in relation to QTB. The result of examining both models of 
relationship is presented in Table 6-27 below.
Chapter 6 Data Analysis & Hypothesis Testing 225
Table 6-27 Summary o f  Regression Analysis results: EFP Mediation o f  ST Moderation o f  TF PES 
direct effects
(N  =  236) TFl TF2 TFH
Equation P aram eters Expected sign SE P SE P SE
Equation 2 ' :  Y  = IT TFxST: (b23) + -.190* .081 -,148A .086 -.100 .081
E quation 6 ^ :  Y  =  EFP TF: (b5l) ? .016 .065 -.1 16A .068 -.104 .065
ST: (b52) + .512** .054 .481** .057 .524** .053
TFxST: (653) + .070 .054 .051 .057 .133* .053
E quation  7: Y = IT TF: (b6l) + .015 .094 .014 .100 .052 .097
ST: (b62) - -.349** .093 -.343** .095 -.364** .095
TFxST: (ba ) - -.169* .078 -.094 .091 -.043 .079
EFP: (bM) - -.357** .096 -.373** .096 -.363** .098
EFPx ST: (b65) ? .089 .056 .058 .062 .078 .057
Equation 7: Y = QTB TF: (b6l) + .102** .039 ..083* .041 .078A .044
ST: (b62) - -.138** .038 -.123** .039 -.146** .039
TFxST: (ba ) - .006 .032 .028 .037 -.036 .033
EFP: (ba) - . 129** .039 _ \ 19** .039 -.113** .04
EFPx ST: ( b 6 S ) ? .044 .023 .054* .026 .041A .024
+ TF PES variables are contrast coded and thus beta estimates are different from those in Table 6-23. ^Results of 
regressing EFP on TF PES (i.e. b 3 /  estimate) is same for panels Y = QTB; IT; & EFF.
A p  <  .10; * p  < .05; * * p  <  .01.
Recall from Section 6.4.9 that ST moderates TFl effect on IT (b23 1- 0) such that TFl 
increases IT only when ST is low, but IT is significantly reduced when ST is high. However, 
the results in the 1st panel of Table 6-27 indicate that these effects are not transmitted via EFP. 
Firstly, results from Equation 6 show that TFl effect on EFP does not depend on the level of 
ST ( b 5 3  =  .07, p  > .10); in fact TFl does not affect EFP once ST is controlled (651 = .016 , p >  
.10). However, allowing for the effects of TFl, ST significantly increases EFP (b52 = .512, p  < 
.01). Secondly, results from Equation 7 in this panel show that EFP significantly reduces IT 
( b M  = -.357, p  < -01) regardless of the level of ST (i.e. b65 = .089, p  > .10). Thus, given that 
651 =  o, b 6 5  = 0, and also that b53 = 0 even though bM ± 0, the conditions for a mediated 
moderation is not met and therefore Hypothesis 13(b) is not supported. Results using TF2 is 
similar to the TFl results. However, results using TFH provide support for the hypothesis 
given that b53t64 ^ 0. First TFH impact on EFP depends on the level of ST (b53 = .133, p  < 
.05). This implies that the trend of TFH impact on EFP is positive as ST increases. Given that 
TFH simple effect on EFP is negative when ST is moderate (i.e. b5[ = -.104, p  > .10 from
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Table 6-27) the moderation is such that TFH reduces EFP when ST is low and increases EFP 
when ST is high. At the same time EFP has a significant impact on IT (b64 = -.363, p  < .01) 
which implies that IT reduces as EFP increases and increases as EFP reduces. Thus when ST 
is low TFH increase of IT is entirely via EFP. TFH reduces EFP, and the reduced EFP in turn 
results in higher IT.
Results in the 2nd panel of Table 6-27 relate to the examination of a possible moderated 
mediation of TFl effects on QTB given that ST does not moderate TFl overall effect on QTB 
(i.e. £>23 = 0)- As already noted, TFl does not impact on EFP (i.e. b5j = 0) and this is not 
dependent on the level of ST (i.e. b53 = 0). Also, EFP has a significant impact on QTB (be4 = - 
.129, p  < .01), and this is not dependent on the level of ST (be 5 = .044, p >  .10). Finally, TFl 
direct impact on QTB is also not dependent on the level of ST (be3 = .006 ,p >  .10). Recall that 
a moderated mediation is only established if b23 = 0, b63 ^  0, and at the same time b5 ij65 0 
and/or Z>53 64 ^  0. Therefore the results do not provide support for a moderated mediation 
relationship. The same conclusion is reached using either the TF2 or TFH PES measure as £>53 
=  0 .
In summary, results do not provide support for Hypothesis 13. In other words, though TFl 
increases IT when supervisory trust (ST) is low and significantly reduces it when ST is high, 
these effects at low or high ST are not transmitted via equity and fairness perception (EFP). 
TFl does not have any impact on EFP regardless of the level of ST, and EFP significantly 
reduces IT regardless of the level of ST. Results using the TF2 measure is also consistent with 
that of TFl. On the other hand, results using TFH provide evidence of a mediated moderation. 
TFH only reduces IT when ST is low and this is transmitted via reduced EFP, i.e. TFH 
reduces EFP and reduced EFP in turn engenders more IT. Results of the exploratory 
moderated mediation relationship in relation to QTB do not provide evidence of such a 
relationship.
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6.4.14 Tests of Hypothesis 14 -  GC Mediation of TF PES Direct Effects
Recall that Hypothesis 14 postulates that goal commitment (GC) mediates the effect of TF 
PES on the criterion variables. Recall also that a significant Sobel’s z provides evidence of a 
mediation effect. Result of testing Hypothesis 14 is presented in Table 6-28.
Results in the 1st panel of the table relating to QTB show a significant Sobel’s z (z = 2.009, p  
< .05) meaning that GC mediates the effects of TFl on QTB. In detail, the results show that 
TFl significantly increases GC (b31 = .2029, p  < .01) and GC, in turn and allowing for the 
effect of TFl, significantly reduces QTB (642 = -.1576, p  < .01). And when the effect of GC 
on QTB is controlled, TFl residual/direct effect on QTB is still significant (i.e. b$\ = .194,/? < 
.01) and greater than its overall/total effect on IT (i.e. bn = .1636,/? < .01). In other words, 
TF 1 impact on QTB is both direct and indirect via GC, but GC actually suppresses some of 
TFl effects on QTB such that TFl overall impact on QTB is reduced though still significant. 
Results using TF2 is consistent though not significant, and results using TFH is consistent and 
marginally significant. In this case of a partial mediation, it is worth noting that the conclusion 
reached using the Baron and Kenny criteria is consistent with the Sobel’s z criteria.
Similarly, results in the 2nd panel of the table relating to the criterion variable IT also show a 
significant Sobel’s z. This means that GC also mediates TFl effects on IT. Firstly, as 
discussed above, TFl increases GC (i.e. b3l + 0). Secondly, allowing for TFl effects, GC in 
turn significantly reduces IT (b42 = -.6212,/? < .01). Thirdly, when the effect of GC on IT is 
controlled, TFl residual/direct effect on IT (i.e. *41 = .182, /? > .10) is not significant and is 
also greater in absolute value than TFl overall effects on IT (i.e. b\\ — .0556, /? > .10). This 
means that GC completely suppresses TFl effects on IT. Thus the overall effect of TFl on IT 
is not observed because as TFl increases IT and it equally increases GC, and GC in turn 
reduces IT such that TFl overall impact on IT is completely suppressed and thus not 
significant. Again, results using the TF2 and TFH measures are consistent with these results,
though Sobel’s z is not significant.
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Table 6-28 Summary o f  Regression Analysis results: GC Mediation o f  TF PES direct effects.
(N = 236) TFl TF2 TFH
Equation Param eters Expected sign P SE P SE P SE
E quation 1: Y = QTB TF : ( bu ) + .1636** 05734 .1757** .0337 .4716** .1342
E quation 3:* Y =  G C TF: (*31) + .2029** .0750 -.0264 .0464 ,3326A .1785
E quation 4: Y =  QTB TF: (b4l) + 194** .057 .173** .033 .519** .133
GC: (6 4 2 ) - -.1576** .0491 -.1096* .047 -.1415** .0484
Sobel’s z -2.009* .552 -1.571
E quation I: Y = IT TF: (bn ) + .0556 .1431 .2111* .0862 .802* .334
Equation 4: Y = IT TF: (b4X) + .182 .138 .196* .082 1.014** .317
GC: (h42) - -.6212** .1182 -.5838** .1155 -.6386** .1152
Sobel’s z -2.405* .564 -1.766A
Equation l : b Y = EFF TF: (b u )c + -.0299 .0836 .0566 .0508 .0634 .1977
E quation 4 : b Y = EFF TF: ( b 4 l ) + -.101 .081 .065 .049 -.049 .190
GC: (bA2) + .3453** .0693 .3335** .0683 .3324** .069
Sobel’s z 2.378* -.565 1.738A
Equation  /:d Y = MP TF: (b n ) + .369** .1222 .2123** .0735 .635** .2406
Equation 3 * Y = G C TF: (b n ) + .2951** .0959 .0097 .0596 .3394** .1918
E quation 4 :d Y = MP TF: ( b 4 l ) + .319* .126 .21** .072 .565 .241
GC: (b42) + .1711 .1138 .2429* .1089 .2066A .1115
Sobel’s z 1.349 .1625 1.279
Equation  /:* Y = AP TF: ( b u ) + -.183** .0633 -.0551 .0384 -.1495 .1489
Equation 3 :e Y = G C TF : (b3l) + .2353** .0750 -.0201 .0458 .3325A .1760
Equation 4:e Y = AP TF: (b4l) + -.197** .065 -.055 .039 -.16 .15
GC: ( M + .0592 .0561 .022 .0558 .0318 .0563
Sobel’s z .999 -.293 .54
“Results from regressing GC on TF PES (i.e. b n  estimate) is same for panels Y — QTB; IT; & EFF. 
bG ender  is a covariate, i.e. partialled out, in the equation.
cb u reported here is the estimate from the regression o f EFF on gender and the linear TF PES term. Nonetheless, 
using the TFl measure, a significant b\ \ (1.03) also resulted from the regression o f  EFF on gender, linear and 
quadratic TFl while the quadratic term was not significant 
N  = 126; ejV = 228 Ap < .1 0 ; *p < .05; **p < .01.
Again, results in the 3rd panel of the Table 6-28 relating to the criterion variable effort (EFF) 
show a significant Sobel’s z indicating that GC mediates TFl effects on EFF. As before TFl 
increases GC (b31 ^  0), and GC in turn increases EFF (^ 42 — .3453, p  < .01). When the impact 
of GC is controlled, TFl residual/direct effect on EFF (i.e. b4l = -.101, p  > .10) is not 
significant and is greater in absolute value than its overall/total effects on EFF (i.e. b\\ 
.0299, p  > .10). Thus GC completely suppresses TFl effect on EFF. TFl overall (linear) 
impact on EFF is negative but not significant because TFl also increases GC which increases 
EFF in turn, therefore TFl overall impact on EFF is suppressed and thus not significant.
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Results using the TF2 and TFH measures are also consistent with these results; except that 
Sobel’s z  is not significant using the TF2 measure.
In the 3 and 4 panels of Table 6-28, Sobel’s z is not significant indicating that GC does not 
mediate the effects of TFl on managerial performance (MP) and on actual performance rating 
(AP). However, the results generally show that TFl increases GC but GC has no significant 
impact on MP and AP. Using the TF2 and TFH measures, the same conclusion is reached i.e. 
no evidence of TF PES indirect effect on MP and AP via GC. In summary, the results provide 
support for Hypothesis 14(a), 14(b), and 14(c). In other words, TFl has an indirect impact on 
quality threatening behaviour (QTB), intention to turnover (IT) and on effort (EFF) via GC. In 
all cases, GC acts as a suppressor of the full impact of TFl, and in the case of IT and EFF it 
completely suppresses TFl impact on these variables. On the other hand, Hypothesis 14(di&2) 
is not supported, i.e. TFl does not have any indirect effect on managerial performance (MP) 
and actual performance rating (AP) via GC.
6.4.15 Tests of Hypothesis 15 -  GC Mediation of GD Moderation of TF PES Effects
Following on from Hypotheses 4 and 14, it was postulated in Hypothesis 15 that goal 
difficulty (GD) moderation of TF PES effects on the criterion variables is produced via goal 
commitment (GC.) Tests of Hypothesis 4 in Section 6.4.4 revealed that GD only moderates 
the effect of TF PES on intention to turnover (IT) and managerial performance (MP). 
Therefore Hypotheses 15(a), 15(c) and 15(d2) -  relating to quality threatening behaviour 
(QTB), effort (EFF), and actual performance rating (AP) - are not supported. Also, results 
from the previous section show that GC mediates the effect of TF PES on QTB, IT and EFF. 
Consequently, Hypothesis 15 will be examined in relation to IT and MP, while a possible 
moderated mediation relationship is explored in relation to QTB and EFF. The results of 
testing these relationships are presented in Table 6-29 below.
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Table 6-29 Summary o f  Regression Analysis: GC Mediation o f  GD Moderation o f  TF PES effects.
( N -  236) TFl TF2 TFH
E q u a tio n  P a ra m e te rs  E x p e c ted  sign  /? S E  f i  S E  ~fi SE
Equation 2:+ Y IT TFxGD: (b23) + .189* M9  .160* ^079 -.028 .081
Equation 6 : ^  Y  = G C  TF: (651) + ” .166** j056 ^019 !058 X)06 .058
GD: (bS2) ? -,084A .043 -,079A .044 -,078A .044
TFxGD: (b53) ? -.054 .043 -.034 .044 -.021 .044
Equation 7: Y = IT TF: (b6i) + ^75 T03 .221* T01 T62 .103
GD :(b62) +  .205** .078 .215** .078 .219** .079
TFxGD :(b63) + .164* .077 ,139A .077 -.041 .077
GC: (bM) - -.55** .118 -.539** .115 -.558** .116
GCxGD: (b65) (??) -.059 .077 -.032 .076 -.051 .077
Equation 2:* * Y = M P  TFxGD: (b23) ?? -.271** M9  -.170* 1)73 3)55 .077
Equation 6:a Y = GC TF: (b5l) + .222** ^79 M9 M 2  3)34 .083
GD: (bS2) ? -.032 .059 -.041 .059 -.042 .061
TFxGD: (653) ? -.075 .059 -.038 .059 -.019 .061
Equation 7:a Y = M P TF: (b6l) + .356** 3)96 ,167A M 9  7021 .104
GD :(b62) +  ,129A .071 .099 .075 .122 .102
TFxGD :(b62) ?? -.268** .068 -.147* .072 .055 .075
GC:(bM) +  .047 .115 .186 .117 .194 .119
GCxGD: (b65) ?? .166* .070 .106 .075 .118 .076
Equation 7: Y = QTB TF: (b6l) + TIT* ^044 .159** ^ 42  .119** 3 )4 r
GD: (ba ) + .065A .033 ,064A .033 .084* .033
TFxGD: (ba ) +  -.022 .033 .018 .032 .014 .033
GC : ( y  - -.131** .050 -.099* .048 -.104* .049
GCxGD: (b6S) (??) -.042 .033 -.044 .032 -.050 .032
Equation 6:b Y = GC TF: (b5]) + .169** ^056 -.016 ^058 ^007 .058
GD: (b52) ? -.092* .043 -,084A .045 -.085A .045
TFxGD: (653) ? -.054 .043 -.032 .044 -.023 .044
Equation 7:b Y = EFF TF: (b6l) +  -.057 .061 .064 .060 -.039 .060
G D :(662) + --113* .047 -.129 .047 -.134** .047
TFxGD: (b62) ?? - 055 .045 -.033 .046 -.078A .045
GC:(M + -316** 069 -309** -068 -306** -068
GCxGD: (b65) ?? - 033 .045 -.032 .045 -.035 .045
+TF PES variables are contrast coded and thus f a  estimates are different from those in Table 6-16.
^Equation 6 result with Y = GC (i.e. b^j - 653 estimate) is same for panels Y — IT, and Y — QTB. 
aAf = 126. bGender was partialled out in both Equations 6 and 7.
*??’ denote where the IV effect is expected to be more (negative) positive at m ediu m  compared to lo w  or high  
levels o f  the moderator, rather than effect comparison between low and high moderator levels.
> < .1 0 ;  > < .0 5 ;  * > < .0 1 .
Results in the 1st panel of the table relate to the criterion variable IT. Results from estimating 
Equation 6 confirm that, allowing for the effects of GD, TFl still has a positive and 
significant effect on GC (i.e. b5l = A 6 6 , p  < .01) regardless of the level of GD (i.e. *53= -.054,
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p  >.10). Furthermore, Equation 7 results show that TFl residual/direct effect on IT is not 
significant (i.e. b \^ — .075,/? > .10), but confirms that this depends on the level of GD (i.e. b& 
= .164, p  < .05). The form of GD moderation of TFl effect on IT was earlier illustrated in 
Figure 6.15 Section 6.4.4, and in the post hoc analysis. The analysis revealed that TFl 
increases IT as GD increases, and that TFl has a positive though non-significant association 
with IT when GD is high and a negative non-significant association when GD is low. 
Equation 7 results also confirm that GC has a negative and significant impact on IT (i.e. b$ 4 = 
-.55, p  < .01), and that this effect does not vary according to the level of GD (i.e. bes = -.059,p  
> .10). Given that b53 = 0, though bM 4 - 0, and also that &5i„65= 0 not all the conditions for a 
mediated moderation relationship is met. Therefore the mediated moderation relationship 
postulated in Hypothesis 15(b) is not supported. The same conclusion is reached using both 
TF2 and TFH PES measures, i.e. Hypothesis 15(b) is not supported.
Results in the 2nd panel of Table 6-29 relate to the criterion variable MP. In this panel, 
Equation 7 results also confirm that, allowing for the effects of GC and GD, TFl still has a 
positive and significant direct effect on MP (i.e. Z>6i = .556, p  < .01). It also confirms that TFl 
residual/direct effect on MP still depends on the level of GD (i.e. b^  = -.268, p  < .01). The 
form of the moderation effect of GD was earlier illustrated in Figure 6.16 Section 6.4.4 and in 
the post hoc analysis. The analysis revealed that TFl effect on MP decreases as GD increases, 
and that TFl positive effect on MP is only significant when GD is low. When GD is high the 
effect is not significant. Furthermore, Equation 7 results show that allowing for TFl effect, 
GC seems to have no impact on MP (i.e. b64 = .047, p  > .10) but this really depends on the 
level of GD (i.e. b65 = .166, p  < .05). This interaction term is positive implying that GC has 
more positive effects on MP as GD increases. This moderation effect is illustrated in Figure 
6.23 below which shows GC’s effect on MP is more positive when GD is high than when GD 
is moderate or low. Recall that TFl increases GC regardless of the level of GD, and when GD 
is high TFl reduces MP. But also GC has a positive impact on MP when GD is high. Thus GC 
suppresses the negative impact of TFl on MP when GD is high. Given that bji ^  0, b$\^  es i 2 0,
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and |Z>23| ~ -271 is greater than \b^ 3\ = .268, there is evidence of a mediated moderation 
relationship. Therefore Hypothesis 15(d,) is supported. Results using TF2 and TFH are in the 
same direction but not significant.
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To further facilitate interpretation of results, post hoc analysis of the simple effects of TFl on
GC and of the simple effects GC on MP allowing for TFl effects was conducted. Post hoc
analysis of TFl simple effects on GC at low and high GD yields:
for low GD: GC = 5.442** + .321TF1* - .032GD - ,075(TFlxGD) 
for high GD: GC = 5.359** + .124TF1 - .032GD - ,075(TFlxGD)
This confirms that TFl has a positive effect on GC regardless of the level of GD; however this
effect is much more significant when GD is low to moderate than high. Also, post hoc
analysis of the simple effects of GC on MP at low and high GD allowing for TFl effects, and
by the same token the simple direct effects of TFl on MP yields:
for low GD: MP = 5.009** + .711TF1** + ,129GDA - ,268(TF1 xGD)**
- .173GC + .166(GCxGD)* 
for high GD: MP = 5.349** + .002TF1 + .129GDA - ,268(TF1 xGD)**
+ .268GC** + .166(GCxGD)*
These results show how GC mediates the effects of TFl on MP at high levels of GD. First, 
when GD is low TFl has a significant and positive direct effect on MP (from above equation
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b6i = .771,/? < .01). But GC does not have any significant effect on MP (b64 = -.173, p  > .10) 
even though TFl significantly increases GC when GD is low. However, when GD is high TFl 
does not seem to have any impact on MP (&61 = .002, p  > .10) because this is transmitted 
entirely via GC. TFl increases GC even when GD is high, and GC in turn significantly 
increases MP {bM =.268, p  < .01). Therefore the negative trend of TFl impact on MP as GD 
increases does not end in a negative association between TF 1 and MP at high GD because GC 
suppresses this effect. This means that GC counteracts the negative impact on MP of 
combining high TFl with high GD.
Results in the 3rd and 4th panels of Table 6-29 relating to QTB and EFF do not provide 
evidence to support a moderated mediation relationship. For instance, results in both panels of 
the table show that the effect of TF 1 on QTB and on EFF, after allowing for the effect of GC, 
does not depend on the level of GD (i.e. b63 = 0). Recall that one of the conditions established 
for a moderated mediation is that b63 £ 0, and since this condition is not met there is 
insufficient evidence for a moderated mediation. The same conclusions are reached using TF2 
and TFH PES measures.
In summary, only Hypothesis 15(dj) is supported, i.e. TFl effect on MP varies according to 
the level o f GD such that TFl increases MP when GD is low and does not seem to affect MP 
when GD is high. Though TFl decreases MP as GD increases, it does not seem to affect MP 
when GD is high because TFl increases GC regardless of GD levels, and GC significantly 
increases MP when GD is high. Thus at high GD, GC suppresses the negative impact of TFl 
on MP.
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6.4.16 Tests of Hypothesis 16 -  JRT Mediation of TF PES Direct Effects
Hypothesis 16 posits that the effect of TF PES on the criterion variables (i.e. QTB, IT, EFF, 
MP and AP) is mediated by job related tension (JRT) such that TF PES is positively related to 
JRT, and JRT in turn is also positively related to QTB and IT, and negatively related to EFF, 
MP and AP. Recall that mediation is established if SobePs z is significant. The result of 
testing these hypotheses is presented in Table 6-30 below.
Results in the 1st panel of the table relate to the criterion variable QTB. Results from 
estimating Equation 3 show that TFl has a positive, as anticipated, though non-significant 
effect on JRT (631 = .0669,p >  .10). Equation 4 results also show, as anticipated, that JRT has 
a positive and significant impact on QTB (642 = .5838,/? < .01) allowing for TFl direct effect 
on QTB which also is significant (i.e. Z?4I = .125, p  < .01). However, SobePs z  is not 
significant thus TFl have no significant indirect effect on QTB via JRT. Using TF2 and TFH, 
642 and 64t are also positive and significant. Results using TF2 and TFH measures are similar 
except that the impact on JRT is significant (631 = .1502, p  < .01; and 631 = .2553, p  < .10 
respectively). Consequently, SobePs z is significant using TF2 and TFH measures indicating 
significant indirect effect on QTB via JRT. As such, TF2 and TFH overall/total effect on QTB 
is greater, in absolute value, than the respective direct effects (i.e. (i.e. |Z > n |  > |64i|). In other 
words, TF2 and TFH increase QTB directly and indirectly via their impact on JRT. So 
Hypothesis 16(a) is not supported using TFl though relationships are in the direction 
hypothesized, but results using the TF2 and TFH measures support the hypothesis.
Results in the 2nd panel of the table relate to the criterion variable IT. Results from estimating 
Equation 4 show, as anticipated, that JRT has a positive and significant effect on IT (642 — 
.8079, p  < .01), allowing for TFl direct effect on IT which is not significant (i.e. bA 1 = .002, p  
> .10). The results show that SobePs z is not significant and thus there is insufficient evidence 
of a mediated effect. Therefore, Hypothesis 16(b) is not supported. However, similar to results 
in the 1st panel of the table h 2 (and of course b3l) is significant using TF2 and TFH measures.
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Also, Sobel s 2 is significant using these PES measures implying significant indirect effects. 
Using the TF2 measure, given that there is no significant direct effects on IT (i.e. b4l = .097,;? 
> .10), the results imply that JRT completely mediates TF2 effect on IT. On the other hand, 
given that TFH direct effect on IT is marginally significant (i.e. b4] = .605,/? < .10), it implies 
that JRT only partially mediates TFH effects on IT.
Table 6-30 Summary o f  Regression Analysis results: JRT Mediation o f  TF PES direct effects.
(iV = 236) TF1 TF2 TFH
E quation P aram eters E xpected sign P SE P SE P SE
Equation 1: Y = QTB TF : 0 „ ) + .1636** .0573 .1757** .0337 .4716** .1342
E quation 3**: Y = JR T TF: 0 j ,) + .0669 .0582 .1502** .0342 .2553A .1367
E quation 4: Y = QTB TF: 0 4I) + .125** .046 .094** .029 .325** .11
JRT: 0,2) + .5838** .052 .5468** .0536 .5755** .0521
Sobel’s z 1.143 4.032** 1.841A
E quation 1: Y = IT TF: 0 „ ) + .0556 .1431 .2111* .0862 .808* .3339
Equation 4: Y = IT TF: 0 4l) + .002 .136 .097 .086 ,605A .32
JRT: 04a) + .8079** .1522 .7589** .1575 .7733** .1517
Sobel’s z 1.123 3.245** 1.753A
E quation l : a Y = EFF TF: 0 n ) 67 + -.0299 .0836 .0566 .0508 .0634 .1977
Equation 4:a Y = EFF TF: 0 4I) + -.044 .083 .029 .053 .012 .198
JRT: 04a) - .204* .0931 .1858A .0965 .1996* .0935
Sobel’s z 1.018 1.763A 1.406
Equation I b: Y = MP TF: 0 „ ) + .369** .1222 .2123** .0735 .6352** .2406
E quation  i b Y = JR T TF: 0 31) + .0434 .0748 .1444** .0429 .2392 .1446
Equation 4b: Y = MP TF: 0 41) + .372** .123 .237** .077 .658** .244
JRT: 0 42) - -.0601 .1472 -.174 .1532 -.0963 .1496
Sobel’s z -.334 -1.075 -.599
E quation I e: Y  -  AP TF: 0 „ ) + -.183** .0633 -.0551 .0384 .1495 .1489
E quation 3C: Y = JR T TF: 0 31) + .0717 .0597 .1517** .0344 .2631A .1376
E quation 4C: Y = AP TF: 0 41) -.183** .064 -.058 .040 -.149 .15
JRT: 0 42) - .004 .0707 .0179 .0744 -.0032 .0721
Sobel’s z .0607 .243 -.046
aG ender  is a covariate, i.e. partialled out, in this equation; djV— 126; CN  228
^Results o f  regressing GC on TF PES (i.e. b3! estimate) is same for panels Y = QTB; IT; & EFF.
A p  < .10; * p  < .05; * * p  <  .01.
Results in the 3rd panel of the table relate to EFF. Equation 3 results presented in the 1st panel 
already show TF1 to have no significant effect on JRT, but TF2 and TFH does have
67 Note b n  reported here is the estimate from the regression o f  EFF on gender and just the linear TF PES term
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significant positive effects on JRT. Equation 4 results in the 3rd panel of the table show that 
TF1 has no significant direct effect on EFF (An = -.0299, p  > .10). But contrary to 
expectation, it shows that JRT has a positive and significant impact on EFF (b42 = .204, p  < 
.05). However, Sobel’s z  is not significant and thus Hypothesis 16(c) is not supported. In other 
words TF1 has no indirect effect on EFF via JRT. Also, results using TF2 and TFH are 
similar, except that it also shows a marginally significant indirect effect of TF2 on EFF via 
JRT. Finally, results in the 4th and 5th panels of the table relate to MP and AP but these also 
show that Sobel’s z is not significant for all 3 PES measures. Thus Hypothesis 16(d) is not 
supported, i.e. JRT does not mediate TF PES effects on MP and on AP.
In summary, none of Hypothesis 16 sub-hypotheses is supported using the TF1 PES measure, 
i.e. JRT does not mediate TF1 effects on QTB, IT, EFF, MP and AP. However, using TF2 and 
TFH PES measures there is evidence that JRT partially mediates TF PES effects on QTB and 
completely mediates TF PES effect on IT. The mediation is such that TF PES increases JRT 
and JRT in turn increases QTB and IT.
6.4.17 Tests of Hypothesis 17 -  JRT Mediation of ICS Moderation of TF PES Effects
In Hypothesis 17, it was also postulated that ICS moderation of TF PES effects on the 
criterion variables is produced via JRT. Results in Section 6.4.7 show that ICS only moderates 
TF PES effect on IT therefore Hypothesis 17 relating to QTB, EFF, MP and AP is not 
supported. Also, results from the preceding section show that (using the TF2 PES measure) 
JRT possibly mediates TF PES effects on QTB, IT and EFF. Consequently, Hypothesis 17 is 
examined in relation to only IT, and a possible moderated mediation relationship is explored 
in relation to QTB and EFF. Result of examining these relationships is presented in Table
6-31 below.
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Table 6-31 Summary o f  Regression Analysis results: JRT Mediation o f  ICS Moderation o f  TF PES 
direct effects.
II N> Os TF1 TF2 TFH
Equation Param eters fi SE fi SE P SE
Equation 6 :^  Y = J R T TF: (*s,) .061 .044 .133** .043 .058 .044
ICS: (bS2) -.128** .037 -.097** .035 . H7** .037
TFxICS: (bS3) -.032 .037 -.006 .035 -.008 .037
Equation 7: Y = IT TF: (A61) .096 .098 .106 .101 .141 .099
ICS: (b62) -.435** .084 -.368** .082 -.407** .085
TFxICS: (b63) -.276** .082 -.199* .082 -.151A .083
JRT: (bM) .634** .147 .635** .151 .652** .149
JRTxICS: (b65) -.054 .114 -.014 .117 -.064 .115
Equation 7: Y = QTB TF: (b6l) .107** .035 .081* .036 .093** .035
ICS: (b62) - .100** .030 -.072* .029 -.095** .030
TFxICS: (b63) -.003 .029 .025 .029 -.022 .029
JRT: (bM) .549** .053 .540** .054 .55** .053
JRTxICS: (b65) .002 .041 -.009 .042 -.001 .041
Equation 7:a Y = EFF TF: (661) -.072 .062 .026 .063 -.049 .062
ICS: (b62) .194** .054 .163** .052 .190** .053
TFxICS: (b63) .057 .052 -.063 .052 .065 .052
JRT: (bM) .277* .093 .252** .095 .269** .093
JRTxICS: (b65) -.084 .072 -.058 .074 -.083 .072
^Results o f  regressing JRT on TF PES (i.e. b3/ estimate) is same for panels Y = IT; QTB; & EFF. 
‘Gender was partialled out in both Equations 6 and 7.
Ap <  .10; *p < .05; **p < .01.
From the 1st panel of the table, the results relating to IT show that, allowing for the effect of 
ICS, TF1 does not have any significant impact on JRT (bn = .061, p  > .10) regardless of the 
level o f ICS (b„ = -.032, p  > .10). Also, it shows that JRT significantly increases IT (*« = 
.634, p  < .01) regardless of the level of ICS ( i 65 = -.054, p  > . 10). Therefore given that neither 
is, and i 65, nor i 53 and i 64 are concurrently significant, the conditions for a mediated 
moderation are not fully met. Thus Hypothesis 17(b) is also not supported. This result also 
hold across all 3 PES measures, i.e. i 5i and i 65 is concurrently significant nor is i 53 and hM.
Results in the 2nd and 3rd panels of the table related to QTB and EFF. The results show that, 
allowing for the effects of JRT, TF PES direct impact on these variables do not depend on the 
level o f ICS (i.e. i 63 = 0 across all 3 PES measures). As i 63 = 0 there is insufficient evidence of 
a moderated mediation. Moreover, TF PES impact on JRT (i.e. bn) and ICS moderation of
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JRT impact on QTB and EFF (i.e. Z>65) are not concurrently significant. Also, neither is ICS 
moderation of TF PES effects on JRT (i.e. 653) and JRT effect on QTB and EFF allowing for 
TF PES effects (i.e. concurrently significant. In summary, Hypothesis 17 is not supported 
and there is insufficient evidence for a moderated mediation relationship between TF PES and 
QTB, and TF PES and EFF.
6.4.18 Tests of Hypothesis 18 -  JS Mediation of TF PES Direct Effects 
Recall that Hypothesis 18 posits that JS mediates TF PES effects on the criterion variables 
such that TF PES is negatively related to JS, while JS in turn is negatively related to QTB and 
IT, and positively related to EFF, MP and AP. Result of testing these hypotheses is presented 
in Table 6-32.
Results in the 1st panel of the table relate to QTB, and results of Equations 3 show that TF1 
has a negative but non-significant effect on JS (b31 = -.0276,/? > .10). As expected, Equation 
4 results show that JS has a negative and significant impact on QTB (h42 = -.1676, p  < .01), 
allowing for the direct effect of TF1 which is still significant (&41 = .159, p  < .01). But the 
results also show that Sobefs 2 is not significant implying that JS does not mediate TF1 
effects on QTB. However, results using TF2 and TFH measures show a significant SobeTs z. 
Both PES measures show a negative and significant impact on JS (i.e. h31 = -.2546,/? < .01 for 
TF2, and b3x = -.9393, p  < .01 for TFH). And similar to results using TF1, JS has a negative 
and significant effect on QTB (i.e. Z?42 = -.1425, p  < .01 for TF2, and h42 = -.1536, p  < .01 for 
TFH) allowing for TF PES direct effect (i.e. bA2) which is also positive and significant. Thus 
results using TF2 and TFH indicate significant indirect effects on QTB via JS such that TF2 
and TFH reduce JS, and the reduced JS induces more QTB beyond levels directly attributable 
to TF2 and TFH. Thus JS partially mediates TF PES effects on QTB. It can be seen therefore 
that the absolute value of the overall/total effect on QTB (i.e. |Z?n| — .1757 for TF2, and .4716 
for TFH) is greater than the residual/direct effects (|Au| = .139 for TF2, and .327 for TFH). So
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though Hypothesis 18(a) is not supported using TF 1, results using the TF2 and TFH measures 
provide sufficient evidence supporting the hypothesis.
Table 6-32 Summary of Regression Analysis results: IS Mediation of TF PES- -direct effects.
(N  =236) TFI TF2 TFH
Equation Parameters Expected Sign SE jS SE 0 SE
Equation 1: Y = QTB TF - .(bn) + .1636** .0573 .1757** .0337 .4716** 1 41
Equation 3~ 3 Y -  JS TF: (by) - -.0276 .1245 -.2546** .0741 -.9393-** 28” ''
Equation 4: Y  -  QTB TF: (b41) + .159** .054 .139** .033 .327* ,130
IS: (642) - -.1676** .0281 -.1425** .0283 -,1536ft**' ,0289
Sobel’s z .221 2,839** 2,784**
Equation 1: Y = IT TF (hi) + .0556 .1431 .2111* .0:862 .808-* .3339
Equation 4: Y = IT TF ( h i ) + .032 .096 -.007 .06 -.001 .232
IS ( h i ) - -.8545** .0504 -.8561** .0516 -.1:548**" ,0515
SobePs z .222 3,364** 3.206**
Equation i a: Y = EFF TF ( h \ ) + -.0299' .0836 .0566 .0508 .0634- .1977
Equation -/*; Y = EFF TF (641) + -.028 .083 .079 .052 ,138 ,201
JS ( h i ) + .0738A .0437 .0889* .0445 ,0804A ,0446
Sobel’s z -.220 -1.727’" -1.578
Equation / ft Y = MP TF: (bn ) + .369** ..1222 .2123** .0735 .6352** .2406
Equation 3b
*3ii TF: ( b y ) - .0325 .1446 -.1733** ,0852 .7299** .2744-
Equation  4* Y = MP TF: (A*i) + .367** .123 .23 .074 .719** .246
IS :  (642) + .0566 .0761 .1041 .0772 ,1143- .0783
SobeTs z .215 -1.124 -E279-'
Equation ! c: Y = AP TF: {by.) + -.183** .0633 -.0551 .0384 1493 ,1489'
Equation 3C: Y -  J S TF: ( b y ) - -.0447 .1286 -.264** .0-750-' 9588** .2909
Equation 4C: Y  = AP TF: (bAi) + -.181** .063 -.047 ,040' —,117 .152
I S : ( b y ) + .0369 .0327 .0298 .0341 .0234- .034-1
Sobel’s z -.332 -.847
T ' T / ' .  C \ T  5 ^ 0
-.941
l G ender  is a covariate. i.e. partial led out, in this equation; N  126; N 228 
Results o f regressing JS  on TF PES (i.e. b y  estimate) is same' for panels Y — Q'TB, IT,. &  EFF. 
Ap < .10: *p < .05; **p < .01.
Results in the 2nd panel of the table relate to IT. As already discussed above TF! does not have 
a significant impact on JS (i.e. by = 0). In this panel. Equation 4 results alls® show that JS has 
a negative and significant effect on IT (b42 = -.8545, p  < .01) allowing for the direct effect of 
TF 1 which is not significant (by ~ .032, p  > .10). Again Sobel s z  is not significant and thus 
Hypothesis 18(b) is therefore not supported using TF1 PES measure. However, Sobel s z is 
significant using the TF2 and TFH PES measures implying that JS does mediate the TF PES
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effects on IT. But the residual/direct effect on IT is not significant (&4i = -.007, p  > .10 for 
TF2, and b$\ .001, p  > .10 for TFH) while the overall/total effect is (i.e. b\\ = .2111, p  < .05
for TF2, and b\\ = .808, p  < .05 for TFH). These results imply that JS completely mediates 
TF2 and TFH effect on IT. As such, the overall/total effects (i.e. |6n | = .211 and .808) are 
greater than the direct effects (|&41| = .007 and .001 respectively). Again, Hypothesis 18(b) is 
not supported using TF1 but results using the TF2 and TFH measures provide evidence 
supporting the hypothesis.
Results in the 3rd panel of the table relate to EFF, and the Equation 4 results also show that JS 
has a positive and significant impact on EFF (i.e. b42 i 1 0) across the 3 PES measures -  though 
only marginally significant using TF1 and TFH. The result also show that TF PES, across the 
3 measures, has no significant direct effect on EFF (i.e. Z>41 = 0). Consequently Sobel’s 2 is not 
significant using TF1 and TFH measures but marginally significant using TF2. On the whole 
therefore, the results do not support Hypothesis 18(c). Results in the 3rd and 4th panels o f the 
table relate to MP and AP respectively, and it shows no significant Sobefs 2 across the 3 PES 
measures. Thus JS does not mediate TF PES effect on MP and on AP.
In summary, none of Hypothesis 18 is not supported using TF1 PES measure, i.e. JS does not 
mediate TF1 effects on QTB, IT, EFF, MP and AP. However, using TF2 and TFH PES 
measures, results provide some evidence that JS partially mediates TF PES effects on QTB, 
and completely mediates TF PES effect on IT. The mediation effects are such that TF PES 
reduces JS, and decreased JS in turn leads to more QTB and IT.
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6.5 Table Summary of Key Results
A condensed summary of key results is presented in Table 6-33 below, and notes on how to 
interpret information in the table is provided in the bullet points below, 
o Rows A — D indicate the hypotheses tested — i.e. direct effects; moderation effects;
mediation effects; and mediated moderation, 
o Columns 1 -  5 indicate the criterion variable involved in the hypothesis test, and sub­
columns show the particular TF PES measure involved i.e. TF1, TF2 and TFH. 
o In row A (direct effects), only TF PES is the independent variable (IV). In rows B — D, each 
sub-rows show the other IVs (i.e. the moderators and mediators) involved in testing the 
hypothesis indicated in italics, e.g. Hypothesis 3 = H3. 
o Results are read horizontally along the rows with each cell showing the sign (+, -) of only 
the significant test parameter of interest, empty cells represent insignificant results.
o For rows A -  C results are interpreted perfectly. For e.g.
Row A x Column 1(TF1): shows the results of testing hypothesis on the direct effects 
of TF PES on the criterion variable QTB. The ‘+ ’sign indicates that using the TF1 
measure, TF PES is positively associated with QTB.
Row B 1x Column 2 (TF2): show result of testing hypothesis on GD moderation of TF 
PES effect on IT. The *+’ sign indicate the sign of GDxTF2 interaction, i.e. TF2 
(positive) effect on IT increases as GD increases.
Row C2 x Column 1 (TF1): show result of testing hypothesis on GC mediation of TF 
PES effect on QTB. The first sign which is ‘+ ’ means TF1 is positively associated 
with GC, and the second sign which is means GC is negatively associated with 
QTB allowing for TF1 effects.
For Row D the tests here involve two regressions: 1st - a moderated regression with 
the mediator as the DV; 2nd - another moderated equation with the criterion variable at 
the top of the column as the DV. The mediator is also an TV and its effect is also 
moderated. Signs in each cell relate to significant test parameters in the equations, but 
the parameter combinations are not always the same. Additional foot notes at the end 
o f the table explain which parameters are involved, and the meaning of other 
notations used in the table.
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6.6 The Relative Importance o f M oderator Variables
Recall that initial results indicate that TF PES is negatively and significantly aissociated with 
quality'" threatening behaviour (QTB) and actual performance rating (A P),. and that results of 
the single moderator models indicate no significant moderation of these effects by .any o f  the 
moderator variables examined. On the other hand TF PES appeared to lave' no signHiram* 
association with IT, while results of the single moderator models indicated, that 'TF' PES effect 
on (IT) is moderated by 3 variables viz.: goal difficulty1"' (GD), interactive use o f  control 
systems (ICS), and supervisory trust (ST). The moderation effects show that TF PES is 
positively and significantly associated with IT when GD is high as well as when ICS' is low,
and negatively and significantly associated with IT when ST is high Recall also* 'that 'initial
results show' TF PES to have a positive and significant effect on managerial performance 
(MP), while the single moderator models indicate that GD and organisational commitment 
(OC) moderate this effect. The moderation effects show'' that TF PES effects on MP remain 
positive and significant only when GD is low and also when OC is low, i.e. TF PES does not 
have any significant effect on MP when GD is high as well as when OC is high. Finally, 
initial results also showed that TF PES did not have any significant linear effect on effort 
(EFF), while the single moderation models show that the association is moderated by 
organisational hierarchical level (OHL). TF PES was found to* have a positive and significant 
effect on EFF at high OHLs.
Having tested the significance of each of the moderation effects, separately in single 
moderator models, the relative importance of each moderator variable and the moderation 
effect is however unclear. Many of the single moderator models have low explsmafaiy power, 
and it is unclear which variables may have incremental explanatory power. To eiariiy these 
issues a combined moderation model is examined using hierarchical regressim where the 
moderator variables are combined together in steps.
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In the first step, each of the criterion variables i.e. QTB, IT, MP, EFF, and AP is regressed on 
TF PES, GD, OC, and the interaction of TF PES with GD and OC. This model will be 
referred to as model 1. GD and OC are entered in the first step of the hierarchical regression 
as they have been previously identified in the literature as having significant direct 
associations with dy sfunctional behaviour. In the second step, OHL and its interaction with 
TF PES are added to the predictors in model 1. This will be referred to as model 2. In the 3rd 
step, interactive use of controls (ICS) and its interaction with TF PES are added to the 
predictors already in model 2. This will be referred to as model 3. In the final step, i.e. model 
4, ST and its interaction with TF PES are added to the predictors in model 3. The model 
represented in each hierarchical regression step is depicted below:
Model 1
Y =  a0 +  P\TF + p2GD + p3TF x GD + p40C +  psTF x  OC 
Model 2
Y = a 0 + pxTF + p2GD + h T F  x G D +  p40C +  p5TF xOC + fieOHL +  p7TF x OHL 
Model 3
Y = cc0 + p 1TF + p2GD + p3TF x GD + p40C + psTF XOC+  psOHL +  p7TF X OHL +
PBICS +  p9TF x ICS
Model 4
Y = a0 +  P\TF + p2GD+ p3TF x GD + p40C +  p5TF x OC +  PeOHL +  p7TF x OHL +
PQICS +  p9TF x ICS + p10ST + PuTF x ST
After the first step, i.e. Model 1, variables are entered into the regression such that no variable 
entering later is presumed to be a cause of a variable entered earlier. The advantage o f such 
ordering is that variables that may be a source of spurious relationship are entered earlier so 
that a unique partitioning of the total variance explained in the dependent variables may be 
made to each variable added later (Cohen and Cohen, 2003). Results of the hierarchical 
regressions are presented in Tables 6-34 and 6-35 below.
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Table 6-34 Summary' of Hierarchical Moderated Regression Analysis (QTB, IT, & EFF)
“E xpected  Sign




4 Y = EFF
N = 256
Step I 0 SE B 0  SE B “E S 0 SE B
Constant 2 .5 6 2 * *  .041 2.958** .085 5.678** .095
TF + .183** .041 .20*6 .109 .117 .050 + -.015 .085 -.011
GD (+) .045 .031 .088 .127* .0*66 .102 |'+) -.138** .048 -. 186
TF-GD + -.017 .043 -.026 .070 .090 .044 ?? -,089A .065 -.094
OC (-) -.179** .035 -.317 -.817** .073 -.589 (+) ,086A .053 .104
TF 'OC - -.011 .050 -.014 -.045 .103 -.024 + -.060 .075 -.054
GENDER 9 -.346** .127 -.160
F 8.07** 28.953** 4.142**
R2 .149 .386 .098
A djusted  R2 .131 .373 .074
Step 2_________ aE .S  0 ________SE  B  0  S E  B  aE .S  0 ________S E  B
C o n  s l a n t  7 1 * *  ( M l  7 n s * <  c  n , n . ct t 2.561  .041 2.963* .086 5,697** .095
TF + .195 .057 .218 .091 .118 .041 + -.012 .085 -.009
GD ( + ) .030 .033 .060 .149* .069 .120 (+) -.148** .050 -.200
TF*GD + -.015 .043 -.023 .065 .090 .041 w -,099A .065 -.104
OC <-) -.184** .035 -.325 -.811** .074 -.584 (+) .078 .053 .095
TFxOC - -.012 .050 -.016 -.044 .104 -.024 + -.071 .074 -.064
GENDER ? - 324** .128 -.164
OHL ( ? ) ,057A .040 .091 -.084 .084 -.055 ( ? ) .056 .061 .062
TFxOHL + -.019 .049 -.023 .056 .103 .028 - .144* .074 .123
F 6.081** 20.821** 3,695**
A d ju s te d  R : .131 .371 .084
J R : .008 .004 .017
Step 3 aE .S 0 S E B 0 S E B 0 S E B
Constant 2.563** .041 2.988** .087 5.715** .096
TF Hr .231** .057 .259 .122 .121 .056 Hr -.048 .088 -.037
GD (+) .015 .033 .030 .115A .069 .092 (+) -.139** .051 -.189
TF-GD + -.034 .043 -.052 .017 .091 .010 “QQ -.092A .066 -.097
OC (-) .144** .037 -.255 -.735** .078 -.530 ■(+) .054 .057 .066
TF*OC - 0.00 .052 0.00 .019 .108 . 0 1 0 + -.065 .078 -.059
GENDER -.344** .129 -.174
OHL (?) .044 .040 .070 -. 109A .084 -.071 (?) .066 .062 .072
TFxOHL + -.024 .050 -.030 .021 .104 .011 - .138* .075 .118
ICS (-) -.121** .039 -.222 -.214** .082 -.159 (+) .081A .059 .102
TFxICS - -.017 .052 -.326 -.169A -.110 -.095 + -.039 .079 -.037
F 6.049** 17.387** 3.256**
A d ju s te d  R 2 .194 .386 .088
A R 2 .037** .019* .011
S te p  4 “E .S 0 S E B 0 SE B
Constant 2.543** .041 2.953*
*
.088
TF + .182** .058 .204 .038 .123 .018
GD (+) .016 .032 .032 .116* .068 .093
TFxGD + -.018 .043 -.027 .044 .091 .027
OC (-) -.106** .038 -.187 -.670** .080 -.483
TFxOC .045 .052 .059 .095 .111 .051
GENDER
OHL (?) .036 .039 .058 -. 123A .084 -.080
TFxOHL + -.043 .050 -.053 -.010 .106 -.005
ICS (-) -.028 .047 -.587 -.054 .100 -.544
TFxICS .020 .061 .028 -.105 .131 -.059
ST (?) -.152** .048 -.273 -.258** .101 -.189
TFxST -.062 .054 -.094 -.107 .114 -.066
F 6.386** 15.401**
A d ju s te d  R 2 .201 .403
A R 2 .045** 0?2*
A p  <  10; *p  < ,05; * * p  < .01 .N o te  1- ta ile d  s ign ifican ce level is reported; 2-tailed sig n ifica n ce  w a s  p re v io u s ly  
r e p o r te d  in the s in g le  m o d e ra to r  models. A lso  2-tailed s ig n ifica n ce  is reported where n o  p re d ic tio n s  w e re  p o s s ib le . 
a Expected signs in brackets relate to effects not formally stated in a hypotheses but are apparent from the moderation 
hypothesis development. ‘?’ denote situations where no predictions were possible, and ?; denote where more TF 
positive effects is expected at medium compared to low  or high levels of the moderator, rather than effect comparison 
between lowr and high moderator levels.
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b VIF < 2.2. Results in step 4 are very much the same after deleting 2 observations with standardized residuals greater 
than 3 standard deviations, AR‘ is .252.
c VIF < 2.2. After deleting 4 obs. in the first regression with std residuals > 2 std dev and then 2 further obs. AR2 is 
.525 (N -23 0 ) and TF (b  = .163), OHL (b =  -.095), and ICS (b = -.119) are significant at the 10% level, while ST (b  =  - 
.144) and TFxST (b = -.174) betas are also significant at the 5% level. d VIF < 1.5
In respect of quality threatening behaviour (QTB), results in Table 6-34 show that Model 1 (Y  
= cto + PtTF +p2GD -  p 3 TF*GD+ p 4 OC+ p 5 TF*OC) yielded R2 and adjusted R2 (AR2) of 
.149 and .131 respectively. Inclusion of OHL and its interaction with TF PES in step 2, i.e. 
Model 2, did not significantly increase the Model’s predictive power, but the inclusion of ICS 
and its interaction with TF PES in Model 3 showed incremental explanatory power explaining 
an additional 3.7% (p < .01) of the variation in QTB above Model 2. Also the inclusion of ST 
and its interaction with TF PES in the final model, i.e. Model 4, explained an additional 4.5% 
(p < .01) of the variation in QTB above the variation explained by Model 3.
Model 4’s R2 (AR2) of .221 (.201) show only a slight improvement over the highest R2 (AR2) 
o f . 189 (. 179) obtained in the single moderator models with ST as the moderator. The results 
are also similar to those obtained in the single moderator models with two exceptions; the 
positive (negative) direct effects of GD (ICS) on QTB are not significant whereas these 
associations were shown to be significant in the single moderator models with the same signs. 
Besides these exceptions, the full model results are consistent with the single moderator 
model results in showing no significant interaction terms and a positive and significant TF 
PES association with QTB (b = .182, p < .001), and a negative and significant OC and ST 
association with QTB (b()c = -.106, p < .001, and bsr= ~-152, p < .001).
Model 4 ’s standardized beta coefficients indicate that TF PES has the most significant direct 
effect on QTB followed by ST. Thus, after allowing for the effects of the other moderator 
variables, GD and ICS direct effects on QTB do not seem as important as was indicated by 
the single moderator model results. However, in Model 3 (i.e. Y — cto + PfTF +p2GD + 
p 3 TF*GD+ p 4 OC+ p 5 TF*OC + p6OHL + p-TF*OHL + P&ICS + p 9 TF*ICS) ICS has 
incremental explanatory power with a significant negative effect on QTB (b . \ 2 \ , p  < .01).
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These results suggest therefore that ICS effects on QTB are transmitted via supervisory trust 
(ST). As highlighted in the theory development section, ICS has the potential to increase trust 
by providing an opportunity for increased communication. Barrett et al. (2005) also note it has 
the potential to dampen trust if used in an interrogative and intrusive way. However, the high 
positive correlation betw een ICS and ST (rho = .651. p  < .01) support the proposition that ICS 
promotes ST, and thus its direct effect on QTB are transmitted via increased supervisory trust 
(ST).
On the other hand, the non-significant effect of GD on QTB, allowing for the effects o f TF 
PES, OC and their interaction, conflicts with previous findings that show GD as the most 
consistent variable with significant effects on QTB (Kelley and Margheim, 1990; Otley and 
Pierce, 1996a; Pierce and Sweeney, 2004). This may be partly due to the coverage o f more 
hierarchical levels and serv ice areas in this study than in previous studies. Perhaps GD is an 
important explanatory variable of QTB at lower OHLs within audit service areas, but not 
generally so throughout an accounting firm. The conflicting result may also be partly due to 
the more comprehensive measurement of TF PES in this study' compared to previous studies. 
This study found TF PES to be relatively more important in explaining QTB when previous 
studies did not find any significant effects.
With respect to intention to turnover (IT), Model 1 yielded R~ ( AR)  of .386 (.373) and Model 
2 did not significantly add to the variance explained by Model 1. However, Model 3 
explained an additional 1.9% (p < .05) of the variation in IT above Model 2, and Model 4 also 
showed incremental explanatory' power explaining an additional 2.2% (p < .05) of the 
variation in IT above Model 3. Model 4 with R2 (AR2) of .431 (.403) also show little 
improvement in explanatory power over the highest R  (AR ) of .3 / 5 (.367) obtained in the 
single OC moderator model. However, the full model results do not show significant 
moderation effects for GD, ICS, and ST as obtained in the single moderator models although 
the coefficient signs are consistent.
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Besides these exceptions, the full model results are consistent with the single moderator 
model results in showing no significant TF PES and OHL effects and significant negative 
effects of OC and ST (b = -.670, p  < .01; and b — -.258, p  < .01 respectively). Equally, the 
results consistently show GD effects on IT to be positive and significant (b = A \ 6 , p  < .05). 
However, ICS negative effect on IT is not significant as indicated in the single moderator 
model, although it is significant in the penultimate step (b = -214, p  < .01), i.e. model 3 
without ST moderation effect. As already discussed in the previous paragraph, ICS effect 
seems to be transmitted via ST. In terms of the relative importance of the direct effects on IT, 
the standardised beta coefficients indicate that OC is the most important explanatory variable 
followed by ST.
With respect to effort (EFF), Model 1 yielded R2 (AR2) of .098 (.074) and Model 2 did not 
significantly increase Model 1 ’s explanatory power. Equally, Model 3, the full model, did not 
significantly increase the variance explained by Model 2. Model 3 being the full
model for EFF yielded R2 (AR1) of .126 (.088). Again, these do not improve much over the 
highest R2 (AR2) of .085 (.069) obtained in the single moderator model with GD as the 
moderator. The results are also consistent with those obtained in the single moderator models 
except for two interaction terms which were not significant in any of the single moderator 
models, but now shown to be marginally significant. These are the interactions between TF 
PES and GD (b = -.092, p  < .10), and TF PES and ICS (b = .081, p< .10). Besides these 
effects, the full model results confirm those from the single moderator models in consistently 
showing significant gender differences in EFF (b = -.344, p< .01), a negative and significant 
GD effect on EFF (b = -.139, p< .01), and a positive and significant interaction between TF 
PES and OHL (Z» = .138,/? < .05). Considering the standardised beta coefficients in model 3, 
GD has the most significant effect on EFF followed by ICS.
With respect to managerial performance (MP), results in Table 6-j5 show R~ (AR ) o f .249 
(.218) for Model 1. Inclusion of OHL and the interaction with TF PES in Model 2 explained 
an additional 4.4% (p < .01) variation in MP; while inclusion of ICS and the interaction with
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TF PES in Model 3, the full model, did not significantly improve the explanatory power of the 
model 2. Model 3 with R" (AR") of .299 (.244) shows only a slight improvement over the 
highest R (AR ) of .203(.183) obtained in the single GD moderator model. Again, results of 
Model 3 are similar to those obtained in the single moderator models with one exception. The 
results show that TF PES interaction with OHL is positive and significant (b = 2 3 8 ,p <  .05), 
whereas this interaction term was negative and not significant in the single OHL moderator 
model. This positive interaction term indicates that TF PES positive impact on MP increases 
at higher OHL. Besides this exception, the results are consistent with the single moderator 
model results in showing TF PES interactions with GD and OC to be negative and significant 
(b = -.440, p < .01, and b = -.317, p  < .01 respectively), and TF PES effect on MP to be 
positive and significant (b = .416, p  < .01). In terms of the relative importance of each 
independent variables effect on MP, the standardized beta coefficients show TF PES has the 
most significant effect followed by GD.
With respect to actual performance ratings (AP), Model l ’s R2(AR2) = .051 (.030). Model 2 
and Model 3, the full model, did add significantly to the explanatory power of the preceding 
model. Model 3’s R2 (AR2) o f . 111 (.009) does not improve much over the highest R2 (AR2) of 
.046 (.033) obtained in the single moderator model with OHL as the moderator. Again, results 
from Model 3 are consistent with those from the single moderator models except that it shows 
the negative OC and ICS effects on AP to be marginally significant, and also the positive 
interaction term of TF PES with OHL to be marginally significant. This marginally significant 
interaction term suggest that TF PES negative effect on AP reduces higher up the hierarchy. 
More importantly the results confirm the negative and significant TF PES effect on AP (b 
.201, p  c.Ol) as obtained in all the single moderator models. The standardized beta 
coefficients also indicate that TF PES has the most significant direct impact on AP followed 
by ICS.
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Table 6-35 Summary of Hierarchical Moderated Regression Analysis (MP and AP)
"E xpected  Sign
b Y = MP
N  = 126
Y =  AP
N  =  2 2 8
Step I B SE B P SE B
Constant 5.243** .088 3.489** .047
TF + .417** .121 .282 -.189** .065 -.196
GD (+) .135* .068 .160 -,053A .036 -.097
TFxGD ?? -.404** .093 -.374 .016 .050 .023
OC (+) .088 .078 .094 -.038 .041 -.062
TFxOC + -.331** .107 -.263 -.051 .057 -.063
F 7.968** 2.390*
R2





Step 2 aE.S P SE B P SE B
Constant 5.269** .087 3.498** .048
TF + .424** .119 .287 -.188** .066 -.196
GD (+) .1 14A .070 .136 -,057A .038 -.104
TFxGD ?? -.422** .091 -.391 .010 .050 .015
OC (+) .073 .075 .078 -.041 .041 -.068
TFxOC + -.350** .105 -.279 -.057 .058 -.069
OHL (?) .106 .085 .103 .023 .047 .035
TFxOHL - .258** .104 .193 .078 .057 .090
F



















TF + .416** .124 .282 -.201** .068 -.210
GD (+) .103 .071 .122 -.047 .039 -.086
TFxGD ?? -.440** .094 -.408 .024 .051 .034
OC (+) .094 .080 .100 -,064A .044 -.105
TFxOC + -.317** .111 -.252 -.072 .061 -.088
OHL (?) .100 .086 .096 .031 .047 .046
TFxOHL .238* .107 .179 .086A .058 .099
ICS (+) -.050 .084 -.056 .066A .046 .113
TFxICS + -.103 .113 -.086 .037 .062 .047
F 5.487** 1.788A






Ap <  . 1 0 ;  *p <  .05; **p <  .01. N o t e  1 -tailed significance level is reported; 2-tailed significance was 
p rev io u sly  rep o rted  in the single moderator models. a Expected sign; see notes in the previous table.. No VIF 
> 1.5; results are similar after deleting 2 obs. with std residual > 3 std dev, except that OC is significant (b —
.155, p<.05) and adjusted R2 improves to .282.
In summary, the full combined moderator models do not show substantive improvement in 
explanatory power over the single moderator models. Furthermore, results of the full 
combined moderator model are largely consistent with those obtained in the single moderator 
models. Results from the full combined moderating model show moderation effects that are 
consistent with those obtained from the single moderator models for all the dependent 
variables except in 3 cases. Whereas the single moderator model results indicate that 
interactive use of control systems and goal difficulty moderate TF PES effects on intention to 
turnover, the interaction of these variables with TF PES are not significant in the full 
combined model (i.e. Model 4) results. Furthermore, the full combined moderator model
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results also show that organisational hierarchical level (OHL) moderate TF PES effects on 
managerial performance (MP), i.e. the positive impact increases at higher OHLs, this 
interaction was not significant in the single moderator model results.
With regards to the simple effects of the independent variables, results from the full model are 
also largely consistent with those obtained in the single moderator models. With respect to 
quality' threatening behaviour (QTB), the results confirm TF PES effects to be positive and 
significant, and organisational commitment (OC) and supervisory trust (ST) effects to' be 
negative and significant. In addition, it show's TF PES to be the most important explanatory'' 
factor o f QTB, followed by ST. But the results do not confirm the single moderator results, 
which indicate that GD and ICS have significant effects on QTB.. On one hand, the 
hierarchical regression results show GD does not have any significant effect on QTB allowing 
for the effects of TF PES and OC. This conflict somewhat with results of previous studies 
conducted mostly at lower OHLs in audit service areas of accounting firms. In these studies, 
GD was the most consistent variable with a significant positive association with QTB. On the 
other hand, the hierarchical regression results suggest that ICS effects are transmitted via ST.
For intention to turnover (IT), the full combined moderator model show significant simple 
effects consistent with those obtained In the single moderator models except in one case. The 
full model results confirm OC and ST effects to be negative and significant, and GD effect to- 
be positive and significant. But it did not show' ICS effects to be significant as obtained in the 
single moderator model; it suggests rather that ICS effects on IT are transmitted via ST. The 
results also reveal that OC. has more impact on IT than the other variables, followed by GD.
With respect to MP, again the simple effects that are significant are very similar in both the 
full combined and single moderator models except in one case. All the single moderator 
models consistently show' TF PES effects on MP to be positive and significant, and this is also 
confirmed in the combined moderator models. However, the full model results do1 not confirm 
GD positive effect on MP to be significant as obtained in the single moderator' model. For
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EFF, results of the full combined and the single moderator models show consistent significant 
simple effects, again with one exception. The full model results confirm that GD has a 
negative and significant effect on EFF, while ICS has a positive and significant effect. But the 
results do not confirm OC positive effects on EFF to be significant as obtained in the single 
moderator model. Finally, for AP both full combined model and the single moderator models 
show consistent significant simple effects. The full model results confirm TF PES effect on 
AP to be negative and significant.
Bearing in mind the order of entering the explanatory variables, the magnitude and 
significance of the change in i?2 of the hierarchical regressions show that Model 1 is the most 
parsimonious combined moderating model for actual performance ratings and effort, and 
Model 2 for managerial performance. For quality threatening behaviour and intention to 
turnover, Model 4 explained significantly more variance than the other models.
", . a o a  v; ‘:;
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Chapter 7 Summary and Discussion of Findings, Conclusions, and 
Limitations
This study examined the consequences of performance management and control systems 
(PMCSs) with particular reference to performance evaluative styles (PES). The style of 
PMCS use in performance evaluation was conceptualised with reference to the focus on 
targets, i.e. target-focused performance evaluative style (TF PES). Accordingly, a prime 
general measure of TF PES was developed in addition to two other firm specific measures. 
The firm-specific measures include a parsimonious version of the prime measure and a 
measure adapted from Hopwood’s evaluative style measurement instrument. Both negative 
and positive consequences of PMCSs were examined in terms of TF PES effects on 
dysfunctional behaviour, effort and performance. Dysfunctional behaviour was represented by 
quality threatening behaviour (QTB) encompassing short-termism, data manipulation and 
impression management, and also by social withdrawal represented by intention to turnover 
(IT). Performance, on the other hand, was represented by the actual performance rating (AP) 
received from formal performance appraisal, and by a self rating of managerial performance 
(MP).
From review o f previous research studies, several potential factors that moderate and others 
that mediate PMCSs effects on behaviour and performance were identified and thus 
investigated. The potential moderating factors identified and investigated include goal 
difficulty (GD), organisational hierarchical level (OHL), interactive use of control systems 
(ICS), organisational commitment (OC), and supervisory trust (ST). While the potential 
mediating factors identified and investigated include equity and fairness perception (EFP), 
goal commitment (GC), job related tension (JRT), and job satisfaction (JS). Finally, in order 
to elucidate a better understanding of the complexities of the way PMCSs impact on 
behaviour and performance, the study modelled and investigated how the interplay o f these 
moderating and mediating factors impact on the effects of the PMCS. This chapter provides a
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summary and discussion of the major results of the study as well as conclusions based on 
these findings. In addition, the limitations of the study are also highlighted and potential 
directions for future studies suggested.
7.1 TF PES Im pact on Dysfunctional Behaviour (Overall Effects on Quality 
Threatening Behaviour, & Intention to Turnover)
The study found that the style of use of PMCS as represented by a TF PES significantly 
increases dysfunctional behaviour, i.e. QTB, and also tends to increase IT. However, the 
significance of the positive impact on IT is sensitive to the way TF PES is measured.68 These 
results are in line with a priori expectations and thus provide additional evidence of the 
unintended negative consequences of PMCSs as also highlighted by previous studies (e.g. 
Hopwood, 1973; Hirst, 1981; 1983; Anthony and Govindarajan, 2004).
Furthermore, the study found that the level of QTB and IT does not differ between those 
whose performance measures are predominantly quantitative and those with predominantly 
non-quantitative measures. Focusing on the group with more quantitative performance 
measures, it was also found that the level of IT did not differ between those with 
predominantly financial measures and those with predominantly non-financial measures. On 
the other hand, the level of QTB was marginally more for those with predominantly 
quantitative financial measures than those with predominantly quantitative non-financial 
measures. However, QTB and IT levels of those evaluated using high TF PES that is based 
predominantly on financial measures did not differ from that of those evaluated using high TF 
PES based predominantly on quantitative non-financial measures. This implies that the impact 
of PMCSs on dysfunctional behaviour arises from the way performance measures are used, 
whether financial or non-financial, rather than the nature of the measures.
68 TF PES positive association with IT is significant using the alternate PES measures.
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Given that PMCSs are usually based mainly on financial measures, previous studies tend to 
suggest that the negative consequences of PMCSs are attributable to the predominant use of 
financial measures. Consequently, the widely proffered solution to these unintended negative 
consequences is the use of more non-financial measures as propagated in such performance 
management frameworks as the Balanced Scorecard etc. However, the findings of this study 
show that these unintended negative consequences of PMCSs are not attributable to the 
predominant use of financial measures. Rather, using financial and non-financial measures in 
the same way, i.e. in a TF PES, results in similar levels of dysfunctional behaviour. Thus, it is 
very doubtful that this much propagated remedy for the ills of PMCSs is effective, even as 
empirical evidence of the efficacy of this remedy is sparse.
7.2 Moderating and Mediating Influences on the Overall Effect on QTB & IT
Having established TF PES overall effect on QTB to be positive and significant, possible 
moderating and mediating influences on this effect were investigated in an attempt to unravel 
the mechanisms underpinning this strong positive association. However, none of the 
moderating variables examined were found to moderate TF PES impact on QTB, i.e. TF PES 
significantly increases QTB regardless of the level of GD, OHL, ICS, OC, or ST. This result, 
though contrary to expectations, indicate the strong negative effects of PMCSs on 
dysfunctional behaviour, although unintended. In a way the results are similar to the 
experimental study results of Schweitzer et al. (2002) where they found that use of targets in 
performance measurement and evaluation lead to unethical behaviour regardless of whether 
rewards where linked to achievement of the targets or not.
On the other hand, some mediating influences were found but the significance of these 
depended on how TF PES is measured. Using the primary TF PES measure, only GC
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significantly mediated, albeit partially, TF PES’s effect on QTB.69 The study found that GC 
partially suppresses TF PES s increase of QTB. Though TF PES has a strong positive impact 
on QTB, it also has a concurrent positive impact on GC and GC in turn has reduces QTB. 
Thus TF PES overall impact on QTB is actually smaller compared to the direct/residual 
impact on QTB. In other words, although TF PES has very strong positive impact on QTB, 
increasing managers commitment to their performance goals significantly reduces the level 
of QTB exhibited.
The other negative consequence of TF PES examined in this study is the impact on IT. As 
indicated above TF PES has a positive but insignificant overall effect on IT. The examination 
of possible moderating influences revealed 3 significant variables that moderate TF PES 
impact on IT viz. GD -  albeit marginally significant, ICS and ST. It was found that TF PES 
tends to increase IT when GD is high but tends to reduce IT when GD is low or moderate. 
However, TF PES significantly increases IT when ICS is low, but tends to reduce IT when 
ICS is high. On the other hand, it was found that TF PES significantly reduces IT when ST is 
high but tends to increase IT when ST is low or moderate. It is worth noting that ICS and ST 
are highly correlated (Pearson rho = .651, p  < .01 -  see Appendix 4). Low ICS implies that 
there is little interaction between superiors and their subordinates. Therefore there is less 
chance of exchanging job relevant information, and little opportunity to clarify expectations 
from both sides in the face of changing operating conditions. In addition, there appears to be 
low trust levels as well. It appears that TF PES much more encourages people to withdraw 
from the organisation under these conditions, i.e. low ICS, than when simply trust levels are 
low notwithstanding that ST is also low in such conditions. On the other hand, TF PES 
actually leads to lower IT when ST is high as higher ST levels, also promoted by high ICS, 
improves subordinates acceptance of the performance evaluation process.
69 Using the alternate PES measures, the impact o f  TF PES on QTB was found to be exerted both directly and 
indirectly via 3 mechanisms viz.: EFP, JRT, and JS. TF PES reduces EFP and JS, and lower levels o f EFP and JS 
in turn induces more QTB above levels directly attributed to TF PES. Also, TF PES increases JRT and htgher JRT 
in turn lead to more QTB than directly caused by TF PES. The results all show the strong impact o f TF PES on 
QTB.
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The examination of the possible mediating influences again shows GC to be a significant 
variable mediating the impact of TF PES on IT. But in this case, GC completely suppresses 
the impact of TF PES on IT. The study found that TF PES increases GC and GC in turn 
reduces IT such that the overall impact on IT is not significant and is smaller than the 
direct/residual impact of TF PES.
This finding, i.e. GC’s significant mediating role, underscores the heavy focus accorded 
budgetary participation in the budgetary control literature. Subordinates’ participation in 
setting their performance targets is thought to encourage higher performance as initially 
suggested by Argyris (1952). But it is also noted that this may be due to subordinates 
negotiating lower performance targets or building slack into the budget (Dunk and Mouri, 
1998; Merchant 1985b; Young, 1985). Moreover, it is also acknowledged that participation 
could be real or ‘pseudo’, thus effects of participation may differ from one research setting to 
another if it is real in one setting and artificial in the other. This is probably reflected in the 
conflicting empirical evidence of the effect of participation and evaluative style (see Table 
2-2: compare Brownell, 1982a, with Dunk, 1989; and Imosili, 1989; also compare Lau et al, 
1995; with Brownell & Dunk, 1989; and Brownell and Hirst, 1986). More recent findings 
show that participation leads to greater GC and GC leads to better performance (Chong and 
Chong, 2002; Wentzel, 2002). This study’s findings provide additional evidence that GC is a 
mechanism by which the effect of ‘real’ participation is transmitted. The study also extends 
previous studies in showing that GC also reduces dysfunctional behaviour. Moreover, 
whether participation is real or pseudo is not easily established using the popular measure of 
participation found in the MCS literature, even more so when used in a survey. 
Comparatively, GC can be more easily gauged using surveys and this further underscores its 
importance as a mediating influence on the effects of PMCSs. Thus it may be a fruitful
70 Using the alternate PES measures, EFP, JRT, and JS were also significant mediating variables with similar 
patterns o f  relationships as observed in the case o f QTB; i.e. TF PES reduces EFP and JS and lower EFP and JS in 
turn induces greater IT respectively. Also, TF PES increases JRT and higher JRT in turn increases IT.
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approach for future researchers to consider GC in studying the influence of participation on 
PMCSs’ effects.
7.3 Interplay of Moderating & Mediating Influences on PMCS’ Effect on QTB & IT
The study found no conclusive evidence of interplay of moderating and mediating variables 
influencing TF PES’s impact on QTB. While this is contrary to prior expectations, it however 
confirms the significance of TF PES positive impact on QTB as a serious, though unintended 
and perhaps unavoidable, negative consequence of using PMCSs. Nevertheless, an interesting 
pattern of relationships was found involving the mediating variable EFP and the moderating 
variable ICS. The findings suggest that EFP mediates TF PES’s impact on QTB depending on 
the level of ICS (i.e. a moderated mediation relationship given no moderation of the overall 
effects). It was found that TF PES significantly reduces EFP only when ICS is low, and that 
lower EFP in turn induces greater QTB beyond levels directly attributable to TF PES. In other 
words, when ICS is low, TF PES has a direct positive impact on QTB and also an indirect 
positive impact on QTB via EFP. But there is no significant indirect effect via EFP when ICS 
is high. It is also worth noting the positive and significant correlation between ICS and EFP 
(rho = .416, p  < .01 -  see Appendix 4). Thus it appears that while high ICS promotes what 
may be considered ‘normal’ operating conditions, low ICS certainly spells trouble as there is 
lower trust, and lower perceptions of equity and fairness which leads to greater dysfunctional 
behaviour among the workforce.
Similarly, the interplay of ICS and EFP was found to affect TF PES impact on IT, but this 
time the evidence is statistically significant. The overall positive impact of TF PES on IT is 
not apparent when analysed alone. However, this is shown to depend on the level of ICS as 
TF PES significantly increases IT when ICS is low, and tends to reduce it when ICS is high. 
Furthermore, the study found that this moderation effect of ICS is explained by EFP, i.e. TF
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PES evokes less EFP, but significantly more so when ICS' is low and lower EFP in tom 
increases IT. In contrast, when ICS is high, TF PES impact on IT is mitigated by higher EFP 
as TF PES tends to positively impact on EFP when ICS is high.
These results in relation to ICS give credence to Chenhall (2003) premise that MCSs focused 
on tight financial controls are systematically combined together with open and flexible 
interpersonal interactions in successful organisations. This premi.se suggests that flexible 
interpersonal communications mitigate the negative consequences of tight financial control. 
This study provides evidence showing the effects of the presence of, and also1 absence of, the 
combination of a target-focused PMCS with interactive use of control systems (ICS) and 'the 
mechanism underpinning this effect. Consequently, previous studies that failed to take into 
account the existence of such a control system package, i.e. combination of control system 
elements, may have under-specified models with the serious implication of spurious and 
inconsistent findings. Therefore this study extends the MCS literature, on one hand, in 
showing the effects of the combination of specific control system elements on behaviour. On 
the other hand, this study further extends the literature in identifying a mechanism that 
underpins the effects of such a control system package, as well as Mghfighting other 
mechanisms that do not explain these effects.
7.4 TF PES Im pact on Effort (EFF)
This study found some evidence of a curvilinear effect of TF PES on EFF such that TF PES 
positively impacts on EFF up to a point and subsequently the effect becomes negative. 
However, it was also found that this convex effect was not substantive though statistically 
significant. Nonetheless, the curvilinear relationship highlights the importance o f testing for
non-linear effects in MCS studies as most researchers simply model a linear relation between 
an element of a MCS and its consequences even when sometimes, theory suggests, otherwise.
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Finding a significant linear relationship in the first instance might not necessarily mean non­
linear relationships do not also hold without explicitly testing for such.
In addition, the study found that the linear impact of TF PES on EFF depends on the OHL. It 
was found that TF PES has a positive effect on EFF at higher OHLs, but tends to reduce EFF 
at middle and lower OHLs. This may also explain the overall negative but non-significant 
impact of TF PES on EFF. Thus while those at higher OHLs increase their effort in response 
to increased focus on targets, those at the lower OHL tend to reduce or simply maintain their 
effort level. This may be an indication that TF PES is perceived as the norm at low OHLs and 
increasing its intensity therefore tends to negatively affect effort, while at high OHLs the 
reverse holds. This view is supported by the study’s finding that more intense, i.e. high, TF 
PES is used more at low OHL and less intense TF PES at high OHL. It may be that at high 
OHL increasing the intensity of TF PES signals top management focus and/or ailing 
performance in line with Otley’s (1978) conjecture that difficult economic performance may 
lead to greater use of a PMCS in a target-focused sty le. Imosili (1989) also attributed the 
finding of little variation from a TF sty le of PMCS use in his research site to the difficult 
economic situation faced by the firm he studied.
Furthermore, the study found that GC completely mediates TF PES impact on EFF, i.e. the 
effect on EFF is indirect via GC, The pattern of effects is such that, as already discussed 
above, TF PES induces greater commitment towards goal achievement of performance goals, 
and then GC in turn leads to increased effort. This finding is in line with goal theory' 
predictions that greater commitment to a goal or target is associated with higher performance. 
In most of the theoretic models of the positive effect of specific goals on performance, both in 
accounting and psychology studies, effort Is always highlighted as the mechanism 
underpinning this relationship (see for e.g. Hirst, 198,/'a, Locke and Latham, 1990b). 
However, this mechanism is often not explicitly modelled and tested in the empirical 
accounting literature (Naylor and Ilgen, 1984). This study formally provides evidence
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supporting this premise. As before, this result also underscores the importance of GC as a 
mechanism by which many of the effects of PMCS is transmitted.
Examination of the interplay between moderating and mediating influences did not however 
reveal any significant relationship affecting TF PES impact on EFF. Thus TF PES engenders 
more effort higher up the hierarchy and this effect, regardless of the hierarchical level, is 
transmitted indirectly via increased commitment to goal achievement promoted by TF PES.
7.5 TF PES Im pact on Performance (Overall Effects on Managerial Performance 
& Actual Performance Rating)
The study found a positive and significant impact of TF PES on managerial performance 
(MP), irrespective of how TF PES is measured. However, the effect is linear and, contrary to 
expectations, no curvilinear relationship was found. Similarly, no curvilinear relationship 
between TF PES and actual performance rating (AP) was found, contrary to prior 
expectations. Rather, it was found that superiors’ rating of performance as low is associated 
with use of higher TF PES, particularly moving from a low to medium TF PES. Thus while 
subordinates perceived their performance levels to be improving as higher TF PES is 
employed, superiors on the other hand rated performance lower.
These results could be attributed to the tendency of superiors, and top management in general, 
to always expect higher performance levels compared to past performance levels, i.e. 
performance target ratcheting. Thus, though managers improve their performance as more 
emphasis is placed on achieving targets, this still falls short of superiors higher expectations 
leading to lower performance ratings. Such a phenomenon would always increase the pressure 
to perform which managers may seek to alleviate by resorting to more dysfunctional 
behaviour (i.e. QTB in this study) and then to social withdrawal (i.e. IT in the present study)
Chapter 7 Summary, Discussion, & Conclusion 262
when they feel less able to cope with the pressure. Thus the somewhat contradictory effect of 
TF PES on MP and AP, reflecting perhaps conflicting perceptions of performance between 
superiors and subordinates, may also partly explain the positive association between TF PES 
and dysfunctional behaviour.
Another plausible and similar explanation for the results can be based on Otley’s (1978) 
conjecture as mentioned in the previous section. Although performance evaluation happens 
later in the year, it is likely that managers monitor through the year subordinates they think 
are not confident or not performing well. For e.g. new subordinates may get closer and more 
detailed attention than older staff. Therefore managers conveying the PES may already have 
an idea of the performance rating they will award prior to the formal evaluation at the end of 
the year. And when they think someone is going to perform poorly a more intense, i.e. higher, 
TF PES may be used for the subordinate. This may actually lead to improvement in 
performance and indeed the subordinates think their performance is better although it may not 
improve enough to change their superiors’ belief. Notwithstanding the source, as it were, of 
such differences between managers and subordinates perception of performance, these 
differences may lead subordinates to engage in greater dysfunctional behaviour and social 
withdrawal.
7.6 Moderating and Mediating Influences on the Overall Effect on MP
The examination of possible moderating influences on TF PES impact on AP revealed no 
significant moderation effect. On the hand, the study found that TF PES effect on MP 
depends on the level of goal difficulty (GD). It was found that the positive effect on MP is 
substantial and significant when the level of GD is low or moderate but almost absent when 
GD is high. In addition, it was found that TF PES effect on MP also depends on the level of
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organisational commitment (OC) such that the effect is significant when OC is low and 
moderate, but not significant when OC is high - although the effect is still positive.
These results imply that having specific targets to aim for does provide managers motivation 
to improve their performance as does emphasis on achieving targets in performance 
evaluation. However, increasing focus on achieving targets coupled with low to moderate 
levels of GD more positively affects performance than when coupled with high GD. These 
findings provide some support to Merchant and Manzoni (1989) finding that, in the context of 
emphasis on achieving budget targets, setting highly achievable targets provide considerable 
challenge with many other benefits including improved motivation, resource planning, 
control, as well as reduced risk of dysfunctional behaviour. It appears therefore that TF PES 
and GD may have substitutionary effects such that focus on goals could be achieved either by 
making it difficult or by showing much interest in the goal. But combining both means might 
be an overkill which does not help and actually hinder -  considering that TF PES leads to 
increased intention to turnover when GD is also high. In addition, TF PES stimulates more 
motivation to improve performance when OC is low than when high perhaps because it 
focuses the mind more on achieving targets, i.e. it provides more motivation in low OC 
conditions. Consequently, given that OC is usually boosted by offering higher rewards, these 
results suggest that doing so while employing high TF PES is more effective when OC is low 
and than when OC is high.. This result corroborates Chong and Eggleton’s (2007) finding that 
a heavy reliance on incentive based compensation schemes provides more motivation to 
improve performance when OC is low and has no effect on performance when OC is high.
Furthermore, none of the mediating variables investigated significantly mediated TF PES 
effect on MP suggesting the effect is all direct. But when the interplay of moderating and 
mediating influences was considered, the study found that the impact of TF PES on MP when 
GD is high is entirely mediated by GC. As noted earlier, the combination of TF PES and GD 
leads to greater IT and also leads to lower MP. However, the negative impact on MP is not so
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significant because GC is equally increased by TF PES, regardless of GD levels, and GC in 
turn has a counteracting positive and significant impact on MP. Thus individual’s attachment 
to and determination to reach a goal increases with more focus on achieving targets, and this 
completely suppresses the otherwise negative impact of PMCS on performance when 
performance targets are set at a difficult level. In other words, if for some reason GC is low 
and unaffected by TF PES, then combining high focus on targets with difficult target levels 
not only increases dysfunctional behaviour but also negatively affects performance. Again 
this highlights GC as an important mechanism that mediates the effects of PMCSs.
7.7 OH L as an Antecedent o f TF PES
This study also investigated the impact of hierarchical levels on the way PMCSs are used. The 
findings show that similar levels of quantitative performance measures are used across 
different organisational hierarchical levels (OHLs). However, more quantitative non-financial 
information is used more extensively at lower OHLs, while financial measures which are 
more aggregate measures of performance is used more extensively at higher OHLs. As 
discussed in the theory and hypothesis development Section 3.4.2, financial information is 
somewhat more predictable than non-financial measures as it reflects aggregate actions of 
many lower level subordinates. More extensive use of such information at higher OHL may 
be because it is seen as ameliorating the difficulty in measuring performance at higher OHLs 
posed by the non-programmability of tasks and the longer action-results time frame. 
Nonetheless, though more emphasis is placed on financial measures at higher hierarchical 
levels, the positive and negative consequences of TF PES is similar whether based mainly on 
financial or non-financial measures as already discussed in Section 7.2. Equally, TF PES 
effects are similar across OHLs except that TF PES elicits greater effort at higher compared to 
lower OHLs. Thus, the use of PMCS based mainly on financial control at higher OHLs is not 
the source of the negative unintended effects associated with PMCS; rather it is the way in
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which it is used. Therefore it suggests that the call by the Beyond Budgeting proponents to 
abandon financial control altogether is not entirely warranted.
7.8 O ther Findings -  Gender Differences
The study found that female workers exerted more effort in their work than men. Though this 
may be due to men’s general tendency to underrate the effort they put into any activity, 
gender differences were further explored using means t-tests for the variables found to 
correlate significantly with gender (see Appendix 4). This exploratory analysis revealed that, 
in addition to women reporting their effort levels to be higher; they also perceived their 
performance goals to be less difficult (t -  2.89,/? < .01); they had more frequent contact with 
supervisors (/ = -1.86, p < . 10); they were more in number at the lower hierarchical levels (t = 
3.38, p  < .01) thus lower in number at higher levels; and they had longer tenures at current 
grades (/ = -2.18, p  < .05). These results corroborate the findings made by Hunton et al. 
(1996) in their study of hierarchical and gender differences among accountants in private 
manufacturing companies. They found that female accountants were greater in number at 
lower hierarchical levels while males were greater at higher levels. They also found that 
female accountants had longer tenure at each hierarchical level except at the highest level 
where they had similar tenures with males. Given that females are more in number at lower 
OHLs, it suggests that these are young women since most people at lower OHLs in this firm 
are young going by the demographic information. Thus the differences observed between 
males and females in this study considered together, and in the light of the Hunton et al. s 
study, raise interesting research questions; i.e. why are there fewer women in the upper 
hierarchies of accounting firms, are ‘glass ceilings for women in these sort of firms? Put 
another way; are there gender discriminations in accounting firms, and if so what factors 
account for it?
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7.9 Key Contributions and Conclusions
The use of performance and management and control systems (PMCSs), particularly' those 
based on budgetary' control, in performance evaluation was widely documented in early 
empirical studies of the late 1970’s to 1990’s. It has been quite awhile since these early 
studies and control practices have changed since then, e.g. budgets are not singularly as 
important as they used to be. It would appear that targets in general have been substituted for 
budgets, but there is not much empirical evidence on how managers use these performance 
targets and its consequences. It is not obvious that what was previously documented on the 
sty le of use of control systems is still as perv asive now. Therefore this study contributes to the 
literature in expanding Hopwood’s original concept to the use of targets more generally, not 
just financial budgets, and thus provides a broader framework for study ing PES.
Targets or goals may be seen as simpler than budgets and easier to control, as such there may 
or may not be dysfunctional behaviour associated with their use. Moreover, goal theory' only 
focuses or acknowledges the positive side of using targets. However, it must be recognised 
that the use of PMCS in a target focused (TF) manner, as is often the case, has both a positive 
and a ‘dark’ side. Consequently, focusing on only the positiv e or negativ e effects of a PMCS 
does not inform an organisation of the full consequences and thus how organisational 
participants’ behaviour and performance are best managed. This study contributes to the 
literature in providing empirical evidence that use of performance targets in a TF PES not 
only encourages better performance but also leads to more dysfunctional behaviour. Thus, it 
is more needful to identify those factors or conditions that affect the way PMCS s use both 
positively as well as negatively affects the behaviour and performance of organisational 
participants, and how they interrelate in affecting the eventual consequences of PMCSs.
Previous PMCS studies, particularly those focused on audit service areas of accounting firms, 
document a significant positive association between goal difficulty' and dysfunctional
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behaviour but do not document significant associations between PES and dysfunctional 
behaviour (e.g. Otley and Pierce, 1996a). This may lead managers not to consider PES as 
being as important as the difficulty of the performance targets they set. The findings of this 
study indicate that they should. High levels of target difficulty elicit dysfunctional behaviour 
irrespective of the level of TF PES, just as high TF PES equally does irrespective of the level 
of target difficulty. And though the wider budgetary' control literature associates dysfunctional 
behaviour with high TF PES based mainly on financial targets, the study’s findings indicate 
that high TF PES whether based on financial measures or quantitative non-financial measures 
had similar effects on dysfunctional behaviour. This has implications for practice. Employing 
a plethora of non-financial performance measures may not ydeld the dividends of significantly 
curbing short-termism among managers, as is popularly promoted in the literature, if these 
measures are used in the same high TF PES as the financial targets tend to be used. Thus 
managers still need to bear in mind that the way performance measures are used impacts on 
behaviour much more than just the effect of the nature of the measures.
Suggestions have been made in the literature that the type of responsibility centre studied may 
explain some of the inconsistent results of earlier studies (Otley, 1978; Brownell, 1982a). The 
responsibility centres these authors studied represented different hierarchical levels in that 
each study’s sampled organisational members were at, equivalently, different hierarchical 
levels. This pointed to possible differences in both the use and the consequences of PMCS at 
different hierarchical levels. However, subsequent studies have focused investigation of 
PMCS at a single hierarchical level and type of responsibility' centre with little comparison 
between responsibility centres or hierarchical levels. Thus, empirical evidence on the effect of 
OHL on the use of PMCSs is still relatively scarce, as is evidence on any differences in the 
consequences of the way PMCS is used at different OHLs. In this regard, this study 
contributes to the PMCS literature in providing empirical evidence indicating that the nature 
of performance measures used differs between OHLs, and that the predominant style of use of 
PMCS also differ at different OHLs. The study shows that more financial measures or targets
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are predominantly used at higher OHLs but in a lesser TF PES, while non-financial measures 
are predominantly employed at lower OHLs but in a more TF PES.
Even more interesting is the finding that higher TF PES seems to have more positive effects 
on effort, and possibly performance, at higher OHL than at lower OHL. But at the same time 
it does not have different effects on dysfunctional behaviour at different OHL. On the one 
hand, these findings support the contingency theory of control systems in that the nature of 
performance measures and the manner in which PMCS is used may be contingent on OHL. 
But on the other hand, it also shows both similar and dissimilar effects of using PMCSs in a 
TF PES at different OHLs. This perhaps further highlights the conflicting equilibrium 
assumptions encountered in the literature in using the theory to inform empirical 
investigations. If equilibrium conditions are assumed, then differences in effects of TF PES 
would not be expected, as observed in relation to dysfunctional behaviour, and one could 
conclude that the dominant PES observed at different OHLs is appropriate for those levels. 
On the other hand, if disequilibrium is assumed then differences in effects of PES would be 
expected as also observed in relation to effort and performance, and one could conclude that 
TF PES is more appropriate at higher OHL. Therefore managers need to bear in mind some of 
these complexities while trying to apply contingency theory motivated research findings in 
their work situations.
Recent changes in the accounting firm environment show that the use of control systems in a 
more interactive manner is becoming more visible than before. Few empirical PMCS studies 
employ Simons’ model of interactive control systems, framed in this study as interactive use 
of controls (ICS). The few that do so only apply the concept in examining control systems at 
top management levels. However, ICS could also be in operation at lower managerial levels 
and this study demonstrates the application of this concept at these levels, as well as at top 
management levels. Hopefully, this opens the door for future studies to consider how these 
systems apply at lower organisational levels. Furthermore, few studies consider the
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combination of different aspects of the control systems and the possible impact of this on 
work performance and behaviour. Calls have been made in the literature for PMCS studies to 
consider the effects of combination of control system features (Chenhall, 2003). Thus this 
study contributes to the literature in answering this call by investigating the consequences of 
such combination of control systems features often examined separately, i.e. the interaction of 
ICS and TF PES. The findings from this investigation also give credence to such calls, as it 
reveals that while a high TF PES elicits dysfunctional behaviour, combining it with a high 
ICS seems to mitigate such behavioural responses. Given that ICS is a key control system 
feature, the absence or presence of such combination of control system features may also 
partly explain some of the conflicting findings of previous studies.
Another key contribution of this study is the application of a relatively new analytical strategy 
in examining the complex relationships between control systems and behaviour, as well as 
performance. This study demonstrates the application of the mediated moderation, and the 
moderated mediation, analytical strategy to management accounting research. By employing 
this regression based analytical strategy it was possible to tease out some of the complexities 
in the relationships examined. It is hoped that this demonstration makes the strategy more 
accessible to management accounting researchers and that future studies will be able apply it 
in investigating the complexities of the impact of PMCS thus enhancing our understanding of 
these relationships.
7.10 Study Lim itations
One major limitation often cited against a case study of a single organisation is 
generalizability to other settings, and this limitation also applies to this study. However, to the 
extent that findings of the study support prior theories and empirical evidence from previous 
studies this limitation or critique does not really hold much weight. Another limitation of the 
study lies in the inherent limitations imposed by the data collection method. The accuracy of
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data collected via surveys, whether web or mail based, is affected by a number of factors 
including coverage, sampling, measurement, and non-response issues. However, effort was 
made to address these issues in this study. For instance coverage and measurement error are 
not much of an issue by the fact that the target sample was pre-identified and the 
questionnaire rigorously developed from prior discussions with the target organisation. Then 
series of pilot tests were conducted, both outside and within the case organisation, before the 
survey was deployed. However, it is felt that the inability' to discuss the results of the study 
with some of the respondents limits the insight that can be drawn from the findings of the 
study.
In this study, differences in PES between different organisational hierarchical levels (OHLs) 
was investigated, as well as differences in the impact of PES on behaviour and performance at 
different OHLs. Similarly, differences in demographics and in the criterion variables 
examined in this study between the lines of serv ice (LOS) were also examined. However, 
there was no examination of possible differences between different OHLs within each LOS 
on account mainly of sample size limitations. It is possible that there might be differences that 
are significant enough to impact on the results. For example, the models examined here might 
have different explanatory' powers at different OHL in each LOS. The focus on one LOS and 
on one or two adjacent OHLs by previous empirical studies of accounting firms may have 
been informed by the desire to control for possible differences between LOS and across 
OHLs. These diversities might have also contributed to the low explanatory power of some of 
the single moderator models, although this also implies that the effects observed in this study 
may be much stronger than indicated without these diversities. Therefore, the results reported 
in this study should be interpreted bearing this limitation in mind.
In addition, it has to be noted that the process of gaining access impacted on the study to some 
degree. For example, the need to reduce the survey items and changes made to the wording of
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some of the survey items to accommodate the interests of the case organisation limited the 
ability to investigate other related issues of interest, and shaped some of the hypotheses. 
Nonetheless, this process also enhanced the study in helping to sharpen the study’s focus, and 
in enabling the use of shorter survey items with minimal loss of reliability as indicated by the 
reliability statistics of the concepts measured.
While much care was taken to ensure that respondents correctly interpret the survey items 
through pre-survey interviews and various pilot tests of the survey instrument, one cannot 
absolutely assure this consistency among respondents to the survey. For instance, did 
respondents consistently make the correct distinction between financial and non-financial 
measures in answering the related question? Those interviewed and comments received 
during the pilot tests did not express any ambiguity in making such distinction. Nevertheless, 
some measures are inherently ambiguous in that it is difficult to neatly classify these as 
financial or non-financial. For example time budgets are generally perceived as non-financial 
but these can be argued to be the same as the financial cost budgets they underpin. Equally, 
are sales revenues financial measures or the representation of the sales volumes underpinning 
them, which would be regarded as non-financial measures? Thus there are sometimes 
significant overlaps in categorising performance measures as financial or non-financial, which 
may have been encountered this study. This should also be borne in mind while interpreting 
the results of the study.
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7.11 Recom m endations for Future Studies
A number of factors suspected as influencing the effects of PMCS use on behaviour and 
performance were investigated in this study. Some of the factors were found to have 
significant influences while others did not. Yet these are by no means the only factors that 
could exert influences on the effects of PMCS use. Using the approach and analytical 
strategies employed in this study, future researchers can test for significance of other factors 
they can identify from the MCS literature and other literature. Furthermore, future researchers 
can also model the significant factors found in this study, as well as other studies, to test 
which of these better explains or has greater influence on the impact of PMCS use. In this 
regard, the SEM technique, which is still a relatively unpopular technique in management 
accounting research, would be very valuable. The study also uncovered possible gender 
discrimination within professional accounting firms. Future researchers could examine this 
issue further to substantiate if gender discrimination is widespread in these type of firms, and 
if so identify the reasons behind it and how this might bear on use and consequences of 
PMCSs.
Appendix 1 Sample o f  Introductory Letter





Dear M r ....
RE: Aligning Performance Management Systems with Strategic Objectives
As part o f an on-going programme of work at the Lancaster University Management School 
(LUM S). I am investigating the effects o f various performance management systems on the 
im plem entation o f  strategic objectives My current study is investigating
•  The role o f performance management systems, how they are used and the factors that 
influence this process: and
• How managers balance multiple measures of performance in the implementation o f 
strategic objectives, with particular reference to performance evaluation practices and its 
consequences: and
• The different ways in which systems are used by managers at different organizational 
levels
Following the recent takeover of Bank NA by RS Group, it occurred to me that you probably 
have two distinct systems that you may be in the process of combining. It would therefore be 
o f  considerable interest to observe and document these systems. I realise that such a project 
would involve the time of your staff, but I would hope that there would be considerable 
benefit to yourselves in studying
• How your systems work in practice and your employees' general perception o f and 
reaction to the systems in place: and
• How thev compare to other firms systems, with possible suggestions for change
I would intend to carry our the work with the assistance of a doctoral researcher at LUMS. Mr. 
Valentine Lruruka. Before joining the research programme at LUMS. Mr. Ururuka had 
completed an MSc in Accounting and Financial Management with distinction and as the best 
student o f 2001 m this Department. Prior to tins, he had worked for 6 years with Citibank in 
N igeria after his First degree.
If  this study is o f interest to you. I should be pleased to discuss the matter further, either with 
vourself or with whomever you would wish to nominate. Perhaps your secretary could let me 
know (by e-mail on d.otlev@lancs.ac.uk) of a suitable time to telephone you, or to arrange to 
visit.
Yours sincerely.
Professor David Otley 
Department o f Accounting & Finance,
Lancaster University Management School.
Lancaster, LAI 4YX, UK
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Appendix 2: Introductory Email to ABC LLP
From: Otley, David 




P ... G ... has passed your note to me as the person interested in a possible project with ABC 
LLP. First let me introduce myself. I am David Otley and am Professor of Management & 
Accounting in the Lancaster University Management School, with major research interests in 
the operation of management control and performnace management system s, including their 
inter-relationship with performance appraisal and remuneration systems. Incidently, I am also  
Senior Moderator for the ICAEW Advanced Stage examinations, with a particular interest in 
the final case  study examination.
My specific motivation for looking for a contact is that I currently have a bright PhD student 
(Valentine Ururuka, a Nigerian who has work experience in banking, and who completed a 
distinction level Masters degree with us at Lancaster recently) who is formulating a project for 
his PhD research. There is som e flexibility still in what he plans to do, but it will involve the 
differing ways in which control is exercised and performance is managed, paying particular 
attention to difference at different hierarchical levels. It will also involve studying how the 
conflicts bewteen short-term and longer-term performance are identified and managed in 
practice. However, there would be significant scope for this to be formulated in a way that 
addresses issue in which ABC LLP might currently be interested.
Perhaps the best way forward might be for us to meet to explore whether there are 
possibilities for a mutual collaboration that might benefit us both. I am in London fairly 
frequently, so  I hope we can arrange a convenient date. One possibility at present is Wed 29  
Septem ber another would be in the pm of 7 October (or the 6th or 8th even). Or on whatever 
later dates are convenient for yourself.




Lancaster University Management School
Lancaster LA1 4YX, UK.
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